THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

THE PROPHETIC MISSION OF HENRI DE LUBAC
A STUDY OF HIS THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
AND
ITS FUNCTION IN THE RENEWAL OF THEOLOGY

A DISSERTATION

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INTRODUCTION

Our age is an age of change. This change, however, is not something accidental as in past ages for it is not simply the transition from one culture to another culture, Rather, it is a change to a culture whose chief characteristic is change itself. Our present and future culture is the opposite of everything static and fixed. It is a culture produced by a creative technology, an expanding economy and a dynamic psychology. Where the old culture looked to the past to tradition the new culture looks at the present to create its own future.

In such an age, more than any other in the past, the Church must change. This cannot mean a change in essentials, although some things which seemed essential in the past may not seem so in the future, but it must mean renewal and adaptation related to the needs of modern man. In fact, in our age of radical change, the Church faces the need of continuous renewal and continuous adaptation.

The Second Vatican Council is a momentous step toward renewal. It is not, however, the final word but only the beginning. How, then, should future renewal proceed? Perhaps an insight can be gathered from the example of Pope John XXIII for he is the symbol of renewal in our times. Henri de Lubac movingly describes John and his accomplishment in the following passage:

> Good Pope John never changed, he never abandoned his simplicity nor lost his equilibrium; he continued to dwell peacefully "on the quiet and safe sea of the Will of God." But, while living this humble existence, the Spirit, attracted by this fidelity one day passed over him--the true Spirit of God, the sole Inspirer of an authentic renewal. A great prophetic breath awakened, so to speak, the whole Church. It overflowed, and while the good Pope found, without having sought it, the way to the heart of men of today, it was everywhere evident in the world that the Church was once again alive.[1]

Although "a great prophetic breath" was joined to the highest authority of the Church in the person of Pope John, the two are not necessarily tied together in one man. The prophetic spirit is always ultimately within the context of ecclesiastical authority, but there is no guarantee that ecclesiastical authority will be prophetic. In a general way, the entire People of God share by the Spirit in the prophetic office of Christ.[2] By the same Spirit they bear witness to the faith of the Saints, penetrate that faith "more deeply by accurate insights" and apply it "more thoroughly to life."[3] In a more particular sense, the "prophetic" is one of the special gifts or graces which the Spirit distributes "among the faithful of every rank."[4] The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church describes these gifts as follows:

> By these gifts He (Holy Spirit) makes them fit and ready to undertake the various tasks or offices advantageous for the renewal and upbuilding of the Church. . . . These charismatic gifts, whether they be the most outstanding or the more simple and widely diffused, are to be

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[1] Henri de Lubac, S.J., "Meditation on the Church," Vatican II an Interfaith Appraisal, Ed. by John H. Miller, C.S.C. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 265-266.

[2] "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," The Documents of Vatican II, Ed. by Walter Abbott, S.J. (New York: The America Press, 1966), p. 29.

[3] Ibid., p. 30.

[4] Ibid.

> received with thanksgiving and consolation, for they are exceedingly suitable and useful for the needs of the Church.[5]

What is this "prophetic" gift which contributes to "the renewal and upbuilding of the Church"? It is a special participation in the prophetic office of Christ and of the People of God whereby a reflective Christian, be he priest or layman, theologian or mystic, penetrates the word of God and perceives the relevance of that word to his own day. This prophetic gift has unique significance for the theologian because by his very profession he shares in the prophetic or teaching mission of the Church. It is his prophetic calling to contemplate the word of God, to be attentive to the questions which men are asking in the world and then to ask these questions at the living center of faith.

The emphasis on this prophetic dimension of theology is of recent vintage, because few theologians in modern times, have been aware of bringing a prophetic consciousness to their task. Theological endeavours have generally been marked by sterile historicism and dry mechanical repetitions of formulas long since without meaning or power.[6] Theological writings generally have shown little evidence of any attempt to come to grips with the burning questions and unfilled needs of modern man. All to often, theologians have been separated from modern man, and this situation has led them to become introspective and prophets of the past.

There have been, however, a handful of theologians, who have reemphasized the prophetic dimension of theology. Of these, none has contributed to this prophetic revival more than Henri de Lubac. In the words of K. Rahner, he is one of those who "say something to us which we in our time have not considered at all or not closely enough, about reality itself."[7] For de Lubac has been a theologian asking the questions which the modern world is asking, and at a time when few theologians had the insight or the fortitude to ask them.

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[5] Ibid.

[6] See Karl Rahner, S.J., "The Prospects for Dogmatic Theology," Theological Investigations, Vol. I, Trans. by Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), pp. 1-18.

It is the purpose of this study to underline the prophetic mission of Henri de Lubac. Accordingly, this dissertation will attempt to show how de Lubac, in the exercise of his prophetical office, by the instrumentality of theological anthropology, has helped to renew the prophetical dimension of theology as well as theology itself. There will be an examination of de Lubac's anthropology because it is in the area of Christian anthropology that de Lubac finds the key to renewal. The first chapter will deal with the vertical direction of this anthropology, that is, man and his relationship to the supernatural. The second chapter will trace the theological reaction and development triggered by this vertical anthropology. The third chapter will present de Lubac's anthropology in its horizontal direction, that is man and his relationship to the world. The last chapter will endeavour to show the relationship between de Lubac's Christian anthropology and the prophetic dimension of theology.

Anthropology and Theology

In contemporary theological circles there is an increasing emphasis on the need for a more anthropocentric theology,[8] and thus for a more anthropological theology. In other words, there is an awareness that theology must be relevant to modern man if it is to fulfill its function and it cannot do this by reducing theology to the study of truths in themselves, apart from man. Y. Congar, for example, states that there can be "no 'theology for man' without an 'anthropology for God'".[9]

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[7] Ibid., p. 10.

[8] C.-J. Geffré, O.P., "Les courants actuels de la recherche en théologie," VSS, No. 80 (Février, 1967), p. 15. Cf. Karl Rahner, S.J., "Theology and Anthropology," The Word in History, Ed. by T. Patrick Burke (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1966), pp. 1-23.

To underline the importance of anthropology in relation to theology is to emphasize the importance of man in regard to revelation. Moreover, the relation of anthropology to theology immediately raises the theological question of the fundamental relationship of man to God and the analogous problem of nature and grace. How is man related to God? Is he naturally oriented to the supernatural or does the supernatural come from without as an extrinsic imposition? Is there a harmony of nature and grace or is there a radical unrelatedness of the two whereby the natural is a self-sufficient order completely independent of the supernatural?

The manner in which a theologian answers these questions will depend very much on his philosophic concept of man. If his anthropology is strictly essentialist his answers will tend towards an "extrinsecism" in which nature and grace appear as two clearly defined abstract essences which are self-enclosed and which have no necessary relation. If, on the other hand, a theologian conceives of man existentially (as he is in the concrete) his solution will tend towards an "intrinsecism" (for want of a better word) in which man and the supernatural, nature and grace, are seen in an "inseparable" interrelation. The terms "essentialism" and "existentialism" are only used here to represent philosophical tendencies and not absolute positions within the sphere of theology. Any absolute usage would raise difficulties and problems that are beyond the scope of this study.

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[9] Yves Congar, O.P., "Christ in the Economy of Salvation and in our Dogmatic Tracts," Concilium, Vol. II: Who is Jesus of Nazareth?, Ed. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P. (Glen Rock, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1966), p. 22.

It is interesting to note that the anthropology of Thomas (which de Lubac interpreted in a more existential fashion and made the key to his own anthropology), is a combination of Augustine and Aristotle or the existential and essential tendencies. To overemphasize the Aristotelian in Thomas, as some theologians appear to have done, is to lose sight of the Augustinian or existential dimension of his anthropology. For Augustine, as M. F. Sciacca writes,

> Man is the totality of his vital and spiritual activities. His tending towards God is not therefore simply one of knowing, but is at the same time one of loving. . . .[10]

Hence, the purpose of Thomas, according to A. Pegis,

> . . . was to give a proper metaphysical grounding to the teaching of Augustine. To fill the Aristotelian bottle of matter and form with the life of the Augustinian wayfarer (spiritual pilgrim) was to create a new reality. The notion of man as an incarnated intelligence. This is a thomistic creation, which, as such, has no predecessors but which expresses in the language of metaphysics what St. Augustine had expressed in the language of history.[11]

It is an indication of the prophetic genius of de Lubac that he saw in the anthropology of Augustine and Thomas that existential dimension which had been obscured in the course of the centuries. He saw also that the revival of the existential dimension was a key to a revitalized anthropology and a renewed theology.[12]

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[10] M.F. Sciacca, Saint Augustin et le neoplatonisme (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1954), p. 58.

[11] Anton C. Pegis, At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 54-55.

[12] Cf. J.B. Metz, "The Theological World and the Metaphysical World," PT, X, No. 4/4. This is a very important article which treats implicitly the heart of de Lubac's concern viz. the historical or the existential as the meeting-place of theology and metaphysics. In the same stream as K. Rahner,

Influences on de Lubac

Henri de Lubac was born in 1896 and entered the Society of Jesus in 1929. Since the nineteen-thirties he has functioned as professor of the history of religions on the Jesuit theological faculty at Lyon-Fourviere. A great patristic scholar and singularly versed in Augustine, he is the co-editor with J. Danielou of the Sources chretiennes, a series of translations of the Fathers. While he is undoubtedly a speculative theologian, he has not attempted a comprehensive or systematic investigation of theology. Rather, in genuinely prophetic fashion, he has given his attention to those areas of theology which the contemporary scene tended to point out as in most need of rethinking and renewal. Among contemporary French theologians, he is considered "the symbol of the theological revival itself."[13]

The men of modern times whose thought has influenced de Lubac have themselves been prophetic voices in the twentieth century. Maurice Blondel,

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Metz shows that it is impossible for the Christian metaphysician to be primarily concerned with the abstract. "The man who enters metaphysics within the horizon of the historical and existence-founding Christian logos does so by reflecting on himself from a certain point of view. He is orientated not primarily toward thing-relationships but toward existence-relationships that are historically unique. He sees himself not as a static world-reason but as subjectivity which in freedom (before God) definitively binds and perfects himself. His way of thinking is not cosmocentric but anthropocentric. Thus we see in the Christian metaphysics of the middle ages the beginnings of the great change from Greek cosmocentrism to anthropocentrism, from objectivity to subjectivity, or better from an objectively ontic to a transcendental-ontological understanding of the subject, from nature to history, from abstract to concrete universality, from the static thing in space to the person in time." (p. to 259.)

[13] James M. Connolly, The Voices of France (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 82.

the French philosopher is certainly one of them.[14] Blondel was a Christian phenomenologist who attempted to build a bridge between philosophy and Christianity.[15] Augustinian in spirit, his philosophy began with action.[16] He taught that if a man is faithful to human action in all of its aspects (thinking, willing and doing) and all of its internal dynamism, then, as J. Macquarrie says,

> . . . it becomes clear that the contrast (between action and its realization) cannot be overcome within the natural order. Thus man is directed from the natural to the supernatural by the demands of action itself.[17]

Thus, we can see already in Blondel one of the basic aims of de Lubac: the restoration of the harmony of nature and grace.

Two other figures who have been influenced in varying degrees by Blondel and who in turn have had effect on de Lubac are J. Maréchal[18] and P. Rousselot. De Lubac specifically indicates his indebtedness to the philosophy of Maréchal in the area of apologetics where he applies Maréchal's idea of the dynamic finality of the mind to the search for God.[19]

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[14] Henri Bouillard, S.J., "L'intention fondamentale de Maurice Blondel et la theologie," RSR, XXXVI (1949), 370. See also, Bouillard, Blondel et le christianisme (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1961). This latter work is probably the best commentary on Blondel.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 321.

[16] Cf. Maurice Blondel, L'Action (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1893). An article in English which best captures the spirit of Blondel is: Albert Poncelet, S.J., "The Christian Philosophy of Maurice Blondel," IPQ, V (1965), 564-93.

[17] John Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 174.

[18] Bouillard, "L'intention fondamentale. . .", p. 352.

[19] Henri de Lubac, S.J., The Discovery of God, Trans. by Alexander Dru (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1960), p. 89. Also, see *supra*, Chapter IV, esp. p. 14. The work of Maréchal which pertains here is: Joseph Maréchal, S.J., Le point de depart de la metaphysique, Vol. V (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1949).

Rousselot's L'intellectualisme de s. Thomas[20] is the most important single influence on de Lubac according to de Lubac's own testimony.[21] Rousselot was the earliest (1908) to incorporate the Blondelian insights into the Thomistic tradition.[22] In answer to the epistemological question of how the intellect can be the faculty of the real, Rousselot said:

> Intelligence, for St. Thomas, is the faculty of the real, but it is the faculty of the real only because it is the faculty of the divine.[23]

Furthermore, he argued:

> Taking the beatific vision itself into account we see that, instead of representing a violent stretching of intelligence beyond its reach, a development of the principles of St. Thomas leads to the view that it is the capacity we enjoy for this vision, being the only common basis for differentiating the different aptitudes of intelligence, which defines intelligence itself. Intellect is the faculty of being in general because it is the faculty of the Infinite Being.[24] (italics added)

The manner in which the ideas of Rousselot were translated by de Lubac into the area of nature-grace theology is the subject of the chapter which follows immediately.

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[20] Pierre Rousselot, S.J., L'intellectualisme de s. Thomas (Paris: Beauchesne, 1924). English translation: Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, Trans. by James O'Mahoney (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935).

[21] See Appendix A, Letter of Henri de Lubac to the writer.

[22] Frederick Scott, "Blondel and Rousselot," NS XXXVI (1962), p. 334.

[23] Rousselot, p. 2.

[24] Ibid., p. 48.

CHAPTER I

SURNATUREL: MAN AND THE SUPERNATURAL

The most radical concern of theology is man's relationship to the supernatural. It lies at the heart of man's self-understanding and his belief: the mystery of divine life and his own sharing in that life. It is a concern which precedes all of these realities and yet abides at their center. This relationship is something dynamic and mysterious and so it is not surprising that the various attempts to formulate it have often led to theological errors or distortions with grave consequences for religious piety and practice. Man's relation with the supernatural has been the heart of various theological controversies throughout the centuries. Augustine and the Pelagians encountered it under the title of freedom and grace. The scholastics debated the natural desire for the beatific vision. The sixteenth century struggled over nature and grace. Today, modern theologians deal with man and the supernatural, or more simply, the problem of the supernatural.

The supernatural is certainly a problem, if not the problem of contemporary theology,[1] for the modern world either questions its very existence or totally disregards it. To modern man, the supernatural seems distant and unrelated; beyond experiment and experience; an unnecessary hypothesis for explaining the human condition. Now, this current attitude towards the supernatural did not suddenly happen; on the contrary, it has been long in the making and its sources are as multiple as its history is complex. Historically, the rise of technology, with its scientific method and empirical approach to reality, provided the conditions for such a mental horizon.[2] Philosophically, Kantian dualism distinguished pure reason from practical reason and in the process left the supernatural outside the realm of the verifiable activity of the intellect.[3] This led to the separation of the natural from the supernatural by the nineteenth century rationalists. Gradually, deemphasis led to the abandonment of the supernatural altogether.

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[1] See Zoltan Alszeghy, "La Teologia dell'ordine sopranaturale," G, XXXI (1950), 414.

Theology also shared responsibility for this development. Perhaps theologians had left the impression that scientists and philosophers were alone responsible for the break with the supernatural: that theologians were innocent if not impeccable in such matters. (Perhaps they had no feelings of guilt regarding the passing of the supernatural.) De Lubac challenged such self righteousness and forced them to examine the record to discover that scientists and philosopers were not alone in their sins.

In the year 1946, de Lubac's famous Surnaturel[4] appeared on the scene.

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[2] Joseph Wood Krutch for example, describes the impact of the scientific mentality on the American scene at the turn of the century and later, in The Modern Temper (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1956), p. 44: ". . . [many] had come instinctively to assume that the universe was a single continuity whose phenomena, from the crystallization of salt on through the transports of romantic love or the profoundest experiences of mystical religion, were all subject to investigation by the same methods."

[3] Gustave Weigel, "Historical Background of the Encyclical Humani Generis, TS, XII (1951), 210. See, also, Roger Aubert, Le problème de l'acte de foi (Louvain: E. Warny, 1958), pp. 104 + 228.

[4] Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel (Paris: Aubier, 1946).

Few theological works in recent years have caused as much reaction as this book. It provoked a controversy which has not completely subsided even in our day. Many, if not most, of the critics disagreed with de Lubac's conconclusions in whole or in part, and for different reasons, but all were forced to look at the problem of the supernatural in a new light, and gradually the course of theology has been altered.[5] Even the critics who were in disagreement with the interpretations and judgments of the author were in admiration of his painstaking research, and masterful handling of the patristic, scholastic and modern sources of theology.

In this chapter we intend to present a detailed analysis of Surnaturel because it has had such influence on theology but especially because it is the essential expression of the author's anthropology in the all-important area of the supernatural. Following this, there will be a discussion of the objections raised against the study and de Lubac's subsequent responses. We will preface all of this with some remarks on his anthropology.

While Surnaturel is a genuine and notable study of various aspects of the supernatural it is much more than this. The underlying supposition, the implicit theme of the entire presentation is the need for a new concept of man. It can be said that Surnaturel is an apologetic for a new theological anthropology in which man is once more considered in the concrete, in his existential reality, and not as an abstraction endlessly subjected to speculative dissection.[6] Certainly, it is this new yet traditional notion of man in the concrete that forms de Lubac's horizon as he views the supernatural, and it is this same man that he is seeking to uncover in his historical researches.

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[5] In saying that there has been a change of course we do not mean to imply that there has been a complete rejection of the past "extrinsecism" but that there has been a definite reaction against it and a real trend towards de Lubac's more anthropocentric view. Karl Rahner's "supernatural existential" is a good illustration of the current direction: Karl Rahner, S.J., Theological Investigations, Vol. I., trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon, 1965), pp. 297-317. See, also, Thomas M. McFadden, "The Relationship Between Nature and Grace: A Survey of 20th Century Theological Opinion" (unpublished S.T.D. dissertation, School of Theology, Catholic University of America, 1963), pp. 158-190.

De Lubac argues that the later scholastics in their passion for precision and clarity were unfaithful to the old anthropology of the Fathers and the earlier scholastics including Thomas and Scotus.[7] In their overriding concern to safeguard the supernatural, they cut it adrift. "They gave away precious ground to naturalism" paving the way for "a world disinterested in such high destinies."[8] Thus, wedded to a static, essentialistic anthropology (flowing from a static, essentialistic philosophy), they necessarily produced a man of two ends and two orders, natural and supernatural. This "dualism" seemed to make the natural appear as a complete, self-enclosed order and the supernatural as an extrinsic, artificial adjunct. What is needed, therefore, is a new anthropology--"called for today on all sides"--[9]which recovers the spirit of the earlier synthesis of the Fathers and St. Thomas and which includes the vital, organic view of the Augustinian school. This new concept of man will make it possible to bring into dynamic relationship the natural and supernatural.

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[6] We are not saying that Surnaturel is expressly an apologetic for a new anthropology but it is hard to conceive of the book being written without presupposing some concern or objective of this kind in the mind of the author. See, for example, Henri Bouillard's article, "L'Intention fondementale de Maurice Blondel et la théologie," RSR, XXXVI (1949), 377, in which he says that the real question is not that of pure nature or of other possible beatitudes. The real question is whether a Catholic ought to be tied to a deexistentialized philosophy which is allied to such abstract theories. By implication, Bouillard would thus question the old anthropology. Bouillard, of course, thinks along the same lines as de Lubac in these matters.

[7] de Lubac, op. cit., pp. 171-175.

[8] Ibid., p. 174.

[9] Ibid., p. 438.

How has it happened that the man of the Fathers, of Augustine, and of Thomas has been devitalized into an abstraction? De Lubac pursues the answer to this question (although this is not his express purpose) in a rich and involved historical search which has as its object certain phases of the nature-supernatural relation.

Surnaturel is divided into four parts: "Augustinianisme et Baianisme"; "Esprit et liberté dans la tradition théologique"; "Aux origines du mot 'Surnaturel'"; "Notes historiques". To each of these parts we now address ourselves in detail.

Part I--Augustinianism and Baianism

Baius

It is one of the many ironies of history that Baius, who was a devoted disciple of Augustine and who had read his writings on grace seventy times, ended by maintaining positions which were more like those of his master's enemies.[10] Somehow, says de Lubac, Baius had missed the entire spirit of Augustine.[11] Baius' view of man before the fall was all optimism but after the fall it was all pessimism. The reason is that Baius conceived of man as standing in a kind of juridical relationship with God. He readily conceded that man needs God's help to achieve his end but he saw the end as merely natural and not as a transformation of nature. Hence, God's intervention is hardly a favor; it is owed to man because the integrity of his nature demands it. Man's supernatural end was really natural to man in paradise; after the fall, Christ came merely to restore man to his natural condition. In effect, in the hands of Baius, the supernatural became a mere means for the natural.[12]

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[10] Ibid., p. 17.

[11] Ibid., p. 30.

Baius clearly twisted the thought of Augustine. The latter was far from any juridicism, for he knew that God, who is "nullius debitor", is not bound by man in any way. Also, de Lubac thinks that the clearest indication that Baius was opposed to Augustine is the fact that Baius maintained the possibility of a purely natural end for man.[13] This is a reflection of his naturalizing tendency which is foreign to Augustine. The opposition between the two men is quite radical, according to de Lubac:

> Saint Augustine showed that the completion of nature consists in its supernaturalization. Baius naturalized the supernatural. He transformed a spiritual teaching into a proposition of ontology. And while it is very true that the teaching of Augustine has an ontological import, the completely naturalist (toute physique) ontology of Baius does not equally have a spiritual import. The heart of Augustine's thought is mystical but the heart of Baius' thought is naturalist.[14]

Jansenius

The teachings of Jansenius were in reality a prolongation of Baianism. Jansenius denied that grace and glory were due to Adam by his natural efforts; nevertheless both (grace and glory) seemed to be "demanded by essential exigencies."[15] He held equivalently that because of man's weakness, God ought to give his help to those he creates. One of the implications of such a teaching is that grace becomes a mere instrument of nature.

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[12] Ibid., p. 34.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 32.

[15] Ibid., p. 43.

Jansenius' major point involved "the relation of grace to free will in Adam."[16] His teaching, according to de Lubac, bore only a verbal resemblance to his master Augustine because Augustine was struggling against the post-fall naturalism of Pelagius and not the pre-fall naturalism of Baius. Hence, Jansenius interpreted Augustine's adjutorium sine quo non and adjutorium quo to be equivalent to sufficient and efficacious grace. But Augustine did not set up any such opposition between grace and free will, or better, "between the activity of the creature and the efficacious influence of the creator."[17] Augustine was not seeking to establish the invincibility of grace but the necessity of grace, against the Pelagians. He taught that grace was just as marvelous and as necessary for Adam as for us even though it is more abundant today than before.

Augustine and Jansenius had very different points of departure.[18] The former's center of perspective was man as sinner and the grace of Christ. The latter's starting point was quite the opposite: he began theoretically with the state of Adam and then determined *a priori* the role grace ought to enjoy. His false optimism concerning human nature before the fall, and his reduction of grace to a mere means rather than a transforming supernaturalization, seemed to make nature and grace extrinsic to each other and opposed. De Lubac contends that this abstract starting point of Jansenius is so alien to Augustine who

> . . . knew divine transcendence, had even experienced the instinctive aversion of the sinner and of the being anguished by emptiness which doubles, so to speak, the distance which naturally separates the finite from the infinite. But with Saint John, with all humble Christians, he

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 50.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

> believed in love. He had also experienced the irresistible force of his call which is able to fill the depths of a man. Finally, between nature and grace, it was not a question of opposition but of inclusion; not struggle but union. It does not mean annihilation for man but intimate union and transformation. A great principle dominates all and expresses his whole soul. *Deus intimior intimo meo*.[19]

This concrete starting point of Augustine's is well illustrated in one of his maxims: "*Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non est Dei caritas*."[20] From this, de Lubac concludes:

> One can hardly be called a Jansenist for refusing . . . to admit that in the concrete there is in man a kind of neutral zone, a kind of *tertium quid* which, without being bad, has only a purely natural value, without salutary efficacy. Augustine never meant to concede that there can be acts which are *steriliter boni*.[21]

Hence, the same unifying *caritas* is in the soul of the sinner (*caritas inchoata*) and of the saint (*caritas perfecta*).

According to de Lubac, it is not in the controversialist that we can find Augustine's teaching but in his own writing taken as a whole.[22] It is true that his writings present some difficulties because he was not very systematic and because he was writing in the midst of controversy, against "the enemies of the grace of Christ."[23] In addition, the most fundamental themes of his work are always those which are least formulated. Finally, there is the difficulty of terminology. For example, by grace Augustine meant mercy rather than liberality, and pardon rather than gift. But this problem of terminology is even more clearly seen in regard to the meaning of "created nature".

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[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

> Created nature, made in the image of its creator, did not mean for him nor for his ancestors, the Greek Fathers, what it has come to mean for very many people since the era of separated philosophy . . . . he saw the human soul illumined and fortified by the incessant action of God. Since all of his thought bathed in a supernatural atmosphere, he did not constantly feel the need that we have today for forging a "supernaturalist" vocabulary.[24]

In short, Augustine was concerned with man as he is in the concrete, and so those who begin by speculating on man in some pure state have already departed, de Lubac, thinks, from Augustine's methodology and spirit.

The System of Pure Nature

Some have maintained that the major error of Baius was his denial of "pure nature". But de Lubac holds that this is far from the truth and that on the contrary it is possible to show that,

> . . . this idea of "pure nature", as modern theology understands it, is a systematic idea, doubtless legitimate and perhaps useful but recent, to which . . . the traditional dogmas defended by the condemnations of Saint Pius V and Urban VIII are not necessarily bound.[25]
>
> In reality, the idea of "pure nature" has neither the antiquity nor the doctrinal importance which some recent theologians suppose it to have. It is only of yesterday on the theological scene. . . . It was not conceived as the result of preoccupations of the religious order. Its origin was, above all, philosophic. It was at first, it seems, one of the numerous abstractions which, since the time of William of Mar, medieval speculation loved to invent. . . .[26]

The first man to employ the idea of "pure nature" in the theological context is Cajetan.[27] He argued that, according to St. Thomas, the natural desire of seeing God resides only in theological man, that is, man raised to a supernatural end and enlightened by revelation. Prudentius and Macedo, among other theologians, opposed the purely natural state, and even Suarez, who favored Cajetan, admitted this was a new idea. The Salmanticenses considered Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas as erroneous. Sestili, writing in the nineteenth century, remarked that Capreolus, de Blois, and Savonarola did not even allude to the idea.

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[24] _Ibid._, p. 79.

[25] _Ibid._, p. 103.

[26] _Ibid._, p. 105.

[27] _Ibid._

Before Baius, Soto had written of man "_in puris naturalibus mente concepto_"[28] but this was merely a fictitious device for better understanding the supernatural. If later speculation was to produce a "_homo physicus_," cut off from his transcendent end, this was not the position of Soto who was certain there was only one final end. In fact, he maintained in the language of Scotus an idea which was not unfaithful to Thomas: since the vision of God is man's only real end and is the object of his natural appetite, it is better to call it our natural end. Soto was faithful to the tradition of Augustine and Thomas "who had never envisaged as possible for man, or a spirit like him, an end at the same time transcendent and natural, consisting in any other knowledge of God than the beatific vision."[29] In other words, Soto could not conceive of a non-supernatural transcendence.

In opposition to Baius, Bellarmine declared that a natural end was possible, but he was quite conscious that it was a new opinion.[30] The distinction between "_Deus auctor_" and "_Deus beatificator_", which Thomas had made and which was current in Bellarmine's time, was not the same as the distinction postulated by the theory of "pure nature" between God, the author of the natural order, and God, the author of the supernatural order. A further indication that the system of "pure nature" was a new opinion was the fact that the Roman Catechism (1566) gives no indication of a double finality for man.

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[28] _Ibid_., p. 107.

[29] _Ibid_., p. 109.

[30] _Ibid_., p. 110.

Subsequent to Bellarmine, Suarez proposed the "pure nature" scheme but he implied that it was really a personal inference of his own and not one of long standing tradition. Suarez began with Aristotle's principle that every natural substance must have a connatural ultimate end. He considered this principle beyond question. Accordingly, says de Lubac, Suarez held that:

> In virtue of his creation, man is made for a beatitude which is essentially natural. If we suppose that in fact man is called to a higher end, this end could only be superadded. . . . If we object that there is in man a natural desire for this higher beatitude, Suarez, even before examining it, replies that this is impossible because, always faithful to Aristotle, an appetite of nature follows from the power of nature: cum appetitus naturalis non fundetur nisi in naturali potestate.[31]

Hence, for Suarez, a natural desire for a supernatural end is impossible and contradictory. Others (Vasquez, Martinez, Viva), following Suarez in his a priori approach, helped entrench the system which was more indebted to philosophy than theology for its origins.[32] De Lubac maintains that the Aristotelian-Suarezian principle on which the system is based has never been seriously questioned even up to our own time.

Somehow, these men (Cajetan, Medina, et alii) had failed to distinguish between beings of nature and spirits.[33] The latter are open to the infinite while the former have an end proportionate to their limits. Christian thinkers from Origen and Augustine to Thomas had always considered man to be mens first and then animal rationale. Soto, for example, was only following Scotus when he taught that it was truly a mark of man's dignity that his end was so greatly superior to his natural powers of achieving it.

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[31] Ibid., p. 114.

[32] Ibid., p. 115.

[33] Ibid., p. 117.

The Stages of its Formation

There were actually two stages in the formation of the system of "pure nature". The first stage took place in the first half of the sixteenth century by means of the commentaries on Thomas' Summa. The second stage, during the latter part of the same century, involved the treatises on the primitive state of man found in the Book of Sentences.

In de Lubac's judgment, the first stage begins with the misinterpretation of Thomas by his interpreters:

> Saint Thomas said: man can be considered independently of his relation to God. They translated it: man can be considered in his essential relationship to God as author and end of his nature. After having distinguished the two points of view of the philosopher and the theologian, in order to avoid putting Aristotle in formal contradiction with the Christian faith, Saint Thomas attempted to establish a bridge between the two, thanks to his doctrine of "natural desire". His interpreters, on the contrary, attempted to complete the rupture by imprisoning philosophy forever in the narrow point of view of the philosopher who does not know creation at all. They did not want to consider "natural desire" except in one who is born apart from divine revelation. . . . How marvelous, indeed, that they cannot find any desire of seeing God in a being they have expressly cut off from all relation with God.[34]

Little by little his interpreters effected a major change in Thomas' position. They began by positing two ends, one natural, the other transcendent. Then they proceeded from a knowledge of God "of the natural order"[35] to an "abstract knowledge" or "intuition", a "natural posession" and even an "immediate natural vision". They ended by breaking every link between the created spirit and the end which God had promised.

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[34] Ibid., pp. 132-133.

[35] Ibid., p. 133.

All that remained in man was an "obediential potency", a non-repugnance.[36]

Thomas held that man's soul was naturally capable of grace but these theologians gradually reversed his position. Capreolus did not deny but distinguished between a natural power properly speaking and improperly speaking. Cajetan made a clean break: the soul's capacity for grace is not natural but only obediential.[37] Toletus opposed the unjustified application of obediential potency. Kӧllin vainly attempted to show the harmony of Cajetan and Thomas. He ended by applying the principle of Aristotle and later Suarez: every being has an end corresponding to its natural powers. Medina repeated Cajetan and Köllin, concluding that man had no natural capacity for seeing God. Down to our time, de Lubac thinks that theologians have gone to incredible lengths, even contradicting each other, to explain away Thomas' "natural desire for God".[38] Some say it applies only to a graced nature, others dilute the desire to a velleitas, and still others reduce "the vision" to an external knowledge of God, the author of creation.

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[36] De Lubac thinks that this is a real misuse of "obediential potency" because the miraculous is a sign of the supernatural but is hardly what they make it, "a simple particular case of the second." *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 137. See Cajetan's commentary on St. Thomas's *Summa Theologiae*, Pars Prima Secundae, Q. CXIII, A. 10. In Question CXIII, A. 10, Thomas discusses whether the justification of the impious is a miraculous work or not. He concludes that it is not. One of the reasons he gives is that, unlike certain miraculous works where the induced form is above the natural potency of the matter (e.g. raising the dead to life), the soul is naturally capable of grace. Thus:

> . . . justificatio impii non est miraculosa: quia naturaliter anima est gratia capax; *eo* enim *ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam*, ut Augustinus dicit.

In his commentary on this question, Cajetan begins by discussing the question whether the soul is naturally capable of grace. He says that the potency of the soul for grace is both natural and supernatural. In a way it is natural in so far as the act of free will prepares for grace but in another way it is supernatural because the act which is a disposition for grace is a grace itself and of an order above the natural. Accordingly:

> Et quia medium nunc hoc, nunc illud induit extremum; ideo potentiae animae ad gratiam quandoque naturalis, sed obedientialis aut supernaturalis vocatur. Simpliciter autem non est naturalis: quoniam ad res supremi ordinis est. Sed deficit a ratione miraculi justificatio, propter illud naturalitatis quod est in anima, praecipue a theologo considerata; qui, quoniam Deus ab initio instituit creaturam rationalem ad hunc supremum ordinem elevandam per sua etiam opera, ideo ut naturale hoc accipit; quod non acciperet si Deus solum naturalem ordinem rerum creasset ac instituisset.

Cajetan makes a clear break from the explicit teaching of Thomas and Augustine. He takes their natural capacity for grace and when he is through, it is reduced to "*Simpliciter autem non est naturalis*."

The second stage of development centers around the primitive state of man. The classic question concerning human origins was: what was the condition of Adam as he came from the hands of the creator?[39] Did he possess grace from the beginning of creation or subsequently? De Lubac judges that Thomas combined Augustine and Aristotle in concluding that Adam was graced in the very act of his creation. But his view was gradually obscured and rejected. Bellarmine prepared the way by distinguishing three states in man: integral, fallen and repaired; or innocence, misery and glory. There followed a mixture of concrete and abstract points of view which resulted in the addition of a fourth state, "pure nature". Now there were four states, each statically defined without any relation to each other or to man's end. The state of "pure nature" soon became a "purely natural order"[40] and the "idea of an intrinsic finality to being" was lost sight of.

The second stage really began with Molina who inserted the new theory of four states into the Augustinian tradition.[41] Molina described man "in puris naturalibus" (first state), in his historical innocence (second state), and man after the fall (third state).[42] In the process of describing the first two states, he implied that man's normal, natural end is a natural beatitude. In his presentation of the third state, he became very explicit in affirming the natural end of man. Suarez then bridged the gap between "in puris naturalibus" and the "natura pura" of modern times.[43] He did so by teaching that a purely natural order was possible not only by God's absolute power but even ex potentia Dei ordinata. Vasquez and others followed in the steps of Suarez, and gradually "pure nature" became the common teaching of all.

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[38] Ibid., p. 139.

[39] Ibid., p. 140.

[40] Ibid., p. 145.

The system of pure nature was not rooted in tradition and yet it became almost a "quasi-necessity".[44] In de Lubac's opinion, pure nature was historically an expedient for refuting Baianism, but there was an even deeper reason for its development. The middle ages had passed, and the coming of the new world resulted in the demise of theology as the queen of the sciences. With the new philosophical tendencies, theology became a "discipline séparée" and this had a profound effect on anthropology, as de Lubac says:

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[41] Ibid., p. 146.

[42] Molina, Concordia: Liberi Arbitrii (Paris: Auteuil), Disputatio III, pp. 15-17. On page 17, Molina states:

> At vires naturales tales secundum se manserunt, quales illas essemus habituri, si in puris naturalibus ad finem tantum naturalem a principio conditi fuissemus. (italics added)

What de Lubac seems to be pointing out is that Molina's framework or point of reference in describing man's condition is a natural state with a natural end. Molina does not use "in puris naturalibus" to refer to an actual, historical state but he uses the phrase so frequently in these few pages as to leave such an impression.

[43] De Lubac, op. cit., p. 148. In his De Gratia, Prolegomenon IV, chapter 1, n. 16+17, Suarez says "God could have created man in puris naturalibus in regard to his last end. . . ." He remarks that Cajetan especially holds this opinion. Further, he says that God could have created man for a natural beatitude only and hence he would not have ordered man to a supernatural end.

[44] Ibid., p. 150.

> In the domain of anthropology as in other domains, a double separation was accentuated and began to bear fruit: the separation of philosophy from traditional theology and within [theology itself] the separation of the scholastic from "des spirituels".[45]

Thus, man was split in two, cut off from the supernatural end without which he could not be explained in his historical situation.

In the light of these general tendencies of the age, de Lubac suggests that the scholastic theologians are less to blame than those who failed to revive the authentic Augustianianism and allowed a renewed Baianism to fill the vacuum.[46] Nevertheless, de Lubac feels that certain questions can still be asked of the theologians. Did they concede too much by setting up a state or zone of activity dominated by the principles of commutative justice instead of charity? Have the anti-Baius theologians really understood the mystery of grace? Did they tend,

> . . . to define the supernatural in an extrinsic and relative fashion, by its character of inaccessibility or gratuity, without returning to the ultimate reason for this gratuity . . . its intrinsically divine character?[47]

From Jansenius to Modern Times

The teaching of Jansenius occasioned a natural reaction among theologians to stress pure nature even more heavily.[47] De Lubac agrees that "pure nature" saved orthodoxy for a while but the price was high--the establishment of dualism: ". . . to make sure that a region of human activity was under grace, it (the new system) took the risk of allowing another whole region to be secularized."[48] In reaction to the pessimistic conception of man with his corrupted nature, it seemed to set up implicitly an ideal of human action which could be achieved by human powers alone. Thus:

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[45] Ibid., pp. 150-151.

[46] Ibid., p. 151.

[47] Ibid., p. 154.

> A certain plane of human sufficiency was established first. Then afterwards, they conceived of a supernatural order completely contingent and extrinsic, and superimposed it on this natural order which was already regarded at its very completion as the normal and properly human order.[49]

Despite the dominance of the system of "pure nature", there were a number of authors in the seventeenth century who opposed it or ignored it: for example, Berulle, Bonal and Prudentius. The Augustinian school, represented by Gavardi, Noris, Belleli and Berti among others, also opposed it.[50] They clearly held that man's natural end was supernatural beatitude. They thought that man has only a moral necessity for the supernatural but this moral necessity applied only to the means (of grace) and not to the end to which man was naturally ordered. The orthodoxy of the Augustinians was suspect in the eyes of some, but while their doctrinal positions were sometimes precarious, they were not Jansenists. To understand the Augustinian position it is important to bear in mind two distinctions which they made. The first is from man's point of view. They considered man in the concrete, in his completeness, in his "constitutive specifics", in the depths of his being and in his "dynamic orientation".[51] Because man is made in the image of God, he cannot be destined for an end other than the beatific vision. The second distinction is on the part of God. By his absolute power God can do anything he decides, but by his ordered power, God is just and faithful to his promises.

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[48] Ibid., p. 161.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

Despite its good points, Augustinianism was tinged with Jansenistic pessimism. Its position on man's unique finality was limited and incomplete, so that it tended only to reenforce the majority opinion on "pure nature". Ripalda cried for the extermination of the innate appetite and his cry was heeded; in fact, it led to the ruin of the "old anthropology".[52]

> The 'desire of seeing God' or . . . the 'desire of the supernatural' which had been for such a long time, as much for the scholastics as for the fathers, the first principle for explaining man and along with man all of nature, this pivot of Christian philosophy could not resist the blows heaped upon it.[53]

The theologians may have won the battle with Baius and Jansenius but in the process they yielded precious ground to naturalism and left men "disinterested in such high destinies."[54] The more they rejected all traces of exigency or need in man, the more man was split in two. The more the purely natural became a closed system, the more the supernatural seemed to be artificial, exiled, separated and unrelated.[55] The theologians eventually came to adopt what Deschamps, the Cardinal of Malines, called "the doctrine of the simple juxtaposition of nature and grace."[56]

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[51] Ibid., pp. 168-169.

[52] Ibid., p. 173.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., p. 174.

[55] Ibid., pp. 174-175.

[56] Ibid., p. 175.

During all these debates between the schools of theology, de Lubac reminds us, the Church never took sides on the "natural desire" or the "innate appetite" nor did it ever officially authorize the idea of "pure nature".[57] Even Pius VI' bull, "Auctorem Fidei," condemning the erroneous teachings of the Jansenist council of Pistoia, did not touch upon the teachings of the Augustinians. The First Vatican Council was equally detached concerning the teachings of the theological schools. It simply reemphasized the absolute gratuity of the supernatural and the impossibility of any natural exigency for it (this in the context of the necessity of revelation).

Part II--Spirit and Liberty in the Theological Tradition

In this second part of Surnaturel, de Lubac traces the development of pure nature and the dilution of the traditional meaning of natural desire in yet another area of theology: angelology. He says that the Patristic tradition taught that God alone is impeccable, and that angels may be fixed in their goodness. The latter is not due to their nature but rather is the result of free choice and divine grace.[58]

In the thirteenth century, however, things began to change with the introduction of Aristotelian thought in the west. This fact gave a tremendous impetus to medieval thought but it also brought with it certain dangers. De Lubac thinks that:

> Danger came especially from the assimilation, which was a long time in preparation, of the angels of Christian tradition to the "separated intelligences" of Aristotle. It had long been a disputed question

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[57] Ibid., p. 176.

[58] Ibid., p. 190.

> whether angels had bodies or not. . . . But from the middle of the century, very many were inclined in favor of pure spirituality. . . .[59]

This new development occasioned new questions, among them: how can a pure intelligence, a pure spirit, sin? If an action is more necessary the more rational it is, would not a higher being be one freed of free choice and incapable of failure? Theologians from William of Auvergne to St. Bonaventure agreed that a free will inflexible to evil would be neither free nor praiseworthy. However, St. Albert, faced with the problem of a pure intelligence failing in the use of its free will, did not contradict Aristotle as his predecessors had done, but interpreted him, introducing a new distinction: pure intelligence or angels are never deceived concerning the good "in se" but only concerning the good here and now.[60] This distinction would soon influence Albert's most famous pupil, Thomas.

Influenced by Albert, Thomas taught, in his earlier days, that the angelic intellect could err practically by failing to consider everything pertinent to the decision. In addition, he held that God alone is impeccable and that angels considered "in suis naturalibus" are no exception to creaturely peccability.[61] Later, Thomas' answer to the question, "how can a pure intelligence err?", showed a development of thought and a new emphasis: the error was in the judgment of the intellect failing to consider a higher good to which it ought to be ordered.[62] The answer was now a stress on finality "whose inspiration was more purely Augustinian."[63] Later still (1265-1271), Thomas discussed the question once again, and while there was some modification of terms or explanations, de Lubac does not see any basic change in his teaching on angelic peccability.[64]

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[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 227. De Lubac, commenting on Albert, remarks that it is possible to accept the essentials of Aristotle's psychology without necessarily admitting the impeccability of any other spirit except God. The author thinks that Albert was excessively optimistic in thinking that there was no danger of the spirit of pagan philosophy infiltrating under the cover of Aristotle. The Philosopher must neither be rejected, nor blindly followed, but adapted. *Ibid.*, p. 228-229.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 234. See *De Veritate*, Q. 24, a. 7. : "Nulla creatura est, nec esse potest, cujus liberum arbitrium sit naturaliter confirmatum in bono, ut hoc ei ex puris naturalibus conveniat quod peccare non possit. . . . Natura

There are some, however, who have concluded from Thomas' later texts (viz. De Malo and Summa Theologica) that "he taught the impeccability of angels on the hypothesis of an order or pure nature."[65] De Lubac argues strongly against such a conclusion. He readily admits that Thomas distinguished between a spiritual nature abstractly considered and the same nature actually related to the end which transcends it. Along with his contemporaries, he recognized two zones corresponding to the natural and the supernatural.[66] But de Lubac contends that he never admitted the gap which a number of later Thomists forced between the God of the natural order and beatitude, and the

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rationalis, quae ordinata est ad bonum absolute per actiones multifarias, non potest habere naturaliter actiones indeficientes a bono, nisi ei naturaliter et immutabiliter insit ratio universalis et perfecti boni: quod quidem esse non potest nisi in natura divina. Nam Deus solus est actus purus nullius potentiae permixtionem recipiens, et per hoc est bonitas pura et absoluta.

[62] Ibid., pp. 237-238. See III Contra Gentes, C. 109. : "In illo igitur volente nullum potest voluntatis peccatum accidere, cujus proprium bonum est ultimus finis, quod non continetur sub alterius finis ordine, sed sub ejus ordine omnes alii fines continentur. Hujusmodi autem volens est Deus, cujus esse est summa bonitas, quae est ultimus finis. In Deo igitur peccatum voluntatis esse non potest. In quocumque autem alio volente, cujus proprium bonum necesse est sub ordine alterius boni contineri, potest peccatum accidere voluntati, si in sua natura consideratur."

[63] Ibid., p. 237.

[64] Ibid., p. 244. See Summa Theologica I, Q. 63, Art. 1.

[65] Ibid., p. 241.

[66] Ibid., pp. 250-251.

God of the supernatural order and beatitude.[67] Accordingly, it is quite contrary to Thomas' mind to say that angels are not capable of sin naturally but only in relation to the supernatural order or end.[68] De Lubac concludes that;

> In this question of the possibility of sin, St. Thomas proceeds, it seems to us, as in the question of the possibility of seeing God. The question proven at first directly, by recourse to a general principle: the natural desire of the spirit which cannot be in vain. . . the objections are then resolved as well as possible. . .; but supposing that a difficulty remains, the initial affirmation no less remains, based as it is on a principle which does not leave room for doubt or exception. In this present case, the same is true.[69]

Divisions in the School

After Thomas, most of the opinions were merely repetitions of the great masters: namely, only by grace is a creature rendered impeccable. However, three new elements appeared which paved the way for change. First, there was the influence of the nominalist, William of Mar, who--concerned with preserving the divine omnipotence--disagreed with Thomas that the contradictory and the absurd are real impossibilities for God. This voluntarism, in turn, had a deep effect on the development of Franciscan thought. The distinction between God's absolute power (ex potentia Dei absoluta) and his ordered power (ex potentia Dei ordinata) tended to be reduced to a legalistic framework in which the former became a pure right and the latter a simple fact. In such a context, de Lubac says, hypotheses "ex potentia Dei absoluta" were ready, in the hands of some, to become "normal hypotheses".[70] A third element was the new perspective introduced by Durand. By teaching that a spiritual creature cannot be naturally impeccable regarding supernatural faith or law, Durand implied that a creature could be impeccable regarding the natural law.

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[67] Ibid., p. 254. De Lubac says on p. 253 of ibid. that in Thomas a new emphasis was placed on the words supra naturam and supernaturalis. This indicates the "physiciste" tendency of Thomism as opposed to the "moraliste" tendency of Augustinianism.

[68] Ibid., p. 257. De Lubac says: "And so, when St. Thomas says, for example, that angels are impeccable in relation to natural things, he is not saying that 'in principle they are impeccable by nature.' He does not subscribe to 'the thesis of the natural impeccability of angels.' This is to go beyond his thought, or better, it is to transform it profoundly, and to construe it by saying that he has limited 'the peccability of angels to the supernatural hypothesis', as if the supernatural destiny was for him an 'hypothesis'."

[69] Ibid., p. 258.

The fifteenth century Thomists, such as Capreolus, generally were faithful to Thomas.[71] But de Lubac argues, as we have already seen, that it was Cajetan who broke with the master and introduced change.[72] Cajetan held that man's natural desire for the supernatural existed only in this present, historical human nature; and that essentially, man was characterized by merely natural ambitions for a natural end. This double finality of Cajetan's provided a neat framework for Thomas' teaching on the angels' impeccability in regard to natural goods. It came as no surprise when Bañez adopted the perspective of Cajetan and decided that angels would have been impeccable if left in their natural non-elevated state. Bañez distinguished between precepts of the natural order and positive precepts superadded, and then concluded that angels could sin only against the latter (i.e. supernatural end and order.)[73] Suarez went a step further. Placing the problem in a new category, he asked: "Is the angel peccable in his pure nature?"[74]

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[70] Ibid., p. 268.

[71] Ibid., p. 271.

[72] Ibid., p. 279.

[73] Ibid., p. 280. While it is true that Molina, Vasquez and Suarez followed Bañez who might be called the founder of the modern thomist school, nevertheless, some Jesuits dissented viz. Tolet and Gregory of Valencia.

De Lubac contends that the older Thomists never dreamed of such an hypothesis as Suarez proposed. For one thing, the meaning of "_pura naturalia_" had changed from the time of the thirteenth century. It no longer meant "the pure essential constituents of human nature"[75] or a state of justice preliminary to grace. In addition, the older scholastic considered impeccability (for a created spirit) due to grace alone. Hence, when John of St. Thomas said that an angel, considered "_in puris naturalibus_", is impeccable, de Lubac asks:

> Is not this contradictory to the affirmation of St. Thomas and the ancients? . . . certainly. . . . because the expression, "_in puris naturalibus_", has, as we have said, changed in meaning. It no longer signifies as formerly: in a natural _state_, that is, without a special help of grace, without a superadded habit; but in a natural _order_, that is, in relation to a purely natural end, proportioned to the nature of an angel or a man. It is by grace alone that one becomes impeccable, said the old school; it is by the _supernatural_ alone that one becomes peccable, pretends the new Thomists.[76]

There were now two schools, the Bañezians and a certain group of Jesuits. Both, according to de Lubac, were partially right and partially wrong.[77] After Suarez, the hypotheses and verbalisms of Nominalism began to multiply. Typical was the idea of a "supernatural substance", which was impeccable and capable of seeing God naturally.[78] A new generation of theologians, however, attacked the "supernatural substance", among them being Perez, Esparza, Sylvester Maurus. About this time, Macedo made a comparison study of Thomas and Scotus in which he accused Cajetan of confusing and obscuring Thomas' thought. He argued that on more than one point Thomas was in agreement with Augustine, Bonaventure, and Scotus, and opposed to Cajetan and his followers.[79] It was not Thomas, he said, but Cajetan who had established "pure nature" by his theory of obediential potency and by his rejection of man's natural appetite for seeing God. Further, it was Cajetan (along with Koellin and Javelli) who was the man responsible for all of the dualistic theology which followed.

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[74] _Ibid._, p. 283.

[75] _Ibid._, p. 289.

[76] _Ibid._, p. 291.

[77] See _ibid._, p. 293, in which de Lubac points out that the ambiguity of Thomas in the matter of angelic impeccability made it possible for variant interpretations. On the one hand, Thomas taught that a creature could be impeccable only by grace, but on the other hand, he did not admit that angels could sin concerning natural goods.

[78] _Ibid._, p. 296.

The theory of the "supernatural substance" was in decline by the eighteenth century.[80] Billuart and Gotti were the new Thomists but they were not always as true to Thomas as they claimed to be. And so, in sum, from the time of Bañez on, the state of "pure nature" had radically changed. De Lubac says:

> . . . this state of pure nature was no longer presented . . . as one of these "purely speculative" hypotheses . . . but as a normal state of created being. . . . the majority of thomists . . . saw in nature, in relation to the supernatural, only a simple "obediential potency" . . . . In short, between nature and the supernatural, the gap was as wide and of the same nature as that between the ordinary course of things and a miracle.[81]

De Lubac thinks that down to modern times, little change has taken place in the over-all situation. He sees Scheeben, the famous theologian of the nineteenth century, as the one exception to the general abandonment of tradition.

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[79] Ibid., p. 312.

[80] Ibid., p. 315.

[81] Ibid., p. 317.

Part III--The Origins of the Word "Supernatural"

In this third section of *Surnaturel*, de Lubac undertakes a history of the word "supernatural". The word is not in the Scripture or in the writings of the Fathers, in fact, it does not appear until the 9th century.[82] However, it does have certain antecedents. According to de Lubac, the cosmological dualism of the ancient world which divided the universe into the corruptible, sublunar world and the aethereal, celestial world was taken over and transformed by the Christians. The new dualism involved the creature (material or spiritual) and the creator (the transcendent and unique).[83] Hence, the Fathers used cosmological terms to express spiritual things. Clement of Alexandria and Origen often used *ὑπερουράνιος* to describe divine things. St. Cyril of Jerusalem used *ὑπερκόσμιος* for spiritual things. Tertullian and Augustine referred to Christ and the angels as *supercaelestis*. With St. Ambrose, "hypercosmis" became "*supramundum*". St. Chromatius encouraged people to ask for "*vitam aeternam*". In short, the word "super" was found especially apt for referring to God, even though it did not tell us what God is, so much as what he is not.

First Appearance

The first appearance of *supernaturalis* followed shortly after another group of words such as *ὑπερφυής* and *ὑπὲρ φύσιν*.[84] The adjective, ὑπερφυής, was first applied to physical miracles and from there it came to be used for the ontological and spiritual. However, while it passed from the extraordinary to the transcendent in meaning, it never lost its fundamental meaning of supernatural "*quoad modum*."[85] The word ὑπὲρ φύσιν was used to describe transcendent realities (e.g. God as above all nature) but also referred to the miraculous. Its Latin translation, *supra naturam*, was quite frequent from the fourth century on, and usually referred to miraculous events like the Virgin Birth or the Eucharist. Although not a properly technical term, ὑπὲρ φύσιν came to mean "supernatural." Maxime was more methodical than others in his use of ὑπὲρ φύσιν. He never confused nature with grace since the latter is always ὑπὲρ φύσιν. However, he taught that there is in "the human *nous* an active tendency, a desire κατὰ φύσιν which brings it to God its last end, nevertheless it is ὑπὲρ φύσιν, that is, κατὰ κάσιν and not simply κατὰ φύσιν which accomplishes salvation."[86] De Lubac asks: is not this really the Thomist axiom that man has a natural desire for the vision of God but achieves it supernaturally? The Greek terminology referred not so much to objects as to the manner in which man attains the gifts of God.

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[82] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 331.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 355.

An unknown author, possibly Pelagius, in reply to those who said that Adam received the Holy Spirit from the time of his creation, answered that Adam was created perfect in his own order.[87] He said that the Holy Spirit and the supernatural not only surpass man's nature, as speaking surpasses a beast, but that they are above all exigencies or powers of man.

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[85] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 367.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 368.

De Lubac feels that this opinion is the first anticipation of dualist theology, because the characteristics of the later dualism were already present in this writer: a supernatural cut off from a nature perfect in its own right; a supernatural relatively defined, that is, not absolutely divine but relative to man's nature; and a supernatural expressed in terms of the miraculous. All of this is entirely opposed to patristic thought.

The first time the word _supernaturalis_ appeared was in the translation of St. Isidore of Pelusium (c. middle of ninth century).[88] Others soon followed, but the words (_supernaturaliter_, _supernaturalissimus_ etc.) were given different shades of meaning by different authors. In the thirteenth century, _supernaturalis_ became a current word especially through certain works of Scotus who used the word in its ontological or transcendent sense.

"Supernatural" and "Superadded"

Another word which influenced the theology of grace and was in contention with _supernaturalis_ was _superadditus_.[89] Scotus used _superadditus_ to describe the consequences of sin and not some supernatural object. In so doing, he was simply reflecting the teaching of many of the Fathers who taught that the tunic of corruptible flesh was superadded to Adam and Eve as a punishment for sin. Actually, there were two contrary biblical images involving the idea of the "superadded": the traveler on the way to Jericho, and Adam and Eve in paradise. To the wounded traveler grace was superadded; to Adam and Eve, the order of sin was superadded. The biblical image of man's sin in paradise was strongly effected by the hellenistic ideas of a multi-leveled universe and of the soul falling through the celestial spheres to the earth. The biblical "expulsion" of our first parents became a "fall". The Greeks judged that the more deeply man fell through the spheres, the more bound and entangled he became with the flesh and its passions. They saw the solution lying in man's struggle for an immaterial existence. The flavor of this dualistic spiritualism could be seen, for example, in Origen:

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[88] _Ibid_., p. 369.

[89] _Ibid_., p. 385.

> If souls are pure and not weighted down by the lead weight of wickedness, they are raised in the air to the zone of purer and more aethereal bodies, abandoning this lower world's gross bodies with all their impurities.[90]

However, this idea of denudation or stripping off the flesh, was exceptional among the Fathers says de Lubac. It did not become general until later. The earlier view of the Fathers, that is, the idea of an exchange of the tunic of flesh for immortality, was much more scriptural and liturgical. Aristotelian-scholasticism readily leant itself to using _superadditus_ by reason of its categories of _habitus_ and faculty, accident and essence. Thus, William of Auxerre described grace as being _superaddita_, and others made similar applications. Nevertheless, in the thirteenth century _supernaturalis_ was never confused with _superadditus_.[91] De Lubac maintains that the former applied only to the end (beatitude);[92] the latter referred only to the means required for attaining the end:

> . . . God himself is "_bonum supernaturale_". . . . But never is he called "_superaddita_": such language in the 13th century would make no sense. The only thing "superadded" is the means destined for procuring this end. . . . It is grace. It is glory itself: but . . . not as included in the finality of the spiritual nature, but in their

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[90] _Ibid._, p. 382. See Origen, _Contra Celsum_, 1. 7, chapter 5.

[91] _Ibid._, p. 391.

[92] _Ibid._, p. 392.

> particular reality, insofar as they are distinct from this end, as means, as "dispositions" apt for procuring it. It is, for example, "lumen gloriae", not "beatitudo" or "visio Dei".[93]

De Lubac is certain that Thomas is clear on this point. He cites a passage from Contra Gentes as an illustration:

> It is fitting that some supernatural form and perfection be added to man, by which he might be conveniently ordered to his end. . . Some perfection above man's own nature is added to man that he might attain his end viz. grace, etc.[94]

But as time went on, superadditum and supernaturale became interchangeable. Gradually, the means became both "supernatural" and "superadded". There would come a day, says de Lubac, when:

> . . . supernaturale would be superadditum naturae, not only in the sense of a "good superadded to a natural good", but in the sense of "finality superadded to natural finality".[95]

The Miraculous and the Transcendent

Thomas taught that God is the supernatural cause or power and that he is a supernatural being in himself. But this does not mean that all of his effects are of the supernatural order because God creates natural and supernatural beings.[96] Accordingly, for something to be a supernatural effect there must be not only a supernatural cause, but a supernatural cause intervening in an extraordinary way (i.e. supernaturalis quoad modum, as the later scholastics called it). Miracles were indistinctly supernatural since they were not considered in relation to their cause but in relation to the natural order of things. Very few miracles were judged,

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[93] Ibid., pp. 392-393.

[94] Contra Gentes l. 3, C. 150 et 153 as cited in ibid., p. 393.

[95] de Lubac, op. cit., p. 394.

[96] Ibid., p. 395.

(as the incarnation was), to be absolutely supra naturam. Albert taught that miracles are above the power and order of nature but not above nature itself because nature has an obediential potency for miracles.

Nevertheless, from the time of Thomas on, a number of usages of the word "natural" disappeared. For example, the condition of Adam and Eve was no longer described as their "natural dignity" and rights were no longer called "natural" if divinely revealed. However, the beatific vision, while not called the "natural end" of man was described as "finis naturae".[97] It is not always easy to grasp the precise nuance of thought, says de Lubac, but generally the Thomists presented two basic meanings of supernaturalis: the ontological meaning of the "transcendent" and the modal meaning of the "miraculous."

In de Lubac's opinion, some mystics were much more careful in distinguishing the ontological from the modal aspects of the supernatural.[98] Ruysbroeck, for example, reacting to the wholesale and indiscriminate use of supernaturalis, devised his own terminlogy. Thus, he described the ontological by "superessence" and "superessential"; the modal by "supernatural" and "supernaturally".

> From the supernatural to the superessence, the relation is for him one of means to the end or of the way to a terminus. The domain of the supernatural appeared to him therefore as an intermediate domain: an order in which the moral life and the life of grace, the order of virtues and of gifts are joined together. It is a dynamic order, a process whose diverse phases are summed up in the imitation of Christ. By it, man is led supernaturally to his superessence.[99]

De Lubac explains further:

> The superessence is not, however, a supernature. It is necessary to see that it is, at the same time, beyond and yet within the

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[97] Ibid., p. 400.

[98] Ibid., p. 402.

[99] Ibid., pp. 402-403.

> supernatural order. By means of this order, it is not so much a question of attaining a far-off end as it is a question of meeting or discovering a reality already mysteriously present at the heart of every spirit. It is in us, or better, we are in it.[100]

Analogous to the teaching of Ruysbroeck is that of the other mystics, Meister Eckhart, Tauler, and Suso. It is interesting to note, also, that the Spanish mystics, Ss. John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila, rarely used the word "supernatural". Despite the advantage of clarity which de Lubac thinks "superessential" achieved, the word gradually fell from usage along with the ontology of Ruysbroeck and Eckhart.

Outside scholastic circles, the meaning of "supernatural" was restricted to the extraordinary and to the miraculous.[101] Rationalists and positivists dismissed the supernatural as pre-scientific and restricted to the realm of the imagination. More recently, philosophers, such as Renan, have equated the supernatural with the transcendent and the beyond. "The beyond" had agnostic overtones since it was considered to be the object not of rational affirmation but of belief only. Sometimes in modern language the supernatural implies a mixture of the miraculous and the transcendent.

In summary, de Lubac says that the word "supernatural" has had little importance in the traditional doctrine of the Fathers and the early scholastics.[102] From the late thirteenth century on, however, "supernatural" invaded the field of theology and gradually became more prominent. Little by little, its meaning changed so that it no longer referred to a metaphysical object.

> Now they speak of a supernatural plan of the world, of a supernatural order, or a supernatural economy and a supernatural destiny.[103]

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[100] Ibid., p. 403.

[101] See Ibid., pp. 414 ff.

[102] Ibid., p. 419.

[103] Ibid., p. 421.

The vast and systematic application of "supernatural" is in the eyes of de Lubac a distortion because:

> . . . "supernatural" primarily qualifies the last end of man and through man, the whole of creation. Man . . . has a supernatural end, that is, he is destined to divine union by sharing the trinitarian life in the "beatific vision". The supernatural, therefore, is essentially the vision of God.[104]

He does not think that theological development to be traditional or helpful in which,

> . . . by extension, everything related to this end [vision of God], everything connected has a right --and in the final analysis everything is connected -- to be contained in the supernatural order and therefore can also, in diverse degrees, be called supernatural.[105]

Hence, he feels that the original ontological and modal meanings of the word "supernatural" have been unified and transformed with the result that "the supernatural relative has been joined to the supernatural absolute."[106]

There are two causes, according to de Lubac, which help to explain this development: the reaction to naturalism from the time of Baius on, and the influence of the modern theories of natural religion on the field of theology (e.g. "natural religion" outside of theology and "natural theology" or "natural apologetics" within it). By the middle of the nineteenth century, the dualism of the natural and supernatural orders reached its peak. The more the supernatural order was defended, the more unacceptable it seemed to the unbelieving world. It seemed to the worldly philosophers that,

> . . . if "the natural order is a complete order", if the supernatural order appears to be simply superimposed on a nature already sufficient,

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[104] *Ibid.*

[105] *Ibid.*

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 424.

> it is difficult to see in whose name we would be obliged to cross over to this new order.[107]

In conclusion, de Lubac says that perhaps the use of "supernatural" was legitimate at times to defend Catholic teaching against naturalism but the Fathers of the Church did not find it so indispensable.

Part IV--Historical Notes

The final part of Surnaturel centers on one theme: the natural desire for the beatific vision. In a series of historical notes, de Lubac attempts to vindicate the interpretations of Thomas which he has assumed throughout the work.

The Natural Desire for the Supernatural

Thomas never used the words, "natural desire for the supernatural" but the idea is clearly in his writings, says de Lubac.[108] He meant primarily the divine vision when he referred to the supernatural. The dualism which followed later was the result of applying "superadded" to the end as well as to the means, something which Thomas never did. Also, today we view "natural" as the antithesis of "supernatural" but Thomas did not consider it in this way, and so he had no fear that this "natural desire" compromised the gratuity of the supernatural. Accordingly, de Lubac thinks those theologians are mistaken who have interpreted Thomas' desire to be a mere *velleitas*, or an elicited desire, or a supernatural desire resulting from grace instead of an innate, ontological appetite in man.

Unlike Aristotle, Thomas considered nature as Aristotelian nature plus the patristic "image of God". Just as Anselm "rationalized" Augustine, so Thomas "naturalized" Augustine (i.e. by positing the desire for the supernatural in nature) but Thomas is not any more a naturalist then Anselm is a rationalist. In short, de Lubac says that the supernatural is the object of an "absolute desire, however inefficacious, and yet the supernatural does not cease to be absolutely gratuitous."[109]

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[107] *Ibid.*, p. 427.

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 431.

Immediate Natural Vision

To show the extreme to which some have gone to explain the "natural desire" of Thomas, de Lubac details the view of Descoqs. The latter had set up as an hypothesis a natural beatitude consisting of the immediate vision of the divine essence. He distinguished this natural beatitude consisting of the divine essence from supernatural beatitude involving the Trinity of divine persons. His distinction between immediate vision and intuitive vision, says de Lubac, is, at the very least, subtle and is certainly foreign to the history of theology. His idea of a natural beattitude consisting in the vision of the divine essence is equally unhistorical, for no one ever suggested a natural beatitude which would be more than the contemplation of natural things. Descoq's distinction is merely verbal.

Natural Beatitude According to Thomas

Some theologians have mistakenly maintained that Thomas spoke of a double possible finality for man. Thomas certainly taught a twofold beatitude, the one perfect, the other imperfect. However, de Lubac says that he never taught that this imperfect beatitude, acquired by human striving, was a possible last end, in fact, it was not even conceived as being transcendent.[110] He held for a supernatural and a connatural beatitude but not for two equally final ends.[111] When Thomas taught that

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[109] *Ibid.*, p. 438.

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[110] *Ibid.*, p. 453.

[111] In this section de Lubac makes a number of references to Thomas' works where this twofold beatitude is mentioned. One of the more prominent passages is Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I^{a}, 2^{ae}, Q. 62, art. I:

> Per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus, quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur. Est autem *duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas*. Una quidem, proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, ... (italics added)

De Lubac contends that this beatitude which man is able to attain "*per principia suae naturae*" is only a connatural beatitude, one which is immanent and not transcendent. He cites another text, Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I^{a} 2^{ae}, Q. 5, art. 5, to back his position:

> Beatitudo imperfecta, *quae in hac vita haberi potest*, potest ab homine acquiri per sua naturalia, eo modo quo et virtus in cujus operatione consistit. Sed beatitudo hominis perfecta consistit in visione divinae essentiae. Videre autem divinam essentiam est supra naturam non solum hominis, sed etiam omnis creaturae. Unde *nec homo, nec aliqua creatura potest consequi beatitudinem ultimam per sua naturalia*. (italics added)

In any case, he maintains that *Quaestio 62* can not be used to support the theory of the two last ends or two orders, the one natural, the other supernatural.

See also, Henri de Lubac, "*Duplex Hominis Beatitudo*", *RSR*, (XXXV) 1948, 290-299. In this article the author treats the question of twofold beatitude once again, especially as found in the text of Saint Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I^{a} 2^{ae}, Q. 62, art. I. In interpreting *Quaestio 62*, he once again relies on *Quaestio 5*, *art. 5* for support as he remarks on p. 293:

> The first of the two "beatitudes" distinguished by Saint Thomas, that which is "proportioned to nature," is not a transcendent beatitude, the last and definitive end of the created spirit in a hypothetical world of "pure nature". It is an imperfect beatitude, terrestrial and temporal, inside this very world.

He sees this confirmed in *Quaestio 5, art. 3* where Thomas says that perfect and true beatitude cannot be found in this life.

In the same article, de Lubac takes up another text of Thomas, *De* man cannot see God in solibus naturalibus, he was only saying that man cannot see God without grace.

The Aim of Thomas' Natural Desire

Thomas taught that man had a natural desire for the vision of God to show that "man, by the very fact that he is a spiritual being, is really destined to see God."[112] De Lubac says there are a number of reasons for this position. For one thing, Thomas held that the beatific vision is more than a simple possibility. For another, he based his case on the principle that a "natural desire cannot be in vain," and since man's natural desire to know cannot be satisfied unless he knows God per suam essentiam, this must be man's last end.[113] This is so because man, when he sees an effect, desires

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Veritate, Q. 14, art. 2, in which the twofold beatitude is alluded to:

> Est autem duplex hominis bonum ultimum . . . . Quorom unum est proportionatum naturae, quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires naturales sufficiunt . . . . Aliud est bonum hominis naturae humanae proportionem excedens, quia ad ipsum obtinendum vires naturales non sufficiunt . . . .

Once again, de Lubac argues that Thomas distinguishes between a perfect and an imperfect beatitude or ultimate good, the latter being not a transcendent but an immanent and earthly beatitude. He finds confirmation of his view in De Veritate, Q. 24, art. 8. In this text, Thomas argues that unless the creature's free will could be confirmed in the good by grace then the beatitude of saints and angels would not be perpetual and hence:

> . . . ex quo sequitur eam (beatitude) non esse veram, cum immutibilitas et securitas sit de ratione beatitudinis.

In other words, the beatitude of this life and this world is not a true beatitude because it is lacking the immutability which grace alone brings.

[112] Ibid., p. 467. See ibid., Note D - "Que veut démontrer Saint Thomas par le désir naturel de voir Dieu?", pp. 467-471.

[113] Ibid., pp. 468-469. See Saint Thomas, Compendium Theologiae, chapter 104:

> Impossible est autem naturale desiderium esse vanum. Consequimur igitur ultimum finem in hoc, quod intellectus noster fiat in actu

to know the cause; and his natural desire to know would be frustrated if he were not able to attain the first cause of things.

Three Interpretations of Natural Desire

In the writings of the Fathers, the nature-supernatural relationship is discussed under the notions of the "image of God" and the "divine likeness" in man.[114] Among the historians of the Fathers, there are three interpretations of this relationship. The first group judges that the divine image in man is already a call to the divine likeness. However, they view this divine image as historical nature and not simply human nature as it is in itself. The second group considers the divine image to be equivalent to the order of nature, and the divine likeness to be equivalent to a superadded supernatural order. The third group concedes that the divine image is in nature and that it is a call to the divine likeness but the latter is only of the natural order.

Now, de Lubac thinks that these three interpretations roughly parallel the three interpretations of Thomas:

> Some, following Cajetan, think that the desire of seeing God which St. Thomas spoke of, belongs to nature historically and not essentially . . . .

> aliquo sublimiori agente quam sit agens nobis connaturale, quod quiescere faciat desiderium, quod nobis inest naturaliter ad sciendum. Tale est autem in nobis sciendi desiderium, ut cognescentes effectum, desideremus cognoscere causam, et in quacumque re, cognitis quibuscumque ejus circumstantiis, non quiescit nostrum desiderium, quousque ejus essentiam cognoscamus. Non igitur naturale desiderium sciendi potest quietari in nobis, quousque primam causam cognoscamus non quocumque modo, sed per ejus essentiam. Prima autem causa Deus est, ut ex superioribus patet, est igitur finis ultimus intellectualis creaturae, Deum per essentiam videre.

See, also, Contra Gentes, l. 3, chapter 58. See, also, de Lubac's later article on the subject: "Saint Thomas, Compendium Theologiae, C. 104," RSR XXXVI (1949), 542-576.

[114] Ibid., p. 475.

> Others, with Suarez and the Carmelites of Salamanca, contend that St. Thomas never intended to speak of a true desire. . . . - they try to sweeten his principles by understanding his texts to mean a vague and insignificant "velleitas".
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> Others finally, admit that St. Thomas speaks quite a bit concerning a real desire, they admit also a desire of nature . . . adding that the term of this desire is not the beatific vision, but a natural knowledge of God.[115]

He says that these three schools of interpretation, in effect, have one concern in common: "they believe they must deny every organic tie between nature and the supernatural."[116] Since they do not care to renounce the authority of Thomas, they feel they must "explain the texts."[117]

Interestingly, while each group concedes and denies different things, an eclectic harvest of their positions would show that, as a group, they concede the following: the desire in man is natural and it is a real desire; the object of man's desire is the supernatural vision of God.

Conclusion: Divine Exigence and Natural Desire

The mind desires God.[118] This desire is completely different from a biological desire, for unlike the animal desiring his prey, the mind desires its gift.[119] This desire for God is an absolute one, not a velleitas, and yet it is false to conclude that it is a demand, an "exigence" placed upon God by a creature. The reason de Lubac says, is that we are dealing with a paradox, the paradox of man naturally desiring God's gift. It is a unique case in which the mind desires "not only God himself, but God such as he cannot not be, God giving himself freely in the initiative of his pure love."[120] As long as we do not give up the basic truths, (viz. God has made all things out of nothing and he is a debtor to no one), there can be no fear of compromising the gratuity of the supernatural nor can there be any need to water down man's natural desire to a velleitas. This desire takes the form of a duty before it appears as a need. This desire is in man but not of man. Man's nature does not belong to man.

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[115] Ibid., pp. 478-479.

[116] Ibid., p. 477.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Ibid., p. 483.

[119] See ibid., pp. 483-494.

> And because the truth of our being consists, in a sense, in being alienated from ourselves, we awaken to ourselves when we become conscious of the very dregs of our being. So much so that . . . we can now say: God is not obliged to give himself to man because man desires him; but, on the contrary, it is because God wants to give himself to man that man is obliged to tend to possess him, --- before understanding that he will possess him only by giving himself to him.[121]

Natural desire or exigence is not what it seems at first sight, for its fulfillment involves duty as well as need. Thus:

> Identically, beatitude is service, vision is adoration, liberty is dependence, possession is ecstasy. [Hence], to define [man's] supernatural end by possession, liberty, vision, beatitude, is to define only one aspect.[122]

The solution to the problem involves the theocentric aspect as well as the anthropocentric aspect, and the two are inseparable. And so now the problem is reversed: how can any creature escape the embrace of a jealous God? It is no longer a question of man's rights over God but God's rights over man.

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[120] Ibid., p. 484.

[121] Ibid., pp. 488-489.

[122] Ibid., p. 492.

Surnaturel and the Anthropology of de Lubac

Augustinianism

In this first part of Surnaturel, de Lubac's concept of man takes shape in two areas of discussion: Augustinian man and its distortion by Baius and Jansenius; Thomist man and its rejection by later scholastics.

De Lubac's anthropology is strongly Augustinian (although not exclusively so). He takes pains to show that many theologians have misunderstood the teachings of Augustine and have mistakenly considered him to be the ancestor of Baius and Jansenius.[123] Augustine began with man as he is -- a sinner in relation to the grace of Christ -- and not with man as he might be in some abstract state. Unlike Baius and Jansenius, he taught that man's nature attained its perfection in being supernaturalized. He took man as a whole and not in segments, and fitted him into the larger picture of reality. There was not a dichotomy or opposition between nature and grace but only an intimate union and interrelation of the two because the God who gives grace is the same God who is at the core of man's being (intimior intimo meo). Augustine's "spirit" was not the isolated spirit of "separated philosophy" but a human soul "illuminated and fortified by the incessant action of God."[124] De Lubac judges the Augustinians faithful to Augustine insofar as they consider man concretely and completely, orientated in the depths of his being to the only possible end that a creature in God's image can have -- the beatific vision.

Thomas, in de Lubac's view, was substantially faithful to Augustinian theology and anthropology. He made use of philosophy to establish the possibility of man's unique supernatural end. His teaching on the natural desire of man for the beatific vision was the bridge between the two (philosophy and theology). In short, Thomas' concept of man was not a static one nor simply Aristotelian. The fact that he infused Aristotle with the vitality of Augustine is partially evidenced by his conclusion that Adam was graced in the very act of his creation and so is naturally capable of grace.

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[123] Ibid., p. 101.

[124] Ibid., p. 79.

De Lubac maintains that the bridge which Thomas attempted to build between philosophy and theology was destroyed by his later followers. Cajetan's introduction of the system of "pure nature" broke up the harmonious union of nature and grace, man and the supernatural. Suarez, another major promoter of the system, presented not a theological reason but a philosophical one. His chief concern was not the safeguarding of doctrine or the teaching of tradition but the establishment of a natural end for man according to the demands of Aristotle's principle.

The key to a renewed Christian anthropology, as de Lubac sees it, is a return to the Augustinian-Thomist concept of man--naturally desiring the beatific vision. He says: ". . . 'the desire for the supernatural' . . . is the first principle for explaining man. . . ."[125] He thinks that theologians believed that the system of "pure nature" protected doctrine but in reality it betrayed it. It produced a split-level man, reflecting the historic split between philosophy and theology. The more theologians rejected all traces of exigency in man to maintain the gratuity of the supernatural, the more man was split in two. As the natural became a closed system, the supernatural was cut off from man, and man came to judge it truly beyond him.

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[125] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

It is clear that de Lubac calls for a new anthropology which he thinks is a return to tradition, Augustine and Thomas. It is a concept of man made in the image of God and therefore destined to see Him only. It is a concept of man viewed in his totality and concreteness, naturally open to grace and orientated to the supernatural by his very creation.

Angelology and Anthropology

In Part II of Surnaturel, de Lubac shows how angelology influenced the development of anthropology. He points out that the Aristotelian "physicisme", introduced by Albert and Thomas, aided the creation of the state of "pure nature" which, in turn, led to a dualism in theology and the theological concept of man.

The author is harsh on the "physicisme" of Aristotle for he sees in it the tendency to swamp the "moralisme" of Augustine and thus produce a static man. He begins with the problem of the angels. The angel of Christian tradition was redesigned after the fashion of Aristotle's "pure intelligences", which were so perfectly rational that they were incapable of error. And so, the question arose as to how an angel could sin? Albert's optimism about Aristotle led him to try to interpret Aristotle in this matter rather than contradict him as his predecessors had done. He distinguished between the good "in se", concerning which an angel could not err, and the good here and now, concerning which an angel could err. Thomas was influenced by Albert in his earlier writings and perhaps left himself open to misinterpretation, but he did not teach the impeccability of angels in any created order, let alone one of "pure nature". Nevertheless, Cajetan interpreted him to have held for angelic impeccability in the state of "pure nature". The latter helped to strengthen his case for "pure nature" by applying it to the solution of the problem of angelic spirits' sinning.

De Lubac attacks "pure nature" because it resulted in a theological and anthropological dualism. He sees Aristotle partly responsible because of his naturalism which infiltrated the minds of Thomas' interpreters and shaped their new view of man with a double finality. The ontological inflation of the nominalists was also responsible, because by lending reality to mere hypotheses, it helped to change the meaning of "pure nature". Thus, gradually, the meaning was altered so that what was once a purely hypothetical condition, now became in Cajetan's hands a normal state of justice prior to grace. In this state, man had his own end distinct from his supernatural vocation. As we have already seen, Cajetan reduced Thomas' natural desire for God to an obediential potency and this was the primary reason for the dualism which followed.

This problem of angelic peccability or impeccability is not so important in itself but de Lubac uses it to show the influence of Aristotle's "physicisme" and also to draw attention to another area where "pure nature" was allowed to creep into theology. It was as if the interpreters of Aristotle from Albert on, were torn by two loves: revelation and Aristotle. This second part of Surnaturel is an implicit but certain criticism of an uncritical acceptance of Aristotelianism. De Lubac by no means condemns Aristotelianism but he is quite firm in demanding that we should not reject Augustinian man in order to make room exclusively for Aristotelian man because in so doing we will abandon Christian as well as Thomist man in the process.

"Surnaturel" and Anthropology

In this fascinating history, de Lubac shows how the word "supernatural" came to be and how its meaning gradually changed. This change in meaning reflected the growth of theological and anthropological dualism, but it also helped to shape it.

This dualism is not found in the scriptures, nor generally in the Fathers or in the early scholastics, but there are definite foreshadowings of it around the time of Pelagius. An unknown author was already teaching that the supernatural completely transcended man's capacities or needs; that nature was a perfect, self-enclosed order of its own; that the supernatural was relatively rather than absolutely divine, and expressed in terms of the miraculous. Another influence which aided the development of theological dualism was the word, superadditus. Competing with supernaturalis, it eventually became interchangeable with it. The result was that not only the means of grace were considered as being superadded to man but even man's supernatural end, the vision of God. Hence, this terminological competition helped to forge two finalities for man, one natural, the other supernatural. Thomas emphasized that God was uniquely supernatural but he also taught that miraculous effects were supernatural in a certain sense. But after Thomas, the word "natural" was replaced, in case after case, by the word "supernatural". Essentially, "supernatural" should be applied uniquely to man's last end, the vision of God, but gradually everything connected with man's supernatural end became "supernatural". The result was that "supernatural" came to be used to describe the "supernatural order" as well as man's destiny. Two factors acted as catalysts in this fusing of the ontological and modal, the supernatural absolute and the supernatural relative: the theological reaction to Baius' naturalism and the influence of the theories of natural religion. This campaign to protect the supernatural ended in severing it from the natural. And so, in modern times, man has rejected a supernatural so distant and unrelated to himself.

Did Thomas hold for a real, absolute desire for the supernatural? Did he ever teach that there are two really possible ends, two possible beatitudes for man? Why did he teach that there is a natural desire for the supernatural in man? Why have various interpreters of Thomas gone to such lengths to explain away this natural desire? Why should man's natural desire necessarily compromise the gratuity of God's gift?

The answers to these questions are central to de Lubac's concept of man because he considers man's natural desire for the supernatural to be the key to the new anthropology that is so needed in our times. But if de Lubac is deeply concerned with building a bridge between man and the supernatural, he thinks that others are equally concerned with destroying it. He sees the opposing opinions as various efforts to eliminate any link between man and the supernatural. Their attempts to "explain" Thomas' "natural desire" take various forms: they say it is not a real desire but only a velleitas; or they say that its object is only a natural beatitude; or they say that its object is transcendent but natural--an immediate vision of the divine essence instead of an intuitive vision of the divine persons.

Hence, in the last section of Surnaturel, de Lubac attempts to document more clearly the major assumption of the first three parts of Surnaturel. He maintains that Thomas taught the "natural desire" to show that "man, by the very fact that he is a spiritual being, is really destined to see God."[126] Thomas' argument is based on the fact that man's desire to know would be frustrated if he could not attain the first cause of all things. Thus, the nature of mind or spirit demands the vision of God: the desire springs from the roots of its being. Such a position seems, a priori, to compromise the gratuity of the supernatural, at least in terms of the past understanding of the supernatural. De Lubac anticipates the objections by placing gratuity and supernaturality in a new framework: the paradox of man naturally desiring God's gift. This is certainly a unique case, he argues, but this does not compromise the gratuity of the supernatural because it is God's work and God's initiative--not man's--that is responsible for man's naturally desiring God's gift. An even deeper reason is the mysterious being of God: man must tend to possess God because God, by reason of his self-giving nature, desires to give himself to man.

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[126] Ibid., p. 467.

We have seen that the heart of de Lubac's anthropology is the "natural desire for the supernatural". This is the thread that runs through the various parts of Surnaturel. If this idea is rejected then man's dynamic relationship with his supernatural destiny goes with it, and man is once more cut off, isolated from the only destiny which can give meaning to his human existence. As we shall see, most of de Lubac's critics seemed more concerned with the gratuity of the supernatural than with its relevance to modern man.

Before drawing this first chapter to a close, we should like to make one final point clear. De Lubac does not think that he is proposing a radically new anthropology. His overriding concern is the need for fidelity to tradition. This fidelity does not mean a "quasi-literal reestablishment of positions which the rational elan of the middle ages has surpassed."[127]

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[127] Ibid., p. 438.

Rather, it means a return to a total, vital concept of Christian man which reflects more truly the spirit of the Fathers and Thomas. He is not urging us to ignore human progress since the time of Augustine. He is only saying that we must not forget to incorporate those neglected elements of tradition without which there can be no new and authentic Christian anthropology.

CHAPTER II

SURNATUREL: CRITICISM AND RESPONSE

In 1949, the eleventh annual convention of the Jesuit Philosophical Association was opened by the president with the following remark on de Lubac's Surnaturel:

> We are confronted with one of the most important issues ever raised in the history of thought. . . . For this, I think, is the philosophical issue of his Surnaturel: Is, or is not, the nature of man like other natures?
>
> If Father de Lubac is right, we are living, I have heard it contended, under a regime which has been described in the truly awful terms of theological nonsense. If, on the other hand, Father de Lubac is wrong, it won't do to compliment him upon his theological insights, his extraordinary erudition, his grasp of history, his skill as a writer. . . .[1]

Perhaps these words overstate the issue but nevertheless they do recall the serious concern which Surnaturel became for Catholic philosophers and theologians from the time of its publication.

The immediate reaction to Surnaturel was generally one of strong opposition. De Lubac was condemned for misreading the Fathers and St. Thomas. He was attacked for rejecting "pure nature" and for interpreting St. Thomas' "natural desire" in such a way as to compromise the gratuity of the supernatural. Only his friends, Henri Rondet and Henri Bouillard, came to his support. However, during the years 1946-1950, there were a few theologians and philosophers who realized that de Lubac was raising legitimate questions. These men did not necessarily agree with our author's solutions but they sensed that it was one thing to reject de Lubac's solutions but quite another thing to ignore the problem he had brought into focus. Was the Catholic conception of the relation of nature to the supernatural an "extrinsecist" approach? In other words, did the supernatural appear as an imposition on a completely self-contained and self-enclosed human nature?

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[1] Gerard Smith, S.J., "Presidential Address," Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the JPA, 1949, pp. 13-14.

Out of de Lubac's problematic there grew a positive development. At the beginning, it was the judgment of some Catholic thinkers that the problem lay in the static philosophy of essences to which theology was wedded. Later (although there were earlier foreshadowings of it), some theologians judged that the only possible answer consisted in placing the problem in a new context. Thus, they changed the context from the metaphysical to the historical. The object was no longer man in his essence but man in his historical situation, that is, in the "supernatural existential."

During the years, 1946-1949, de Lubac's rebuttal consisted in three brief essays, which were largely reiterations of different parts of the original Surnaturel. In 1950, Pius XII issued his famous encyclical, Humani Generis which seemed to many to be an implicit condemnation of the central thesis of Surnaturel.[2] Although not condemned by name, de Lubac was left in the shadows by the encyclical and did not write again on the subject of the supernatural until 1965.

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[2] Gustave Weigel, S.J., "Gleanings from the Commentaries on 'Humani Generis'," TS, XII (1951), 540.

Early Opposition

The critics attacked de Lubac's Surnaturel on two major points: "pure nature" and "natural desire". They argued that his position was historically and philosophically unsound. Thus, the early critics generally rejected his central thesis, his new anthropology: viz., that man naturally desires the supernatural.

Pure Nature

G. De Broglie,[3] among others,[4] made a strong case for those who maintained that such a hypothetical condition was necessary for preserving the gratuity of the supernatural. He agreed with de Lubac that the Fathers did not expressly teach the possibility of an economy other than the graced economy which we actually enjoy, but on the other hand, they did not deny such a possibility. The Fathers were historically rather than metaphysically oriented. For example, the notion of "nature" in Augustine was "historical rather than metaphysical, taking man not as he necessarily is but insofar as God has originally willed him to be."[5]

But the question of pure nature cannot be solved by the data of revelation or the writings of the Fathers, de Broglie argued, because it is a philosophical issue which is at stake. Hence, either we must concede the possibility of a pure nature or deny the gratuity of the supernatural order. If there is no other possible destination for man than the vision of God, then grace is no longer grace.

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[3] Guy de Broglie, S.J., "De Gratuitate ordinis supernaturalis ad quem homo elevatus est," G, XXIX (1948), 435-463.

[4] See Charles Boyer, S.J., "Nature pure et surnaturel," G, XXVII (1947), 379-395. See also, H. de Lubac, S.J., et J. de Blic, S.J. "Echange de vues a propos de la conception medieval de l'ordre surnaturel," MSR, IV (1947), 365-379.

[5] de Broglie, op. cit., p. 437.

> For, if by the very essential laws of a spiritual nature, man would be called to participate in divine life and would partake of this heavenly inheritance, the _essential_ nobility of man himself would be celebrated, which would not allow him to be called to any other end than the very society of God; but absurdly. . . .[6]

Further, de Broglie concluded from Pius X's encyclical, _Pascendi_[7] which attacked those who teach any exigency in man for the supernatural order, that there must be allowed a possibility of an order of pure nature.

Many felt that Alfaro had definitively treated the historical aspect of the problem of pure nature in a careful study of thomist theologians from Thomas to Cajetan.[8] He agreed with de Lubac that Thomas never affirmed explicitly or equivalently the hypothetical state of pure nature but he maintained that Thomas unquestionably set up the principles which necessarily lead to such a possibility.[9] What de Lubac failed to see in his researches, Alfaro held, is that the gratuitous and supernatural character of God's gifts to men necessarily demands the possibility of a state of pure nature. Hence, it is at least possible that man in a pure state might have lacked the vision of God as his destiny. The theologians who followed Thomas--Durand, Peter de Palude, Capreolus--were "unanimously faithful to the principles established by St. Thomas on this problem (pure nature)."[10] Finally, Alfaro disagreed with de Lubac that Cajetan had invented pure nature. On the contrary, when Cajetan taught the possibility of pure nature, he was not introducing a concept foreign to the principles of Thomas or his followers but was showing that he "truly continued the thought of the Angelic Doctor and of the thomist theologians of the 14th and 15th centuries."[11]

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[6] _Ibid_., p. 444.

[7] _DR_, 2103. Omitted in _DS._ See, also, L. Renwart, S.J., "La 'nature pure' a la lumière de l'encyclique _Humani Generis_," _NRT_, LXXIV (1952), 337-354. Renwart sees _Humani Generis_ as a continuation of the teaching of Pius V, Pius VI, and Pius X. Thus, _Humani Generis_ implies the possibility of a pure nature.

[8] Juan Alfaro, S.J., _Lo natural y lo Sobrenatural, estudio historico desde santo Tomas hasta Cayetano, 1274-1534_ (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1952).

[9] _Ibid_., p. 283.

Natural Desire

The greater part of the criticism against Surnaturel was levelled against de Lubac's teaching on the natural desire of man for the beatific vision. Malévez, for example, wondered how the human spirit could be ordered to the vision by metaphysical necessity.[12] He asked how it was possible for the supernatural to remain gratuitous if man has an absolute natural desire for it. Granted that the Fathers seem to favor de Lubac, were they not speaking within the hypothesis of the given world rather than the world of essences or metaphysics? De Lubac's system suffers from an internal contradiction, for it is impossible to affirm at one and at the same time that our desire for God is unconditional and yet inefficacious. When de Lubac explains his case by stressing the divine origin and graciousness of man's desire, he seems to identify the desire with grace and thus to confuse nature and grace.

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[10] Juan Alfaro, S.J., "La gratuidad de la vision intuitiva de la esencia divina y la posibilidad del estado de naturaliza pure segun los teologos tomistas anteriores a Cayetano," G, XXXI (1950), 251.

[11] Ibid., p. 252.

[12] Leopold Malévez, S.J., "L'Esprit et le desir de Dieu," NRT, LXI (1947), 21.

A slightly different tack and a more sympathetic tone was maintained by Roy in his criticism of de Lubac.[13] He said that any desire for the supernatural, however primitive or obscure, must contain some supernatural element in it. In other words, there can be no simply natural desire for the supernatural. Accordingly, we must have recourse to obediential potency, not a "simple, empty being," but "the power of a nature opened by God to an even higher destiny."[14] This obediential potency has two sides. On the one hand, it is natural because rooted in man. On the other hand, God has called man to demand something other than nature. Hence, the desire of seeing God exists only in a graced world in which grace builds on this obediential potency and "prolongs the aspirations of nature."[15] While Roy did not agree with de Lubac he did admit that de Lubac had given a new perspective to the question and had pointed out the error of severing existentially the natural and supernatural spheres.

Le Guillou,[16] like Roy, also opposed de Lubac's interpretation of natural desire, but also showed signs of genuinely trying to meet de Lubac's protest against the absolute separation of the natural and the supernatural. Le Guillou pointed out that the context of Thomas' teaching on natural desire (viz. III Contra Gentes) must be kept in mind. Historically, he was attempting to defend the possibility of the vision against the Greek Christians and the Arabs who denied it.[17] Further, he was attempting to structure the Augustinian "restless heart" by a dialectic based on the Greek idea of knowledge. The desire is called natural because it flows from man's intellectual nature. Thomas did not conceive of man's capacity for the divine as a passive power or as an obediential potency. The fact that Thomas used such terms as "_aptitudo_", "_inclinatio_", "_capacitas_", "_ordinatio_", and "_habilitas_" indicates that he considered man's capacity to be like an "opening" (_ouverture_) for the supernatural.[18] Thus, without contradiction, Thomas "affirms the natural desire of seeing God -- and that the spirit is not effectively proportioned to see God."[19]

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[13] Lucien Roy, S.J., "Désir naturel de voir Dieu," SE, I (1948), 110-142.

[14] Ibid., p. 136.

[15] Ibid., p. 141.

[16] M. J. Le Guillou, O.P., "Surnaturel," RSPT, XXIV (1950), 226-43.

The Response of de Lubac and Friends

The only clear support that de Lubac received was from his friends, Rondet and Bouillard. In 1948, Rondet defended de Lubac's historical interpretations in an article on pure nature and the theologians of the sixteenth century.[20] Rondet said that sometimes speculative theologians are careless of history, forcing authors of the past to fit into their own speculative molds of the present. He said that the critics of de Lubac seem to have been guilty of this tendency. Was the gratuity of the supernatural historically tied to the possibility of pure nature? Rondet agreed with de Lubac that it was not. Augustine recognized only one last end for man. Even Thomas, who attempted to give Aristotelian precision and structure to Christian thought, taught only one end for man--and that a supernatural beatitude. When Thomas distinguished the natural and the supernatural, the former was always considered to be within a total order whose finality was supernatural.

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[17] _Ibid._, p. 229.

[18] _Ibid._, p. 232.

[19] _Ibid._, p. 234.

[20] Henri Rondet, S.J., "Le Problème de la nature pure et la théologie due XVI^e siècle," _RSR_, XXXV (1948), 481-521.

Rondet also supported de Lubac's indictment of Cajetan's exegesis of Thomas' natural desire for beatitude.[21] When Cajetan interpreted not only Thomas' but Augustine's teaching on man's natural capacity for God to be an obediential potency, he betrayed a gross "apriorisme". Sylvester of Ferrara and Soto both opposed Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas. Soto implied the source of Cajetan's error: his literal Aristotelianism. Since Aristotle knew nothing of the supernatural he could not concede that something could have an inclination to something without having the powers of attaining it. Bellarmine, Lessius and others widened the gap between the possible and the real orders. Rondet judged that it was de Lubac and not his critics who read history correctly. In conclusion he asked: ". . . is not [de Lubac's thesis] more capable of saving transcendence and gratuity?"[22]

No one did more to clarify the issues and draw up the battle lines than Bouillard. In his lengthy article on Blondel,[23] he pointed out that Blondel had been pressured by certain theologians into giving great insistence to the possibility of the state of pure nature. Thus, Blondel was torn between two extremes: a philosophy of the concrete and a philosophy of the possible. Bouillard proceeded to describe the problem in detail:

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[21] Ibid., p. 492.

[22] Ibid., p. 521.

[23] Henri Bouillard, S.J., "L'intention fondamentale de Maurice Blondel et la théologie," RSR, XXXVI (1949), 321-402.

> . . . this doctrine (pure nature) is bound historically and logically, to a philosophy which pretends to seize being in its essence, abstracting from concrete existence, a philosophy which proceeds from the possible to the real and tends to conceive of existence as an obscure complement of the possible. This manner of thought was adopted by theologians a long time ago. . . . As long as human nature is considered as an abstraction apart from real and historic relationships, then a necessary relation to the supernatural must be considered to be the destruction of both transcendence and the gratuity of the supernatural.[24]

Bouillard felt that the question is not whether we should hold for pure nature or not, "but the real question is whether we ought to hold such a philosophy."[25] The implications for the Surnaturel debate could not be more clear.

During the years 1948-1949, de Lubac himself published three articles in reply to his critics. All three were expansions of material which had originally appeared in Surnaturel. The first two articles were commentaries on passages from St. Thomas. In the first article,[26] de Lubac argued that Thomas could not be used in support of a purely natural order or a double finality for man.[27] In the second article,[28] he repeated his contention that Thomas taught that man naturally desires the vision of God.[29]

The third and most important article, "Le mystere du surnaturel,"[30] developed the argument for natural desire which de Lubac had presented in the conclusion of Surnaturel.[31] He maintained once again that the insistence on a possible order of pure nature resulted in erasing the actually existing nature in the order of reality.[32] In other words, the real situation of man is changed by the separation of nature and the supernatural, and its by-product is a self-contained and self-sufficient humanity. Man's actual desire for the vision of God is so much a part of his being that it cannot be frustrated without doing essential injury to his being. The reason is that:

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[24] Ibid., p. 377.

[25] Ibid., p. 378.

[26] Henri de Lubac, "Duplex hominis beatitudo," RSR, XXXV (1948), 290-299.

[27] See infra., Chapter I, p. 45.

[28] Henri de Lubac, "Saint Thomas, Compendium Theologiae, C. 104," RSR, XXXVI (1949), 542-576.

[29] See infra., p. 46.

[30] Henri de Lubac, "Le mystère de surnaturel," RSR, XXXVI (1949), 80-121.

> It [this desire] is in me from the fact of my sharing nature in actual humanity. For, my finality, of which this desire is the expression, comes to me from my nature. And I do not have any other real end, that is, one which is really assigned to my nature, except "to see God". . . . If I lack this desire in myself, "I lack all".[33]

Hence, the problem still remains: how is the supernatural gratuitous, not for a hypothetical human nature, but for this concrete historical nature here and now?

De Lubac pointed out that it is quite inadequate to explain the problem by the analogy of a gift received by one man from another man. By this analogy, God gives me being and then he impresses a supernatural finality on my being. But this is no solution:

> It is contradictory. It does not express truly -- it does not express sufficiently -- the radical gift of being which God has given me . . . in creating me. For this gift is completely interior and there is nothing of what I am without it.[34]

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[31] See de Lubac, op. cit., pp. 483-494.

[32] de Lubac, "Le mystère du surnaturel," p. 88.

[33] Ibid., p. 92.

[34] Ibid., p. 102.

To say that God has etched in my being a supernatural finality is to speak,

> . . . as if his situation in my regard was completely exterior, allowing him only to give me a gift, a gift entirely external. . . . In summary, as soon as I say "I", I exist, I have my being; and as soon as I exist, as soon as I have my being, I am finalized.[35]

Along with the foregoing remarks, de Lubac continued to hold that:

> After as before, we can continue to say that if God had willed, he would have been able not to give us being, and that this being which he has given us could have been lacking the call to see him.[36]

He added that the supernatural gift was not a simple sequel to creation, for the gap between nature and the supernatural was as great as that between being and non-being. How then can we explain the mystery? God is absolutely free, and so the desire in our nature which results from the free gift of himself to us can only be explained by his love.[37]

These were to be the last remarks by de Lubac on the subject of the supernatural for the next fifteen years. Perhaps he had no more to say on the subject at the time, but it seems more than likely that Pius XII's encyclical letter, Humani Generis, was the reason for his silence. Issued on August 12, 1950, it condemned, among others, those who:

> . . . destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision.[38]

Although de Lubac was not mentioned by name, many commentators on Humani

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[35] Ibid., p. 103.

[36] Ibid., p. 104.

[37] Ibid., p. 120.

[38] Pius XII, Humani Generis (Washington, D.C.: NCWC Translation, 1950), p. 12.

Generis concluded that this section of the encyclical was a reference to his teaching.[39]

De Lubac was silent, but the debate on the problem of the supernatural continued to grow during the 1950's and even beyond. He had raised an issue which could not be easily brushed aside and he had evoked real concern for the condition of nature-grace theology. There were two developments which were fostered (in varying degrees) by Surnaturel. On the one hand, there was the philosophical debate on the nature and finality of man, and on the other hand, there was the development of the theory of the "supernatural existential".

Philosophical Debate

It is rather interesting to note that some philosophers in Catholic circles were more interested in de Lubac's position than the theologians.[40] The theologians, understandably theocentric, tended to be concerned with preserving the gratuity of the supernatural which de Lubac's theory seemed to undermine. The philosophers, on the other hand, were disturbed by the possible consequences of de Lubac's ideas on the philosophic notion of man. What kind of philosophic anthropology is possible if man has no natural end? If, theoretically speaking, we cannot speak of a purely human finality (pure nature) for man then, as Smith remarked:

> . . . it seems impossible to speak any longer of human nature as nature; and by the same token we cannot speak any longer of supernature, because there is no nature left for supernature to transcend.[41]

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[39] Gustave Weigel, S.J., "Gleanings from the Commentaries on Humani Generis," TS, XII (1951), 540.

[40] Gerard Smith, S.J., "The Natural End of Man," Proceedings of the ACPA, XXIII (1949), 47.

[41] Ibid., pp. 57-58.

Pegis answered that St. Thomas held de Lubac's position seven centuries ago.[42] Thomas, too, saw only one finality for man. Pegis thought that de Lubac's problem was his deep suspicion of Aristotelian natures. Aristotelian natures are not closed but open. In fact, spiritual natures are open precisely because they are spiritual. Man's nature is naturally endless because only the vision of God can quiet man's desire. Hence, the real question is not whether God could create but whether he would create man for anything but the vision.[43] Is man's supernatural destiny a mere incident that could just as easily not have happened? Pegis thought not. If man is not a merely natural thing does this imply an exigency of the supernatural? Pegis answered:

> Assuredly not, for the divine generosity does not presuppose receivers, it prepares them. God's most perfect gift comes first. It is not nature therefore, which requires grace; it is rather grace which, as a gift of the divine life, given with a love which is as unconditional as it is perfect, calls into being spiritual creatures to receive it.[44]

Pegis' opinion seemed very close to de Lubac's idea of finality and was reminiscent of the patristic view that God made man in order to redeem him.

In philosophical circles there were also some interesting comments on pure nature. Smith thought that the notion of pure nature was necessary for a philosophical understanding of man, yet he contended that St. Thomas was not the author of the idea.[45] Pegis admitted the possibility of pure nature but did not think that it touched the main issue that de Lubac was raising: viz. the gratuity of the supernatural for man concretely destined to the supernatural.[46]

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[42] Anton C. Pegis, "Nature and Spirit: Some Reflections on the Problem of the End of Man," Proceedings of ACPA, XXIII (1949), 67.

[43] Ibid., p. 79.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Smith, loc. cit., pp. 59-60.

Lonergan, much like Bouillard, recognized that the debate involved much more than the interpretation of the natural desire for the beatific vision. The real issue was between the essentialists and the existentialists. Thus, the static, essentialist position, which is expressed in a closed intellectualism, conceives of finite natures as being prior to world-orders. Such a view is very difficult (but not impossible) to reconcile with the natural desire of the supernatural. Lonergan argued that a world-order without grace is a possibility but it is only a "marginal theorem" and not necessarily a "central doctrine for explaining the gratuity of the supernatural."[47] Those who hold the essentialist position say that God must have a double freedom: he must be free a first time to create; and he must be free a second time to give grace or not. Hence, they say that God would not be free twice "unless there is the possibility of another world-order without grace."[48] Lonergan did not think that the number of divine acts of will is tied to the possibility or impossibility of world-orders without grace (i.e. pure nature). Accordingly, God has willed our present world-order by a single act and he could will another ungraced order by another single act. He concluded that:

> . . . The real issue does not lie in the possibility of a world-order without grace; the real issue, the most momentous in its consequence, lies between the essentialist and conceptual tendency

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[46] Pegis, loc. cit., pp. 66-67.

[47] Bernard Lonergan, S.J., "The Natural Desire to See God," Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the JPA, p. 43.

[48] Ibid.

and, on the other hand, the existential and intellectualist tendency.[49]

The Supernatural Existential

In theological circles, the most important consequence of the Surnaturel controversy was the development of the theory of the "supernatural existential" by Rahner.[50] Confronted with the seeming nature-supernatural impasse in the metaphysical order, he shifted the problem to the historical order. Deriving his inspiration from the ontological categories of Heidegger,[51] Rahner contended that since man exists in the order of salvation, he cannot be considered merely in his naturality. God has ordered all men to a supernatural end and since God's decree cannot be simply an extrinsic thing, a juridical decree, it must affect man intrinsically in his very being.[52] This effect, though gratuitous, is not grace;

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[49] Ibid. See Thomas M. McFadden, "The Relationship Between Nature and Grace," (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1963), especially pp. 161-181, where there is a good discussion of the essential and existential tendencies within Thomism. Typical of the existentialist emphasis in relation to the problem of the natural desire would be Maréchal and de Finance. See, for example, Joseph Maréchal, "De naturali perfectae beatitudinis desiderio," Melanges Joseph Maréchal, Tome I (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1950), pp. 323-337. In this essay, written in 1930, Maréchal illustrates his stress on the dynamic or existential tendency of being, when he writes:

> Our natural desire argues to . . . (in our very intellectual nature, before every elicited act) an inclination to the objective and subjective perfection of our activity i.e. finality to seeing God. P. 334.

For another illustration of this tendency, consult Joseph de Finance, Etre et Agir (Paris: Beauchesne et ses Fils, 1945), p. 341. De Finance readily agrees that it is unthinkable to interpret St. Thomas' natural desire for the vision of God as "an inclination . . . which looks to assure the integrity of nature. . . ." For, there is no proportion between man and God. However, it is acceptable to speak of this desire as an inclination for which nature furnishes the support. Thus, de Finance distinguishes between the "puissance naturelle," which indicates a relation to an agent with the power to fulfill it, and "appetit naturel," which is simply the "desiring capacity of nature."

[50] Rahner himself admits that the theory of the supernatural existential has been proposed in substance, much earlier by E. Brisbois, S.J., in his article, "Le désir de voir Dieu et la mataphysique du vouloir selon saint Thomas," NRT, LXIII (1936), 978-89, 1089-1113. At the time his first article on the subject appeared, he was unaware of Brisbois' article. See Karl Rahner, S.J., "Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace," Theological Investigations, Vol. I, trans. by Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), pp. 297-317. See also, Karl Rahner, S.J., "Nature and Grace" Nature and Grace trans. by Dinah Wharton (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp. 114-149. In this later article, Rahner made no major changes in the position he proposed in Theological Investigations, Vol. I. The supernatural existential or the

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supernatural *a priori* continued to be the perspective of Rahner's remarks. See also, Karl Rahner, S.J. and Herbert Vorgimler, "Supernatural Existential," *Theological Dictionary*, trans. by Richard Strachan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 161.

[51] In his introduction to Karl Rahner, S.J., *Theological Investigations*, Vol. I (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), p. xvi, Ernst described Rahner's "supernatural existential" as ". . . a modality of human existence as this is concretely realized in an economy within which by God's free decision this existence is ordained to supernatural beatitude." See also, Leopold Malévez, S.J., "La gratuité de surnaturel," *NRT*, LXXV (1953), 577-78. Malévez points out that Rahner deliberately uses "das *Existential*" instead of "*das Existentielle*". The latter, "*das Existentielle*", reflects the philosophy of Kirkegaard and Jaspers and refers to the concrete possibilities offered to existence, that is, an act which a man places insofar as he is a free person. "*Das Existential*", however, is Heideggerian, and means: "the general structures of *Dasein*, common to human beings in general, anterior to every personal decision, to every involvement of liberty, (i.e., the ontological structure of man)." Hence, when Rahner uses the phrase "supernatural existen*tial*" he means "a reality inscribed by God in man, in every man, before every exercise of liberty."

[52] Rahner says on p. 302, *op. cit.*:

> . . . must not what God decrees for man be *eo ipso* an interior, ontological constituent of his concrete quiddity 'terminative', even if it is not a constituent of his 'nature'? For an ontology which grasps the truth that man's concrete quiddity depends utterly on God, is not his binding disposition *eo ipso* not just a juridical decree of God but precisely what man *is*, hence not just an imperative proceeding from God but man's most inward depths?

though ontological (and not moral only), it is not constitutive of man's nature. It is an ontological constituent of man's quiddity.

Rahner conceded that the extrinsecism of the past was only too true: the supernatural was made to seem like an imposition on a self-sufficient human nature. He maintained this was so because it was presumed that man's experience was limited to the realm of nature. But if man exists in a graced universe and if this situation really effects man at the roots of his being, then we can no longer speak of purely natural experience or a simply natural desire for the supernatural. And so, we have no certainty that what we experience is simply and clearly nature or that our experience (say, of natural desire) would be the same if we were not called to the supernatural by God's free decree. Because we do not experience grace as grace does not mean that we do not experience grace. In short, when man experiences his quiddity, he experiences his nature plus his supernatural existential.

While Rahner agreed with de Lubac in his criticism of the past extrinsecism, he definitely disagreed with him in his solution. Man cannot have a natural desire for the beatific vision because then grace would no longer be grace but would be exacted by man's desire.[53] Nor is it necessary to scorn obediential potency[54] as de Lubac does, since the supernatural existential allows man to experience his spiritual nature as dynamically opened and ordered to the supernatural. (Although this is not an unconditioned demand for grace.)

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[53] Ibid., pp. 309-310.

[54] It should be noted that Rahner makes it clear that the supernatural existential is not meant to solve the problem of obediential potency or to explain nature's attrait for grace. If this were the case then someone could easily say that Rahner is merely shifting the problem to another term. Ibid., p. 302. (footnote). See supra p. 89, where Rahner was attacked precisely on these grounds by Schillebeeckx.

In rejecting the gratuity theory of the anonymous writer, D., Rahner seemed to be rejecting the same theory of de Lubac.[55] By D.'s theory, man has a natural desire for the supernatural but the supernatural remains unexacted because God's love is a free gift to man. If this is so, said Rahner, then we have a contradiction: a God incapable of refusing what is unexacted. In sum, he seemed to be saying that D. and therefore de Lubac, had jumped from the historical order into the metaphysical order. It is one thing to say we are called to the supernatural in the historical order but quite another thing to say that it could not have been any other way. In so doing, we have left the world of contingency for the world of necessity--we have abandoned existence for essence.

The theory of the supernatural existential was soon adopted by two other theologians, Urs von Balthasar, whose theological sympathies were generally in accord with de Lubac; and Malévez, a temperate critic of de Lubac. In his study of Karl Barth, von Balthasar agreed that there can be no purely natural theology because our reason is under the influence of the present graced order.[56] He had reservations about the necessity of pure nature. He conceded that from man's viewpoint, pure nature is necessary for preserving the gratuity of the supernatural but not from God's viewpoint.[57] In the real order, God has willed only one thing and this from all eternity--to give his love to man. It is anthropomorphic to imagine God pensively considering two possible orders before actually willing one into reality. In short, God does not proceed from possibles to reals, for the possible always comes after the real.

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[55] In his "Ein Weg zur Bestimmung des Verhaltnisses von Natur und Gnade," *Orientierung* Nr 12/13, Zurich, 30 juni 1950, pp. 138-145, D. presents a rough translation of the ideas of de Lubac's article, "Le Mystère du surnaturel," and Bouillard's "Le fondementale intention du Maurice Blondel,". As Rahner mentions, D.'s article was the most extreme of all.

[56] Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Karl Barth*, *Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Cologne: J. Hegner, 1951), esp. Part III, pp. 278-355.

[57] *Ibid*., p. 312.

Urs von Balthasar developed his own theological concept of nature at some length. There are three characteristics of this concept.[58] First, "nature" indicates the "otherness" of the creature in relation to God. It describes the "constant" which perdures through all of man's various states from first justification to final glorification. Finally, this "nature" in man is modified by grace and so it is not a "pure" nature historically. While the distinction between nature and grace is minimal in fact, the concept of nature is theologically necessary in order to preserve the distinction between God and creatures, and to preserve the gratuity of grace.

He further thought that Aristotle's categories of substance and accident are not adequate for man because Arirtotle did not take into account man's historical orientation to the supernatural. Man's ordering to the supernatural is not accidental but a part of his essence. In other words, man's supernatural existential is never separated from his essence and so we must adopt a new idea of nature to replace the static concept of nature as the principle of man's operations. The only adequate idea of nature is one which includes man's supernatural existential along with his essence. Hence, in the new formula, nature equals the essence plus the existential.

From this perspective, Urs von Balthasar criticized Rahner and

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[58] Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie," _ZKT_ LXXV (1953), 454.

Malèvez.[59] He felt that they had "reified" essence and the existential, thus making two things out of nature. Rahner did it by making the existential an ontological constituent of the quiddity. Malèvez did the same by reducing the existential to an accident modifying the essence. In reality, however, since the existential cannot be conceived of apart from nature, the two must be aspects of the very same reality.

Much like de Lubac, Urs von Balthasar questioned the traditional manner of guaranteeing the gratuity of grace.[60] Is the gratuity of grace really shown by asserting that God did not have to do it, or by saying he could have done otherwise? Man, in fact, is called to grace. Is God bound to give grace once he has willed it? Is grace necessary for historical man or is it not? Urs von Balthasar contended that grace is both necessary and contingent: necessary for historical man since he would not be historical man without it, but also contingent for it is not just another component of human nature. That is, grace is not a thing like a man's hands or feet, rather it is God giving himself to man. In other words, God is not like anything else in creation and so only in an analogous sense can we describe his actions as necessary or contingent.

In his concluding remarks on pure nature and the natural desire for the supernatural,[61] Urs von Balthasar leaned towards de Lubac's views but with some interesting qualifications. He held that we know much more about actuals than possibles. We know much more about the present order which is gratuitous than some other possible order. Since we do not know what pure nature is, how is it possible to explain gratuity by means of it? We simply cannot know God's possible powers in relation to another world order. Finally, does man by his very nature desire the beatific vision? Urs von Balthasar answered that such a question is concerned with abstract man and since it is not easy to distinguish abstract man from concrete man, it is difficult to theorize about abstract man. It would seem, thought Urs von Balthasar, that biblical categories are preferable to "natural desire."[62]

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[59] _Ibid._, pp. 456-461.

[60] _Ibid._, pp. 457-458.

[61] _Ibid._, p. 458-460.

Malévez also generally approved of Rahner's theory[63] of the supernatural existential and contributed a small refinement to it. He was ready to agree with de Lubac that the natural desire for God is an idea that is quite in keeping with the Christian tradition of the general upward movement of the universe towards God.[64] But he still felt that the real question is whether an absolute desire is compatible with the gratuity of the supernatural. Malévez then distinguished between an absolutely absolute desire and a relatively absolute desire, the latter being the desire man experiences in the present order by reason of the supernatural existential. Thus, he said:

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[62] Bouillard came to the same conclusion as von Balthasar in "L'Idée de Surnaturel et le mystère chrétien," L'Homme devant Dieu III : melanges offert au pere Henri de Lubac (Paris: Aubier, 1964), pp. 153-166. Bouillard felt that the supernatural is, in the Christian sense: ". . . the communication which God makes of Himself to men in Jesus Christ, or again, it is the participation of men in the divine life by the mediation of Christ." p. 163. The old terminology of "natural" and "supernatural" is incapable of expressing the personal and historical dimensions of the mystery of God's self-communication and man's free response. p. 166. What of gratuity in this new perspective? Bouillard answered that the ". . . gratuity of the communication which God makes of Himself to human liberty, is manifested in history by the contingence of the appearance of Christ and the faith of Christians." p. 163.

[63] See Malévez, "La gratuite du surnaturel," pp. 561-586, 673-689.

[64] For example, in Rom. 8:19 where St. Paul describes all of creation as groaning for redemption. Also, the general theme of St. Thomas' Summa Theologica.

> There is in the concrete nature of fallen man an absolute desire for the kingdom, and we understand by it the attrait correlative to the universal divine decree, which decree, in fact and not by right, has fixed for all men taken collectively, their last end, the supernatural end. . . .[65]

This absolute desire must be relatively so because its fulfillment in every individual case is conditioned by God's free gift of grace.

He recognized with Rahner that man's ordination to a supernatural end is itself supernatural and therefore cannot be constitutive of his nature. It cannot be extrinsic and it cannot effect a radical change in man's finality. In other words, it should be an intrinsic perfecting and prolonging of man's natural desire. Hence, Malévez argued that this ordination of man elevates his nature and modifies it intimately as an accident modifies an essence.[66]

In regard to Urs von Balthasar's contention that the possibility of pure nature is necessary to preserve the gratuity of the supernatural but only from man's viewpoint, Malévez strongly disagreed. Like Rahner, he felt that pure nature was an absolute truth, and not merely a relative one.[67] The idea of pure nature is not dependent on an essentialist ontology nor is it the result of an approach which proceeds from possibles to reals. For, by what right can we delimit God's possibilities by his actual decisions? And by what right can we so restrict divine power that God could not have made man for an end inferior to the supernatural? Nevertheless, the critics are correct in urging that the theology of the supernatural is best served by occupying itself with God's actual design rather than designs of human speculation.

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[65] Ibid., p. 678.

[66] Ibid., p. 685.

[67] Ibid., p. 675.

Malévez attacked Rahner's position that pure nature is practically unknowable because of the admixture of the existential. He thought that while it might be difficult it was not impossible. Besides, if we cannot have any certitude as to the essential structure of the spirit then there is great risk "of suppressing the very subject of grace."[68]

By 1960, the theory of the supernatural existential was further strengthened by the endorsement of Alfaro. He urged, however, that it should be placed in the personalist perspective of the I-Thou relationship:

> The internal action of grace and its corresponding experience pertains to concrete human existence: historic man is encountered permanently in an economy of grace. In this sense only is it allowable to speak of a supernatural existential in man; but it is necessary to add that the psychic coloration characteristic of the supernatural element in human existence is eminently personal: it is the call of the personal absolute, which internally invites man to a personal I-Thou relationship. By grace, man remains . . . able to make his free option before the infinite, as of person to person. This free self-determination . . . [brings] a special self-possession and consequently a perfecting of his person.[69]

Not all were in agreement with Rahner's theory. E. Schillebeeckx clearly rejected the idea in the course of a lengthy review of M. Seckler's study on the instinct of faith in St. Thomas.[70] Seckler[71] had proposed an interpretation of "instinctus fidei" in Thomas which resulted in conclusions similar to those of de Lubac. Thus, he wrote that concrete nature itself, the very essence of man, is an invitation to believe. To put it in our context, the instinct of faith in man expressed as a natural desire for the supernatural is the result of man's natural and real destination to the supernatural. And so, by God's continuous creation man's nature, by the very act of creation, becomes a concrete gift of grace and an invitation to believe. Seckler did not condemn the view of Rahner and Urs von Balthasar but found the supernatural existential elusive and its precise content difficult to circumscribe.

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[68] Ibid., p. 688.

[69] Juan Alfaro, S.J., "Persona y gracia," G, XLI (1960), 10. In an earlier article, "Transcendencia e inmanencia de lo sobrenatural," G, XXXVIII (1957), 5-50, Alfaro held that an intellectual creature would have sufficient reason for being even if it were not ordered to the beatific vision. But the influence of de Lubac could be detected in the following passage on page 39: . . . the intellectual creature, by reason of its very intellectuality, possesses a profound, singular and exclusive ontological affinity with the vision of God: an affinity discovered in the fact that outside the vision of God it cannot attain its perfect immutability and definitive perfection. . . .

Schillebeeckx rejected Seckler's position on the grounds that the term of man's real destination to the supernatural cannot be man's nature concretely taken. The reason is that the term is sanctifying grace itself.[72] In addition, he attacked the supernatural existential of Rahner and Urs von Balthasar as a useless and meaningless medium which only shifted the problem from the relationship between nature and the supernatural to that of nature and the new "medium".[73]

Nonetheless, Rahner's theory of the supernatural existential seemed to be in the ascendancy. Perhaps it is not the perfect or final solution but many thought that it did make it possible to ask the right questions. The question was no longer: how can man be related to the supernatural in any real way before the reception of grace?; but rather, as C. Peter phrased it: ". . . even before Baptism can one deny that the child is somehow in a supernatural order?"[74] Baptism certainly provides the means but is it necessary to say that it also provides man with his finality? This is a far cry from the theological perspective which de Lubac encountered in 1946--and it was not too different from his own.

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[70] Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., "L'Instinct de la foi selon S. Thomas d'Aquin," RSPT, XLVIII (1964), 377-408.

[71] Max Seckler, Instinkt und Glaubenswille nach Thomas von Aquin (Mainz: 1961).

[72] Schillebeeckx, op. cit., pp. 397-399.

[73] Ibid., p. 397. See infra p. 74 regarding Rahner's position in relation to this objection.

De Lubac's Later Response

In 1965, de Lubac broke his lengthy silence on the subject of the supernatural with the publication of two works: Augustinisme et Théologie Moderne[75] and Le Mystère du Surnaturel.[76] In both of these works our author elaborated ideas which he had previously proposed.

The study on Augustinianism was an expansion of the first part of Surnaturel, "Augustinisme et Baianisme."[77] Once again, he endeavored to show that the basic idea of Augustinianism does not lead necessarily to heresy. He underlined his earlier contentions: Thomas had truly preserved the anthropology of the Fathers and especially of Augustine;[78] Cajetan's application of obediential potency which eliminated man's natural capacity for his unique supernatural beatitude and made his finality appear as a kind of miracle, was a definite deviation from the teaching of Thomas.[79] Finally, the system of pure nature was a corruption of tradition and Thomist thought.

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[74] Carl J. Peter, "The Position of Karl Rahner regarding the Supernatural: A Comparitive Study of Nature and Grace," Proceedings CTSA, 1965, pp. 93.

[75] Henri de Lubac, S.J. Augustinisme et Théologie Moderne (Paris: Aubier, 1965).

[76] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Le Mystère du Surnaturel (Paris: Aubier, 1965).

[77] See infra, Chapter I, pp. 14-28.

[78] Ibid., p. 327.

[79] Ibid., p. 242ff.

There were, however, a number of points which were new to this study. For one thing, de Lubac proposed an added explanation for the development of the idea of pure nature: the case of infants dying without baptism. This problem had led theologians to create an intermediate state as an hypothesis which was easily applied to all men.[80] Our author also incorporated and amplified the material from Rondet's article on pure nature in the sixteenth century.[81] Finally, there was a slightly more extensive treatment of the Augustinian tradition in theology and a plea for a renewal of the thought of Augustine.[82]

The renewal of Augustinianism was in perfect harmony with Humani Generis which did not canonize any special system of theology. In fact, de Lubac contended, by proposing St. Thomas as a guide the encyclical did not encourage a "servile conformism" but rather "an effort of renewal which could hardly leave the system of 'pure nature' intact under the form then prevalent."[83]

The second and more important study which he published was Le Mystère du Surnaturel. This work was a theological-historical presentation of his latest position regarding the supernatural. There was nothing essentially new in his argument but the book did represent the clearest and most complete presentation of his anthropology.

One theme seemed to recur throughout the book: in the final analysis, abstract hypotheses explain nothing and safeguard nothing.[84] The concept of "natura pura" may be legitimate but the system of pure nature does nothing to solve the problem of the supernatural.[85] Man's desire for the supernatural is not accidental to his being, it is constitutive of it because man's desire to see God is but an expression of the very finality of his actual being.[86] Hence, the real problem, which abstract hypotheses never touch, is:

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[80] Ibid., pp. 140-143, p. 176, p. 205.

[81] Ibid., pp. 151-223 passim. See infra pp.64-65 regarding Rondet's article.

[82] Ibid., p. 326 ff.

[83] Ibid., p. 327.

> . . . to show how the supernatural is not only gratuitous in relation to this or that hypothetical state of human nature, or even in relation to human nature in general . . . but how it is so, precisely in relation to the concrete men which we are, in relation to all those who have a share of this present humanity, of this humanity which God has created to see Him, as is sometimes said, of this 'historic nature'.[87]

In short, man has no other possible finality than his present historic supernatural end.[88] And so, the question remains: how do we explain gratuity relative to this historic reality?

De Lubac readily affirms that it would be erroneous to hold that God was bound to create or that he was bound to destine intellectual creatures for the beatific vision.[89] He insisted, nevertheless, that although the Church taught these points, and rightly so, in order to preserve the gratuity of the supernatural, it did not dictate the systematic theories necessary for explaining it.[90] The extrinsecists, compelled by their desire for clarity, divided God's single act into separate parts, so that man's finality was made to appear as subsequent and extrinsic to his existence as an intellectual creature. The older tradition (the Fathers and earlier scholastics) was "much more personalist and much more existential."[91] St. Thomas, for example, saw man's finality as something intrinsic, "affecting the very depths of being."[92] Extrinsecists[93] consider man's finality as extraneous and accidental and so they understandably conclude that a natural desire compromises the supernatural and God's freedom as well. He argued further:

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[84] See de Lubac, Le Mystère, p. 257, where the author refers to this emphasis.

[85] Ibid., p. 56.

[86] Ibid., p. 81.

[87] Ibid.

[88] See ibid., p. 82 where de Lubac remarks that Rahner places the problem in the historical context also by use of his "supernatural existential."

[89] Ibid., p. 111.

[90] Ibid., p. 121.

> . . . it is not the supernatural which is explained by nature . . . it is on the contrary, nature which is explained, to the eyes of faith, by the supernatural. . . .[94]

It is the end which recruits the means. Hence, de Lubac felt that to attack his view of man's natural desire apart from man's supernatural vocation was to misinterpret his position.[95]

In regard to the idea of human nature, de Lubac taught that it was not like any other nature.[96] A rational nature, unlike a natural thing, transcends its natural form. This is so because it has an infinite character about it, a higher appetite. Nature is, of course, a paradox in which a creature naturally desires a supernatural destiny. The pagans, unaware of man's true destiny, did not see the paradox.[97] Cajetan, with his obediential potency, broke with Thomas and denied the paradox.[98] He was a genuine heir of the Augustinian tradition and so his concept of man far surpassed Aristotle's. Unlike Aristotle, who treated man like a star and applied the laws of the star to man, Thomas taught that there was no comparison between a corporeal and a spiritual creature.

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[91] Ibid., p. 91.

[92] Ibid., p. 100.

[93] Ibid., p. 89.

[94] Ibid., p. 128.

[95] Ibid., p. 136. De Lubac, remarking on Brisbois' position, stresses the point that in man there can be no natural desire for the supernatural independent of his supernatural destiny.

[96] Ibid., pp. 136-137.

Despite the majority of theologians who had abandoned the paradoxical reality of man for a simplistic clarity, there was a certain group of contemporary thomists who had reestablished the traditional anthropology. Rousselot, Maréchal and others in this school agreed on three things: that man has a "positive openness" to the supernatural; that the problem of the supernatural is a unique case, in other words, it is not in the order of the miraculous; that nothing created can satisfy man's natural desire.[100] It is this new yet traditional concept of man that de Lubac advocates, and this notion is based on the condition "there is a real dynamism and a real progress" in man towards the "inaccessible term".[101] If man's progress towards the absolute is merely an illusion then de Lubac concedes the possibility of a natural beatitude. For, as Jules Monchanin says:

> An indefinite progress without crossing to the end is like a march across the relative without absolute, a time without eternity, and

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[97] *Ibid*., p. 155.

[98] *Ibid*., pp. 179-182.

[99] *Ibid*., pp. 194-195.

[100] *Ibid*., p. 238.

[101] *Ibid*., p. 249.

finally, it is only the idea of going beyond and not its reality.[102]

Once again, de Lubac pointed out the inadequacy of the analogy of human gift-giving when applied to God. How then do we explain God's freedom in the presence of man's natural desire? God is free. Yet, "the ocean of being" is not only "the ocean of liberty" but also "the ocean of love."[103] It is, at bottom, God's "radical generosity"[104] alone which can explain the mystery.

De Lubac and Teilhard de Chardin

No treatment of de Lubac's view on the supernatural would be complete without reference to his appraisal of Teilhard de Chardin. The latter has been accused of being a pantheist, of teaching a kind of Hegelian evolutionism in which "the world spirit naturally so to speak, evolves towards the supernatural order and the plenitude of Christ."[105] In effect, he has been condemned for materializing the supernatural by making it appear as the natural, inevitable extension of the natural forces of evolution. With Teilhard, de Lubac shared friendship and a common master, Maurice Blondel,[106] so it is no surprise, that he has come to Teilhard's defense.

In a letter from Peking, dated June 27, 1932, Teilhard wrote:

> The whole theory of the supernatural . . . is discussed in a field of thought that most modern people have left behind them. It is

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[102] Jules Monchanin, De l'esthétique à la mystique (1955), p. 44, as cited in ibid., p. 251.

[103] de Lubac, Le Mystère, p. 280.

[104] Ibid., p. 287.

[105] Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., "La nouvelle théologie ou va-t-elle?" A, XXIII (1946), 138.

[106] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Teilhard de Chardin, The Man and his Meaning (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1966), p. 133.

> essential to transpose it into a system where things are represented in a way that is intelligible and living to us.[107]

Even if it were conceded that Teilhard's appraisal of the situation was correct, his efforts to transpose the supernatural were often confusing and led to much misunderstanding. De Lubac explained that his friend was not a theologian or a metaphysician but a mystic and a scientist.[108] His method was a combination of anthropology and cosmology.[109] In addition, he did not attempt to produce a fixed system or a set of clear ideas but rather he tried to communicate a certain esprit.[110]

De Lubac readily admitted that Teilhard's language was at times excessive[111] but he denied that anyone could legitimately question his orthodoxy. Teilhard taught that man had a divine end but he never taught that human effort could achieve it alone or that man naturally participates in divine life.[112] "Hominisation" was a preliminary condition for divinisation but hardly an equivalent.[113] He criticized those who equated the human and the divine, nature and grace,[114] but at the same time he opposed the "actual independence" and favored the "coherent subordination" of the two orders.[115] In all, de Lubac was quite definite in his opinion that, notwithstanding his excesses in expression, Teilhard in no way undermined or threatened the Catholic dogma concerning the gratuity of the supernatural.[116] In fact, the opposite is true for he had restored the truly Catholic harmony between nature and grace by:

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[107] Ibid., p. 120.

[108] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Penseé Religieuse du Teilhard de Chardin (Paris: Aubier, 1962), p. 115.

[109] Ibid., 242.

[110] Ibid., p. 20.

[111] Ibid., p. 90.

[112] Ibid., p. 169.

[113] Ibid., p. 174.

[114] Ibid., p. 172.

> . . . reestablishing the bonds so often stretched or broken, in order to organize things between the two worlds which, in the divine design, are really only one.[117]

These two men, de Lubac and Teilhard have much in common. One may look for the wealth of the Christian past while the other sought to bring Christ to the scientific age but both opposed the rigid duality in the area of the supernatural and both have called for a more existential[118] approach to the problem. There are many ways in which the two men differ, and yet de Lubac could have been thinking of himself when he applied this passage from Berdyaev to Teilhard:

> All the attempts . . . to grasp the external world without first taking into consideration the human depths, can only result in a superficial penetration of things. It is not possible to penetrate the universe profoundly if we separate it from the human problem, for the meaning of everything lies precisely in man. Positivism is the extreme expression of that tendency which not only seeks to attain the external world, as detached as possible from subjective considerations, but even regards man himself as an object among objects in this external world.[119] (italics added)

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From the appearance of Surnaturel in 1946 to the time of Le

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[115] Ibid., p. 175.

[116] Ibid., p. 181.

[117] Ibid.

[118] de Lubac, Man and his Meaning, p. 144.

[119] Nicolas Berdiaev, Le Sens de la Création, p. 81, as cited by de Lubac, Pensée Religieuse, p. 245.

Mystère du Surnaturel in 1965, there was an evident development of theological thought and perspective in the area of the supernatural. The sin of "extrinsecism" was at least generally admitted to. "Pure nature", if not completely rejected, was no longer unreservedly considered as primary in preserving the gratuity of the supernatural. Even in so-called conservative circles, the "natural desire" was seen as more than a mere wish, and "obediential potency" as more than a non-repugnance; and the rapport of man's nature with the supernatural was considered in the more positive terms of aptitude, inclination, and "opening".

Even more important, the theological perspective of the supernatural had changed. Theologians were no longer preoccupied with preserving the gratuity of the supernatural so much as they were concerned with showing how the supernatural was relevant, meaningful and, in a certain sense, "needed" for man. The context was definitely changed from the metaphysical to the historical, from man in the abstract to man in his concrete, historical situation. There might be debate about the abstract possibilities but there was growing agreement that the starting point is man as he is at present ordered to his supernatural end. Whether man is naturally or gratuitously ordered to this end is still an unsettled question.

In the light of all this, what can we say of de Lubac's anthropology? First of all, is his present position the same as his original position, or has he altered it in deference to his critics? Is his position consistent or contradictory? Does his teaching deny or implicitly compromise the gratuity of the supernatural order? Is his interpretation of "natural desire" equivalent to Rahner's "supernatural existential"?

Generally speaking, de Lubac's anthropology is the same today as it was in its first statement.[120] There have been some minor alterations and helpful clarifications over the years. For example, in the later book he seems less harsh on the idea of pure nature, even though he continues as before to attack the systematization of pure nature.[121] Apparently, too, Alfaro's study led him to qualify his remarks on Cajetan. He no longer spoke of him as the inventor of pure nature but rather as the first to place the idea expressly under the patronage of St. Thomas.[122]

In his first work, it was not always clear whether de Lubac was speaking of man metaphysically or historically. On the one hand he argued for a return to the patristic and existential tradition (i.e. man in his actual condition) and on the other, he claimed that man essentially, by reason of his intellectual nature, desires the supernatural. We think that any obscurity over the matter has been removed by his later remarks:

> The fact that the nature of a spiritual being, as it exists (telle qu'elle existe), is not conceived as an order called to be definitively closed in on itself, but as opened ineluctably to a supernatural finality, this fact does not entail that it has in itself and out of its own depths the least positively supernatural element. It does not entail that this nature, "as nature and by nature be elevated."[123]

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[120] See also John H. Wright, S.J., Review of Henri de Lubac, S.J., Augustinisme et Theólogie Moderne, and Le Mystere du Surnaturel in TS, XXVII (1966), 278-280. Wright says that de Lubac's most recent works show "no basic shift in position." p. 278.

[121] Compare de Lubac, Surnaturel, p. 105, and Le Mystère du Surnaturel, p. 56.

[122] de Lubac, Le Mystère du Surnaturel, pp. 98-99.

[123] Ibid., p. 55.

Is it a contradiction to say that historical, existential man is essentially a certain way? To say that man, as he exists, is of a certain nature does not involve a contradiction. If man were able to fly in his present existence we could legitimately say that flying is essential to man in his existential reality. At times, de Lubac may give the impression of holding that man by his very nature would desire to see God in any order. But since he is speaking of our present actual order only, this conclusion would not be justified. His reaction to abstract men should be fairly clear by now.

Traditional theology would seem to judge de Lubac's position as inconsistent because of the confusion of the essential and existential orders. In other words, if man can be conceived of without a supernatural finality then we cannot say that it is essential to man. As Rahner sees it, de Lubac jumps from the historical to the metaphysical order. According to Rahner's categories, Rahner may be correct but not necessarily according to those of de Lubac.

Much the same kind of criticism arises concerning the gratuity of the supernatural. How can man naturally desire the supernatural, as de Lubac says, without undermining the gratuity of the supernatural? Perhaps the answer lies in one's starting point or primary concern, so to speak. De Lubac begins with the certainty that God has made man for a supernatural end. If the only end that man has is supernatural, what other end can he naturally desire in the historical order?

The problem of nature-grace is very similar to that of predestination, grace and free will. An unrelieved emphasis on God's predestinatory power results in the practical annihilation of man and his free will. Similarly, if we are preoccupied with the divine gratuity of grace (which is an insoluble mystery and beyond all dispute for

Catholic theologians) there is the danger that we will not only fail to explain God or gratuity very well but that we will fail man--for whose enlightenment theology is undertaken in the first place.

How is man, as man, related to the supernatural? What does it mean in his experience? Is man's desire the power to achieve the supernatural? His critics had concluded that it was, but de Lubac argued that their deduction was not justified. Is man finalized prior to any call to the supernatural? Pegis thought so and he was sure that Thomas had taught the same. Are two acts of God's liberty required to preserve the gratuity of the supernatural or can we opt for one single act? Lonergan thought that it depended on one's framework of thought. Hence, there is only one thing that seemed beyond dispute: man in his present condition desires God. Rahner explained it by the "supernatural existential". De Lubac explained it by the paradox of man naturally destined to a supernatural end. The former seemed more satisfactory to traditional theology; the latter seemed to leave the gratuity of the supernatural unexplained.

Some might say that de Lubac had explained nothing, but he could answer that this is the nature of paradox, that it is:

> . . . The search or wait for synthesis. It is the provisional expression of a view which remains incomplete, but whose orientation is ever towards fullness.
>
> Paradox has more charm than dialectics; it is also more realistic and more modest, less tense and less hurried; its function is to remind the dialectitian when each new stage is reached in the argument, that however necessary this forward movement is, no real progress has been made. As the scholars of old say, in a rather different sense, of eternal life itself, we are ever going from "beginnings to beginnings."[124]

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[124] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Further Paradoxes, Trans. by Ernest Beaumont (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1958), p. ix.

CHAPTER III

MAN AND THE WORLD

If the pivotal point of de Lubac's anthropology is man's natural desire for God in whose image he is made, then its necessary result and indispensable condition is man's involvement with the world and other men. Man is authentically individual only on the condition that he is truly social. Man's vertical relation with God is dependent on his horizontal relationship with men, for man cannot naturally desire unity with God unless he naturally desires unity with his fellow man. In the final analysis, man's individual destiny is, at the same time, a collective destiny uniting all men together.

This social or collective dimension is essential to de Lubac's notion of man and is a dominant theme in his theological-apologetical enterprise. The reason is not hard to find. De Lubac is one of the earliest theologians to see that theological relevance must begin with a theological anthropology which can compete with the "new man" of atheist humanism. This new mystique of man is most clearly seen in the Marxist collectivist notion of man which has synthesized the social and theological trends of recent history. Thus, the ideal man in the eyes of the modern atheist humanist, is one who is dedicated to his fellow man and concerned with earthly values. Christian man has struck him as one obsessed with his own private salvation and uninterested in worldly affairs. This "Christian image", however distorted, has had little appeal for modern man.

The socialist extremism of the 'new man' of Marx and others did not develop in a vacuum. Rather, it was forged in the white heat of reaction to the unrelieved individualism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This excessive individualism developed over many centuries and was the product of a general development of individualism.[1] Theology had hardly remained unscathed. De Lubac judged that Aristotelian logic and Roman law had played their parts in the development. Both helped to construct a theology more concerned with clarity and precision, definition and the isolation of objects than the discovery of mystery. The controversies of the sixteenth century only fostered the movement. By the 1930's E. Masure could say that individualism in theology had reached such a point that:

> Our treatises on Grace and the Sacraments, on the Eucharist, even on the Church, are fashioned so as to give the impression that God the Redeemer is never faced with anything but an untold number of individuals, every one of them regulating on his own account the measure of his personal relationship with God.[2]

One writer, Père Philippe de Régis, commenting on this theological individualism, went so far as to suggest:

> Perhaps Marxism and Leninism would not have arisen and been propagated with such terrible results if the place that belongs to collectivity in the natural as well as in the supernatural order had always been given to it.[3]

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[1] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Catholicism (New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 1964), p. 167f.

[2] Cited in ibid., p. 175.

[3] Cited in ibid., p. 169.

No matter what the failures of the past, de Lubac calls for the present restoration of the truly Catholic man of the Fathers and the early scholastics. But no adequate appreciation of the social dimension of de Lubac's concept of man can be had apart from his careful study of secular man. In the following pages therefore we will treat de Lubac's analysis of the concept of man according to secular humanism.[4] The chapter will conclude with the social dimension of his Christian anthropology.

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[4] De Lubac has written at some length on the subject of Buddhism but the Buddhist concept of man is not of particular importance to our purpose here. Our author's concept of man has been fashioned in the historical context of western man. In addition, he considers Christian anthropology to be in competition primarily with the "new man" of Marx, of atheist humanism and not with the Buddhist concept of man. (See de Lubac's "The New Man," DuR, No. 442 (1948), 5-35.) Nonetheless, there are some aspects of Buddhism which touch upon not only the Christian concept of man but the Marxist concept as well. Rationalists of the nineteenth century attempted to use Buddhism as a "machine de guerre" against Christianity by claiming that it proposed a higher perfection than Christianity or that Christianity had borrowed inspiration from it (Henri de Lubac, S.J., La Recontre du Bouddhisme et de l'occident (Paris: Aubier, 1952), p. 172). Some have described Christianity as the Buddhism of the west (ibid., p. 175) and have attempted to show that Christianity is entirely dependent on Buddhism (Ibid., p. 208). A. Malraux judged Buddhism to be the first universal humanism--the first attempt of man without God to defend himself against destiny (ibid., p. 264). Haeckel recognized his own theories, such as the eternity of matter, in Buddhism. Others have concluded that Buddhism anticipated everything from positivism, evolution, and modern science to nuclear energy (ibid., pp. 235-236). -- On the contrary, de Lubac thinks that only a shallow mind can identify Christ and Buddha or Christianity and Buddhism (ibid., p. 254). In fact he considers it a much more likely hypothesis that Christianity influenced Buddhism (ibid., p. 80). He points out that those elements of Buddhism which seem to resemble Christian elements are later developments of a sect within Buddhism called Amidism. This sect was very possibly influenced by Nestorian Christianity in the fifth century (Henri de Lubac, S.J., Amida (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1955), pp. 226-236). In any case, what is the position of man in Buddhism? Since there is no historical foundation for Buddhism and since its character is so mythical in general, it reduces human destiny to a dream. In short, it replaces a dream world for reality. Buddha is not God and there is no personal, living God at the heart of its religion (Henri de Lubac, S.J. Aspects of Buddhism, trans. by George Lamb (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1954), p. 41). Christian man is made in the image and likeness of a personal God but Buddhist man is a creature attempting to return to the void of Nirvana. Man is an unimportant monad seeking escape in the depersonalized heaven of pantheism. The I-Thou unity of the creature with Amida is attained through the loss of identity and personality (de

The Man of Atheist Humanism

The concept of man according to atheist humanism does not include God or transcendence but we should not conclude that is is merely a negative notion. On the contrary, it is a positive concept of man, reflecting "contemporary atheism [which] is increasingly positive, organic, constructive."[5] It is not a product of social, political or economic forces only, but is the result of a kind of theology or better, an anti-theology. It is characterized by a "mystical immanentism" fused to a clear-headed grasp of the power of man in control of technology.

De Lubac believes that there are three principal aspects of modern atheism and that they reflect the thinking of three men of the nineteenth century: Auguste Comte, Ludwig Feuerbach (Karl Marx) and Frederich Nietzsche. Each of these men contributed importantly to the "new man" of Karl Marx. But before we pursue the thought of these three men, we must spend some time with Pierre Joseph Proudhon. This man, whom our author has described as "the unmarxian socialist", existed in an intellectual "no man's land" between Christianity, Marxism, democracy and even most forms of

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Lubac, Amida, pp. 270-272.) Buddhist charity, "maitri", may seem like Christian charity but in reality it never rises above pity or compassion (de Lubac, Aspects of Buddhism, p. 38). In addition, "maitri" is merely provisional and never enters into man's eternity. "Maitri" is simply a technique used in achieving detachment: one's neighbor is never loved for his own sake (ibid., p. 41). Thus, on the one hand, Buddhist man is seeking to lose his identity in the eternal void and on the other hand, his neighbor is merely a tool for achieving his escape. What of Buddhism and secular values? Bergson has written that Buddhism is an "incomplete mysticism" because it does "not see the efficaciousness of human action"(cited in de Lubac, La Recontre, p. 285). De Lubac does not think that Buddhist man is really in competition in the market place of modern anthropology.

[5] Henri de Lubac, S.J., The Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. by Edith M. Riley (New York: Meridian Books, 1966), p. vii.

socialism. He is important, however, because he bears witness to the revolt of the lower classes and to the depressing condition of European Catholicism. In addition, unlike the other three men, he never completely dismissed the problem of God.

Proudhon

Proudhon was the first man to describe himself as an "anti-theist."[6] Yet he strongly objected to being called an atheist for he was not opposed to the "hypothesis of God"[7] and in fact, judged that the so-called tough-minded man, who had no need of religion, was one who had never really thought about anything. In the speculative order, God may or may not be, but in the practical order, "man must take God's place in the chariot of destiny."[8]

In the nineteenth century, Catholicism was to religion what capital was to economics and government to politics. The three of them combined to form "the system of the ancient regime, which was called absolutism."[9] It seemed to the revolutionaries that everything of value to man was opposed or repressed by this absolutism and so it must be overthrown. But to eliminate absolutism, Proudhon felt that man must eliminate the primary cause of all absolutes. This is why he put his axe to "the root of the evil and opened the fight with God himself."[10]

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[6] Henri de Lubac, S.J., The Unmarxian Socialist, Trans. by Canon R. E. Scantlebury (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948), p. 171.

[7] Ibid., p. 250.

[8] Cited in ibid., p. 181.

[9] Ibid., p. 170.

[10] Ibid., p. 171.

Proudhon's attitude was rooted in his own bitter experience. His passion for justice was wounded by a church which had abandoned the poor.

> If the Church had resolutely taken up the cause of justice, she would always have been queen; the hearts of the people would have remained with her; she would have seen neither heretics nor atheists in her bosom. The distinction between the powers would never have been drawn. . . . Nobody would have cast a doubt on the authority of the priesthood, any more than on the certitude of its revelation; for nobody would have been tempted to doubt by the sight of social calamities, ecclesiastical tyranny and heaven's inclemency. It is the misfortune of man's lot which drives him to indict his religion and his God. Do you not see, at this moment, that your flock consists exclusively of rich people, and that those who are leaving you are the poor?. . . . O Holy Church . . . in which I was brought up and which received my first oath! It is you, yourself who made me lose faith and confidence! Why, instead of finding in you a mother, did I find only a cruel step-mother?[11]

It was truly difficult at times to distinguish between the goals of Church and State. Politicians who did not even believe in Christianity used the Church to keep the destitute masses in check.[12] Middle class Christians were more upset when Proudhon said "property is theft" than when he said, "God is evil."

There is still another reason for Proudhon's promethean stance towards God and that is his own personal makeup. By his own admission he was "The least mystical man in the world."[13] Mysticism, transcendence, religious enthusiasm all seemed to him foolishness and obstacles to reconstructing the real world--the social order. Unlike some other libertarian socialists, Proudhon was no enemy of morality; on the contrary, he was its champion provided it was "free from all mystical alloy."[14] One of the reasons he rejected Marxist Communism is that he saw it as a "new religion," another mysticism proposing to deify man. He realized that the disguised pantheism of Marxism would end in the depersonalization of the individual.[15]

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[11] Cited in ibid., p. 95. Pius XI referred to the Church's failure to identify with the working classes as "the great scandal of the nineteenth century." This is cited in ibid., p. 95.

[12] Ibid., p. 187.

[13] Cited in ibid., p. 289.

[14] Cited in ibid., p. 250.

Proudhon was filled with a passion for justice. In fact, he said that justice "is my God, my religion, my all."[16] But he did not mean an abstract or transcendent ideal when he spoke of justice, rather he meant a faculty or sentiment immanent in man. For Proudhon, a man of the working class and a sharer in its misery, the Church had betrayed the transcendent justice of God and so man must go on without God or the Church or any other transcendent thing. Despite all of his assertions he was never perfectly content to be a purely immanent man. He found the problem of God which he had dissolved in his writings earlier springing up again within him.[17]

> Whereas for Marx, "humanity lays down for itself only problems that it can resolve," Proudhon, on the contrary, was of the opinion that "our thoughts go further than it is given us to reason."[18]

And so, for the man of Proudhon, "the fight against God is never ending."[19]

Feuerbach

To the other revolutionaries, especially Marx, Proudhon appeared timid and uncommitted; incapable of utterly rejecting the transcendent. Feuerbach, on the other hand, shone in a different light and was the first of the three great influences on the Marxist concept of man. Feuerbach was the bridge between the world of German idealism, especially that of

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 213.

[16] Cited in *ibid.*, p. 279.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

[19] Cited in *ibid.*

Hegel, and the revolutionary thought of the nineteenth century, especially that of Marx.[20]

According to de Lubac, the sole aim of Feuerbach was:

> To reveal to mankind his own essence in order to give it faith in itself. . . . But in order to attain it he thought it necessary to overthrow the God of the Christian conscience.[21]

The tradition of God, in the judgment of Feuerbach, is an illusion. In fact, Feuerbach says:

> It is the essence of man that is the supreme being. . . . The turning point of history will be the moment when man becomes aware that the only God of man is man himself.[22]

If man had created his illusionary God by applying divine attributes to a non-existent subject, he could easily correct things by applying these same attributes to the essence of man, that is, to man in his "generic being". And so, Feuerbach reduced theology to anthropology.

The revolutionaries from Engels and Bakunin to Marx, embraced his doctrine with enthusiasm. In the words of Engel: "we all became Feuerbachians."[23] Marx, the most famous of Feuerbach's disciples, felt that the doctrine of his spiritual father was correct but incomplete.[24] Marx was not interested in "the abstract man" so much as "the science of real men and their historical development."[25] He transposed the religion of Feuerbach to the society of men. In short, the spiritual heritage of Marx can be traced back to Feuerbach because, as de Lubac says:

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[20] De Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, p. 8.

[21] Ibid., p. 11.

[22] Cited in ibid., p. 10.

[23] Cited in ibid., p. 12.

[24] Ibid., p. 14.

[25] Ibid.

> Marx' doctrine, never plain naturalism, always paid as much attention to man's spiritual life as to his material existence. His communism offered itself as the only concrete realization of humanism; it quite deliberately claimed to be a total solution for the whole human problem; moving to the plane of reality, it did not propose to figure there only as a social phenomenon but as a spiritual phenomenon also.[26]

Nietzsche

Nietzsche, even more than Feuerbach, was an anti-theist. He saw God as "the mirror of man" and religion as "a kind of psychological duplication" by which man attributes to a non-existent superhuman being powers which really belong to himself.[27] Hence, religion results in man being debased and his personality adulterated. Christianity, said Nietzsche, represents the process of man's debasement at its extreme for natural values are made to genuflect before grace and,

> . . . man seeks a principle in the name of which he can despise man: he invents another world in order to be able to slander and besmirch this one; in actual fact he never grasps anything but nothingness and makes of that nothingness a "God", a "Truth", called upon to judge and condemn this present existence.[28]

Nietzsche did not think that man would ever be truly man until the death of God was proclaimed and this by a daring act of man's will. "Even if it could be proved by mathematics that God exists," he said, "I do not want him to exist, because he would set limits to my greatness."[29] Thus, Nietzsche appealed to man's instinctive will to greatness.[30] Even in his madness, Nietzsche recognized the consequences of man's rebellion. There could be no more truth and no more value. Philosophy would be the art of creation and invention, and the philosopher "the man of violence."[31] The result of this would be nihilism, but at least man would reign supreme.

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[28] Cited in *ibid.*, p. 19.

[29] Cited in *ibid.*, p. 27.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

Nietzsche's fury was directed not only to God but also to "Socratic man."[32] He had established an antinomy between Dionysm and Socratism in which the former represented the aesthetic conception of man and the latter symbolized the rationalist conception of man. He saw the Socratic man as rationalist, abstract, almost barbarous in his hunger for knowledge, mythless and "monstrously deficient in a sense of mysticism."[33] As de Lubac mentions, Nietzsche made no distinction between myth and mystery and yet the two are as different, at least in the final analysis, as paganism and Christianity. It is one thing to attack the rationalism of Socratic man and quite another to substitute irrational man, living by myth and rapture instead of truth, in its place.

At the same time that Nietzsche was fashioning his own bold, powerful and egoistic superman, he was fighting against the Christian ideal of man. His contempt for Christian man was almost without limit. He fought:

> . . . that ideal [of] . . . truthfulness, ingenuousness, simplicity, patience, love for one's neighbor, resignation, submission to God, a sort of disarming and repudiation of one's own ego . . . as if that inconsiderable runt of a soul, that virtuous middle-sized animal, that docile sheep of man . . . were even the ideal, the aim, the norm of man in general, the supreme good.[34]

And so, as is evident, Nietzsche divinized man at the expense of divinity.

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[31] Cited in ibid., p. 30.

[32] Ibid., p. 39.

[33] Cited in ibid., p. 40.

[34] Cited in ibid., p. 64.

Comte

Comte, like Feuerbach and Nietzsche, was also an anti-theist, but he was not as preoccupied as they were with eliminating God. His concern was more organic and constructive, more positive--hence the term "positivism" to describe the solution he proposed.[35]

Positivism is both a method and a doctrine offering a complete plan of life. It is based on a single all-embracing formula called "the law of the three states." It reads as follows:

> From the very nature of the human mind, every branch of our knowledge has necessarily to pass through three successive theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state, the metaphysical or abstract state, and the scientific or positive state.[36]

By reason of this law, the idle speculations and unsolvable "whys" of theology and metaphysics gradually give way to the pursuit of laws which regulate phenomena. Thus, man's mind gives up its search for the absolute for having reached this state of "rational positivity". It recognizes that the only absolute principle is "everything is relative."[37]

Comte did not like to be associated with atheism because it was a merely negative system and because it prolonged the metaphysical state.[38] He considered the whole question of God unsolvable because undiscussable. This agnosticism, however, was only apparent since he felt that the entire question of God was meaningless and outside the real world of positive testing. His position was actually beyond atheism. Classical atheism had never satisfied man's need for worship but Comte had a program for filling the need. Much like Feuerbach, he substituted humanity for God. As de Lubac says: "Positivism is essentially a religion of humanity."[39] With Comte as with the other, immanence had triumphed again and God was earthbound.

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[35] Ibid., p. 77.

[36] Cited in ibid., p. 79.

[37] Ibid., p. 97.

[38] Ibid., p. 95f.

One of the charges which Comte threw at Christianity was, in his judgment, its antisocial character. He felt that it was antisocial in its very conception of man. In other words, the personal dimension of Christian man in which he is intimately related to God isolates him from his fellow man and involves a kind of Christian egoism. Further, he considered the Christian conception of salvation to be antisocial as well because it made human society to appear to the believer as,

> . . . merely an agglomeration of individuals whose coming-together is almost as fortuitous as it is transitory and who, each exclusively occupied with his own salvation, regard cooperation in the salvation of others merely as a good means of working out their own.[40]

Although he concluded that the Catholic Church had failed socially he conceded that it had been successful in the personal dimension of man. Despite his criticism of Catholicism, he appraised it as a provisional system paving the way for the true and second "Catholicism."[41] This new Catholicism of positivism however, would be characterized by the universality which the old had laid claim to but had never in fact realized.[42] Unlike its forerunner, positivism would become the true religion of humanity.

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[39] _Ibid_., p. 100.

[40] Cited in _ibid_., p. 107.

[41] _Ibid_., p. 128.

[42] _Ibid_., p. 129.

Despite Comte's claim to emancipate man from chimerical beliefs, his own teachings easily lead to spiritual despotism.[43] The positivist faith is a subjective synthesis which is continuously evolving and is a product of human determination. It would seem, de Lubac suggests, that mankind is potentially a more fickle tyrant than absolute truth.[44] A world without absolutes will ultimately be the victim of whim. Comte sought to throw off the yoke of religion and yet his own theory became more "religious" as time went on. But, de Lubac points out that:

> . . . the illusion cannot possibly continue. The virtue of a religion in which there is nothing transcendent, of a mysticism in which there is nothing supernatural, must soon show signs of exhaustion.[45]

De Lubac views the development of atheist humanism in our times as a personal, emotional, historical drama. The protagonists are Feuerbach, Nietzsche and Comte as we have seen. Each is a symbol for a dimension of the new man. This new man, along with Feuerbach, sees God as an illusion and mankind as worthy of deification in his place. In company with Nietzsche, he senses the need to will his own greatness at the cost of God's. Finally, with Comte, he believes in the scientific method as unshakably as any peasant ever believed in providence. Thus, the primacy of man, the will which drives him and the method he follows are the components of the new man.

In another place, the author describes Marxist man in somewhat less theological terms although the above characteristics are implicit.

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[43] Ibid., p. 146.

[44] Ibid., p. 141.

[45] Ibid., p. 158.

Hence, he observes that there are three characteristics of the "new man" of Marxism. First, there is his unwavering "faith in science" which disperses the myths of the past and provides true knowledge.[46] Secondly, this science is "wholly directed towards the possession of the world."[47] In other words, we are not speaking of pure science but applied science whereby man can remake the world through his own industry. Thirdly, man has within his power "the transformation of society."[48] Thus, a whole science and technology of man is developing which will enable man to engineer his own industry.

One idea emerges from the foregoing: the man of atheist humanism has rejected transcendence and has opted for immanence alone. At the same time, he has thrown aside that sense of mystery which could leave him open to the transcendent. All of this man has done with the aim of attaining his own perfection and true dignity. The question arises, however, as to whether man can even be man without God. De Lubac notes that Dostoyevski's dominating idea is "that to kill God in man is to kill man himself."[49] Dostoyevski recognized man's desire for the unity of all men but he also knew, as de Lubac says:

> . . . that the "ant hill", "the great uniform ant-hill", in no way satisfies that need. There is no mirror worthy of that name except between persons, and where there is no freedom there are no persons, just as, without God, there is no freedom.[50]

Perhaps the impossibility of a purely immanent solution to the social problems of man in his quest for personal dignity and unity is best seen in the following remark by Dolgorouki, a hero of Dostoyevski's Raw Youth:

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[46] De Lubac, "The New Man," DuR, p. 6.

[47] Ibid., p. 7.

[48] Ibid., p. 8.

[49] De Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, p. 199.

[50] Ibid., p. 201.

> And why should I love my neighbor or posterity, which I shall never see, which will know nothing about me, and which in its turn will disappear without leaving any traces or memories when the earth in its turn changes into a block of ice and flies through space, without any atmosphere, along with an infinite number of bodies of the same kind -- which is surely the most ridiculous thing that could be imagined.[51]

Our concern at this point is not the problem of God or man in search of God since we intend to deal with this aspect of man in the following chapter. Our concern rather is the social dimension of Christian man. Hence, the preceding treatment of man according to atheist humanism has been presented to indicate the importance of a strongly Catholic dimension for any concept of Christian man if it is to fulfill the modern need. It is evident to a believing Christian that the purely secular ideal of man without God is inadequate for a number of reasons, some of which have already been mentioned.

The Man of Catholicism

How can Christianity appeal to modern man when its ideal man seems to be one who is uninterested in the future of the earth or the fellowship of men? De Lubac answers that the Christian concept of man is more than it may seem in an age of individualism. The struggle for the unity of mankind and the cultivation of a universality of mind are indispensable characteristics of the traditional Christian concept of man. There can be no authentic Christian man who is not truly Catholic in the richest sense of that word.

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[51] Cited in ibid., p. 202.

De Lubac begins with a familiar patristic theme. He says that all men are naturally one because all men are made in the image of God. But the unity of mankind has been lost along with his oneness with God. Christ's redemptive work is "the recovery of lost unity--the recovery of supernatural unity of man with God--but equally of the unity of men among themselves."[52] Christ unites men together because in some mysterious way all men are in Christ:

> Christ from the very first moment of his existence virtually bears all men within himself -- erat in Christo Jesu omnis homo. . . . He incorporated himself in our humanity, and incorporated it in himself.[53]

Christ is the new unifying force by which all men are made one in the mysterious "new man", Christ. Christ does not destroy or ignore human unity, rather he makes it possible once again but in a more intimate and wonderful way.

The Church is the sacrament of Christ. She is "Jesus Christ, spread abroad and communicated," as Bossuet said,[54] and so she continues Christ's work of reunion. She endeavors to remind humanity of its lost unity to restore it once again. Like Judaism, of which she is the flower,[55] the Church is "essentially social"[56] and so the Christian finds salvation only to the degree that he belongs to its social structure. She is much more than a "federation of local assemblies", a simple gathering of individuals, or an external organization arranged for the sake of convenience. She is the "Qehal Yahwe"--"The People of God."

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[52] De Lubac, Catholicism, p. 22.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Cited in ibid., p. 31.

[55] De Lubac, The Splendour of the Church, p. 36.

[56] De Lubac, Catholicism, p. 36.

The Church is the means, the way to reunion but at the same time she is the end or that very unity itself. She is God's salvific intention for all men being realized in time and so in a sense she antedates the human race itself. In this regard de Lubac quotes a passage from The Shepherd of Hermas:

> "Who is this aged woman, think you, from whom you received the little book?"
> "The Sibyl," I replied.
> "You are wrong," said the Shepherd, "for it is not she."
> "Who is it then?"
> "The Church."
> "Why is she aged?" I then asked.
> "Because," he answered, "she was created first, before all else. that is why she is aged. It was for her that the world was made."[57]

In sum, to break with the Church is to rend the body of Christ. This, in turn, "is an onslaught on the very society of the human race"[58] for the Church is the source of its future unity.

The Sacraments are the channels of the Church's salvific power, but at the same time they are "instruments of unity."[59] This social aspect is so much a part of the sacramental system that in effect the Christian is united with Christ through his union with the community. Thus, through Baptism a man is incorporated into the visible church and made a member of Christ's Body. Again by means of Penance, the sinner is reconciled with the Church. In fact, as de Lubac indicates, in the early Church "the whole apparatus of public penance and pardon made it clear that the reconciliation of the sinner is in the first place a reconciliation with the Church."[60]

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[57] Cited in ibid., pp. 40-41.

[58] Ibid., p. 44.

[59] Ibid., p. 48.

Nowhere is the social dimension of the sacraments and by implication the social dimension of the Christian concept of man, brought out more forcefully by de Lubac than in the case of the Eucharist. Nothing seems more intimate and more personal than communion with the Eucharistic Christ. This is undoubtedly true, but de Lubac shows that it was this private and personal phase of the Eucharist almost exclusively emphasized which helped to distort the traditional teaching on the subject. The Eucharistic individualism of the recent past is one important instance in which the social dimension of Christianity was neglected.

One thought stands out clearly in the writings of the Fathers--the unifying force of the Eucharist. They saw the Eucharist as making the Church because through the Eucharist Christians became one body--Christ. The passages from the Fathers concerning this idea are numerous, according to de Lubac, but the following selections from St. Cyril of Alexandria is typical.

> To merge us in unity with God and among ourselves, although we have each a distinct personality, the only Son devised a wonderful means: through one only body, his own, he sanctifies his faithful in mystic communion, making them one body with him and among themselves. . . .
>
> . . . .
>
> We are all of us, by nature, separately confined in our own individualities, but in another way, all of us are united together. Divided as it were into distinct personalities by which one is Peter or John or Thomas or Matthew, we are, so to say, moulded into one sole body in Christ, feeding on one flesh alone. One Spirit singles us out for unity, and as Christ is one and indivisible we are all no more but one in him. So did he say to his heavenly Father, "That they may be one as we are one."[61]

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[60] _Ibid._, p. 50.

[61] Cited in _ibid._, p. 53.

The ancient tradition of the Church never separated the Eucharist from the Church. The two were bound together as "cause to effect, as a means to an end . . . and as a sign to reality."[62] The Eucharist was described as the "mystery of unity" and the "sacrament of federation."[63] "Sacramental communion" was always in conjunction with "ecclesiastical communion."[64]

The reason for the neglect of this social and unifying aspect of the Eucharist which is so essential to the understanding of the real depths of the mystery, are both subtle and complex.[65] The apologetic reaction to Berengarius, the stress on Eucharistic realism, the desire for clarity at the expense of mystery, these among other things had a part to play in theologians forgetting the social dimension. De Lubac argues, however, that a return to sound tradition means that we see with the Fathers "a profound identity between the mysteries of the 'real

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[62] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Corpus Mysticum (Paris: Aubier, 1944), p. 19.

[63] Ibid., p. 22.

[64] Ibid., p. 27.

[65] In Corpus Mysticum, an historical study of the relationship of the Church to the Eucharist up until the middle ages, de Lubac indicates the various shifts in nuance of meaning of Eucharistic and ecclesiastical titles. He shows that it is not until the latter half of the twelfth century that the body of Christ which is the Church begins to be described by the adjective "mystical". (See pp. 117-127). There were "corporealist" and "spiritualist" schools of thought. The latter school (represented by Augustine and Ambrose among others) was generally favored until the time of Anselm and Peter Lombard. Thus, for example, Augustine spoke of "the flesh of Christ spiritually eaten" (cited in ibid., p. 144). In general, this "spiritualist" emphasis can be seen from the fact that the Eucharist was referred to as "caro spiritualis" or "corpus mysticum." However, when Berengarius appeared on the scene, he began to use "the old 'spiritualist' themes in an atmosphere of thought which was not totally changed" (ibid., p. 165). His expressions seemed to compromise or attack the reality of the Eucharist. The first reaction to Berengarius can be seen in Alger de Liège who began to use "substantially present" in reference to the Eucharist. Hence, the new emphasis was placed on "substance" instead of "life" (ibid., p. 171), and "spiritualis" was no longer used to qualify "caro" or "corpus" (ibid., p. 176). Next, the description of communion as "corporeal eating" led to the description of the Eucharist presence as "corporeal presence" (ibid., p. 178). This was quite a different emphasis from Augustine's teaching that Christ was "spiritually" yet "really" present in the Eucharist (ibid., p. 179). All of this led to the impression that the "res" was separated from the "virtus" which was narrowly restricted to the sacrament itself; at the same time, "mystical" and "spiritual" were used to qualify the effect of the sacrament only and not

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the sacrament or "virtus" itself. In reality, however, the "*res*" and "*virtus*" are indissoluble according to de Lubac, since the "*res*" is as much life as it is unity, and "*virtus*" is as much unity as it is life (*ibid*., p. 207). In short, the reaction to Berengarius occasioned the development of a theology of the Eucharist which resembled more and more an apologetic for the "real presence" (*ibid*., p. 254). There is a further point of importance that bears on this development. Anselm and Peter Lombard, the founders of "Christian rationalism" (*ibid*., p. 272), introduced a new concept of "*intelligence*" to the theological world -- dialectics. Preoccupied with rational demonstration, which did not easily lend itself to the contemplation of mysteries, they helped to point theology in the direction of the apologetical rather than the theological or contemplative. Once again de Lubac asserts that this rational impatience with mysteries (such as the Eucharist) is certainly a far cry from the loving contemplation of the mysteries which characterized Augustine's "*intelligence de la foi*." Finally, it is true that today our faith in the "real presence" leads us to faith in the Church, but the opposite was once so. The Fathers accented the effect rather than the cause (*ibid*., p. 289) because for them ecclesial realism guaranteed Eucharistic realism. Our author concludes: "Ecclesial realism assures Eucharistic realism" (*ibid*.) and vice versa, and so, neither realism should be neglected. - It seems to this writer, that it is legitimate to suggest that de Lubac contributed substantially to the present efforts in theology to break away from the "physicism" or "corporealism" in past Eucharistic theology. F. Clark notes in his *Adjumenta ad Tractatum de SS. Eucharistiae Sacramento* (Romae: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1966), p. 121, that the new theories of "transsignification" and "transfinalization" are really not new at all. He says that the essential ideas behind them first appeared in *La présence reélle* by Yves de Montcheuil in 1936. Although privately circulated, the ideas in the work gained sufficient attention to be condemned by Pius XII in his encyclical, "*Humani Generis*". Since Yves de Montcheuil was a personal friend of de Lubac (*The Un-Marxian Socialist* is dedicated to the memory of Yves de Montcheuil), and since their theological sympathies were, generally speaking, the same, it is not unreasonable to conclude that de Lubac's *Corpus Mysticum* was a strong support, although an indirect one, of the pioneering efforts of Yves de Montcheuil.

presence' and of the 'mystical body', for, as de Lubac has pointed out, the title 'mystical body' was originally used to describe the Eucharist.[66] This richer and more traditional view of the Eucharist enables us to see how an intensely personal sacrament is at the same time a supernatural social force uniting the individual to all men. As Olier put it: "Our Lord's aim in multiplying His body [is to make] but one Church of all the world."[67]

What of a man when he dies? Does he not stand naked before God? De Lubac returns to the tradition once again to remind us that it always considered heaven under the analogy of a city--the heavenly Jerusalem. Typical of the Fathers is the following passage from Gregory of Nyssa:

> Far from remaining separate all will become a single unity, since they are united to that Good which is one alone; so that, bound together by the bond of peace, in the words of the Apostle, in the unity of the Spirit, all will be one Body and one Spirit, by reason of the hope in which they were called. And it is in the bond of this unity that glory consists.[68]

Thus, even in eternity, the Christian concept of man does not cease to be social.

Christian Man And The Missionary Enterprise

Despite Christian avowals of universality and desire for the spiritual unity of mankind, the Church strikes the unbeliever as a divisive factor in the world, as an exclusive club for the "saved". De Lubac readily concedes that the old formula of "outside the Church, no salvation", is not only a negative but an ugly way of expressing the truth that it is by the Church alone that man is to be saved. To say that the Church is the divinely appointed means of salvation is not to limit salvation to its visible members only. As St. Augustine writes: "many who appear to be outside are within [while] many who seem to be within are without."[69]

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[66] See Corpus Mysticum esp. chapter I, "L'Eucharistie corps mystique." Also, see The Splendour of the Church, pp. 87-92.

[67] Cited in de Lubac, The Splendour of the Church, p. 108.

[68] Cited in de Lubac, Catholicism, p. 65.

As de Lubac sees it, humanity is comprised of many individuals, all of whom share the same destiny and the same desire for that destiny. God has not imposed himself upon men in any mechanical or mathematical fashion. Rather he has used various and sundry forms of religion to bring men to himself. Men in these religions are characterized by "a certain groping after the truth."[70] In our fallen world, these unbelievers have "an inevitable place in our humanity."[71] By God's design they are "indispensable for building the Body of Christ" and so they must derive profit in some way "from their vital connexion with this same Body."[72]

> . . . it seems right to think that though they themselves are not in the normal way of salvation, they will be able nevertheless to obtain this salvation by virtue of those mysterious bonds which unite them to the faithful. In short, they can be saved because they are an integral part of that humanity which is to be saved.[73] (Italics added)

When a missionary preaches to those who have never heard of Christ, he is preaching at the same time to all of those men of the past who have done their best, however indirectly, to lead or urge their children toward the light.

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[69] Cited in de Lubac, The Splendour of the Church, p. 155.

[70] De Lubac, Catholicism, p. 124.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., p. 125.

[73] Ibid., (italics added).

This does not mean that the Church is not the unique means of salvation. De Lubac affirms the absolute necessity of Christianity for salvation and he does not teach that it merely facilitates the process.[74] On the other hand, he maintains that it would be rigorism to condemn all pagans to hell since we know that "under a thousand _anonymous_ forms the grace of Christ is at work everywhere."[75]

How then shall we consider the nature of the Church's missionary endeavor? In the first place, the Church by its very nature is missionary, for Catholicity is not a statement of a fact as it is a description of the Church's essential vocation. But God has chosen the Church not in opposition to others or to the exclusion of others but _for the sake of others_.[76] Hence, to conceive of the mission as a kind of "systematic conquest" of the world is a misunderstanding of the entire enterprise. Rather, since the law of love is "the center of the life of the Church," missionary activity is simply the extension of that life.[77] It is the law of love also which impels the Church to be missionary. As de Lubac says:

> . . . divine charity can exist only by seeking to be everywhere, the Christian--the _homo_ _ecclesiasticus_, the man in whom the full consciousness of the church is incorporated--seeks to spread it everywhere. He knows that he possesses it to the degree that he seeks to spread it.[78]

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[74] Henri de Lubac, S.J., _Le fondement theólogique des missions_ (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1946), p. 36.

[75] _Ibid_., p. 44. (Italics added.)

[76] _Ibid_., p. 42.

[77] _Ibid_., p. 44.

[78] _Ibid_., p. 43.

De Lubac urges us to see the larger picture of salvation. He teaches that we should not conceive of salvation in individualist terms so much as in collective terms.[79] Individual conversions are certainly not without importance but the primary work of the missions is "to plant the Church in all countries where it is not yet established."[80] In other words, the aim of the missions is to build the city on the mountain as the sacrament of the heavenly Jerusalem.

In summary, our author brings out the truly social and catholic dimensions of the missions. He shows that there can be no salvation outside of the Church and that the Church is an absolute necessity but only "for humanity taken as a whole."[81] In such a perspective, an unbeliever is able to be saved by being less than a visible member, not by reason of his unbelief but by reason of his aspiration for a fuller participation in God's plan. Secondly, he indicates that the missionary concern is qualitative and not quantitative since the norm is not "numbers" but "the law of love." Finally, the Church is the chief force for spiritual unity in a world which God has called to salvation. But all of mankind is mysteriously yet vitally connected with and oriented towards that spiritual unity which the Church seeks to effect in the present order of things. It is not surprsing, therefore, that there are many "anonymous Christians," as they are now called, who are not fully aware of the spiritual unity towards which they are striving but which they radically possess by reason of their humanity.[82]

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[79] Ibid., p. 46.

[80] Ibid.

[81] De Lubac, Catholicism, p. 126.

Christian Man And Human Values

Christian man seeks to embrace not only all of mankind but all human values as well. "Nothing authentically human, whatever its origin, can be alien"[83] to him because everything comes from the one God whether by creation or redemption. A look at history shows us that Christianity was rooted in the culture of the past. And today we can see:

> . . . the 'elements of the world' slowly forming, growing to maturity; evolving--no man knowing--to provide a body for the Christianity of the future.[84]

Christianity is truly divine and yet it is at the same time thoroughly human. It seeks to penetrate history, and to embrace human values without crushing them, in order to transform mankind. It is also true that "with the growth of the Church this human contribution must increase."[85] This is clearly in line with the teaching and practice of the

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[82] The idea of "anonymous Christianity" in contemporary theology is derived from the Fathers through de Lubac, as far as this writer can ascertain. It flows from the view that since all of mankind is called to salvation, the human race is a kind of preliminary "people of God", or a blueprint of the Church to be constructed. Hence, by the very fact that a man is a member of the human race, he is radically a member of the Church. Schillebeeckx, for example, speaks of an "ecclesial" and a "worldly" expression of the very same "God-related life concealed in the mystery of Christ" (Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., "The Church and Mankind," in Concilium, Vol. I: The Church and Mankind, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P. (Glen Rock, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1965), p. 83). See, also, Karl Rahner, S.J., "Membership of the Church According to the Teaching of Pius XII's Encyclical 'Mystici Corporis Christi,'" in Theological Investigations, Vol. II, Trans. by Karl-H. Krüger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1964), esp. pp. 81-88). For a fairly recent documentation of the point, see Boniface Willems, O.P., "Who Belongs to the Church?" in Concilium, Vol. I, pp. 131-151. The first name mentioned by Willems on this particular turn of contemporary theology (viz. "anonymous Christianity") is that of Henri de Lubac (ibid., p. 144).

[83] De Lubac, Catholicism, p. 159.

[84] Ibid., p. 153.

[85] Ibid., p. 154.

Fathers, says de Lubac. "They were fond of emphasizing, somewhat to excess, the points of similarity between Christian beliefs and the teachings of the philosophers."[86] These same Fathers never considered "the purity of Christianity" in the negative terms adopted by some of the men who followed them. The spread of Christianity has and will continue to involve new "human contributions" to Christianity reflecting the various cultures from which they come.

Like St. Paul, Christian man seeks to become all things to all men. In doing so, he is guided by a "twofold desire willingly to entertain whatever can be assimilated and to prescribe nothing that is not of faith."[87] In other words, "There is nothing good which Catholicism cannot claim for its own."[88] This is so, because Catholicism is not just one religion among many but rather:

> Catholicism is religion itself. It is the form that humanity must put on in order finally to be itself. . . . It is therefore the very opposite of a "closed society." Like its founder it is eternal and sure of itself and the very intransigence in matters of principle which prevents its ever being insured by transitory things secures for it a flexibility of infinite comprehensiveness, the very opposite of the harsh exclusiveness which characterizes the sectarian spirit. . . . The Church is at home everywhere, and everyone should be able to feel himself at home in the Church.[89]

What is true of Catholicism in relation to human values is true of Christian man as well: there is nothing good which he cannot claim for his own.[90]

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[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid., p. 155.

[88] Ibid., p. 160.

[89] Ibid.

[90] It should be noted in passing, that de Lubac's concept of man in relation to human and secular values is strongly reflected in the "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," of the Second

Christian Man: Historical, Personal, Transcendent

The Christian concept of man is unique for it not only includes the social dimension of man but also the historical, personal and transcendent dimensions as well. The man of Buddhism seeks to escape the world. Christian man, on the other hand, considers the world to have a purpose and sees time as something to be used in order to achieve that purpose.[91] The various stages of history are vitally important because "they are in reality stages of an essentially collective salvation."[92] Christian man breaks "the eternal cycle of Brahmanism and other myth-based religions by connecting history to the transcendent destiny of mankind. It is this dimension of history which gives Christian man his unique realism.

Although Christian man is truly social he is at the same time truly personal. There is no danger of him being swallowed up in the amorphous collectivism of Communism or the unconscious eternity of

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Vatican Council. The first words of the document read: "The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age . . . these too are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed nothing genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts" (The Documents of Vatican II, Ed. by Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: The America Press, 1966), pp. 199-200). The constitution makes its anthropocentric nature very clear from the beginning: ". . . the pivotal point of our total presentation will be man himself, whole and entire, body and soul, heart and conscience, mind and will (ibid., p. 201). Citations could be multiplied but it is enough to note that the document stresses the greatness of man made in the image of God; it places heavy emphasis on the community and its importance; and it rejects a "merely individualistic morality" as inadequate for the Christian who is truly a member of the human community (ibid., p. 228). Other points could be mentioned but perhaps it is enough to note that de Lubac was a member of the commission responsible for drafting the constitution which is in essence--the "Constitution on Christian Anthropology."

[91] De Lubac, Catholicism, pp. 80-81.

[92] Ibid., p. 83.

pantheism. Every man is an image of God and is bound to respect all other men who share the same dignity. Christian personalism, however, must not be confused with a narrow religious individualism.[93] Christian man's personal dignity is at the same time a "vocation" to freely contribute to the building up of the community.[94] Without this sense of community, personalism becomes egoism.

Finally, Christian man possesses what Marxist man does not--transcendence. Marxist man is rooted in history and stretching to embrace the whole social order. But nonetheless, Marxist man is inadequate because he lacks the one dimension which gives lasting importance to everything else, transcendence or "the sense of the Eternal."[95] And so, de Lubac judges that Christian man is, in the final analysis, better equipped than Marxist man for the contest between them. For Christian man is unique.

> No human problem, no human anxiety can find in him a stranger: all awake within him an echo that is all the deeper for his realization of their eternal consequences. The service of his brethren is for him the only form of apprenticeship to the charity which will in very truth unite him with them. . . . Yet he cannot remain satisfied--no more satisfied with the world than with himself. The spiritual union for which he longs is not within but beyond that social harmony for which he must strive.[96]

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[93] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

CHAPTER IV

DE LUBAC AND THE PROPHETICAL DIMENSION OF THEOLOGY

The Prophetical Dimension of Theology

The contemporary revival of theology, under the Spirit of Christ, arises from many streams: biblical, patristic and philosophical renewals are among those which are more important. In the process of this revival, the very notion of theology itself is being re-thought. Up to the recent past, theology tended to be static, introspective, and preoccupied with its own internal coherence. Today there is a growing exigency that theology be creative, dynamic and involved with the modern world. Accordingly, there is a greater emphasis of the prophetic dimension of theology. The Church certainly possesses its divine teaching authority by the will of Christ but it must also recognize its prophetic mission. If theology is an instrument of the teaching authority of Christ's Church, it is at the same time, a participant in its prophetic office.

What is this prophetic service? In the Old Testament, as R. Latourelle makes it clear:

> The prophet is the witness and qualified interpreter of history, he discloses its supernatural significance. There are two complementary lines in the Old Testament: the events and the prophets who interpret the events, proclaiming their significance in God's name. God reveals Himself through history, but through history divinely

interpreted by the prophets.[1]

In the New Testament, there is an analogous structure in which Christ is both the historical event and the prophet explaining his own supernatural significance. The New Testament affirmations, in turn, witness to the event of Christ's death and resurrection and its meaning in terms of salvation.[2]

Prophecy, then, is the servant of revelation, for the saving events which take place in and through history must be interpreted by the prophetic word. This revelation has been committed to the Church "to preserve, defend, propose and interpret" authentically.[3] But revelation is a complex and mysterious reality for its summit is the "global experience" which the Apostles had of Christ, the Word in its fullness.[4] Furthermore, (objective) revelation is Christ himself and therefore not merely a set of abstract propositions to be codified or categorized.

In transmitting God's revelation to the men of every age, the Church seeks to convey not only doctrine but also her experience of and her faith in Christ. Thus, there is a real interaction between the Spirit of Christ present in the Church and the members of Christ's body living in the world. There must be, therefore, a continuous growth in man's understanding of God's living truth. The "Constitution on Divine Revelation" says:

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[1] René Latourelle, "Revelation, History and Incarnation," _The Word: Readings in Theology_, ed. by the seminarians of Canisianum, Innsbruch,(New York: P.J. Kennedy & Sons, 1964), p. 33. (italics added)

[2] _Ibid_., p. 34.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 39.

[4] "Development of Dogma," in _Thelogical Investigations_, Vol. I, Trans. by Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), esp. pp. 63-68.

> This tradition which comes from the apostles develops in the Church with the help of the Holy Spirit. For there is a growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been handed down. This happens through the contemplation and study made by believers, who treasure these things in their hearts, through the intimate understanding of spiritual things they experience, and through the preaching of those who have received through episcopal succession the sure gift of truth.[5]

One of the consequences of this is:

> . . . as the centuries succeed one another, the Church constantly moves forward toward the fullness of divine truth until the words of God reach their complete fulfillment in her.[6]

The Church's understanding of God's Word increases as it seeks to interpret that Word for each generation. In other words, the Church deepens her understanding of revelation by the exercise of her prophetical office. This growth is effected, in a certain measure, through the instrumentality of prophetic theology for this new understanding "happens":

> . . . through the contemplation and study made by believers who treasure these things in their hearts, through the intimate understanding of spiritual things they experience. . . .[7]

Who are these "believers"? As the history of theology shows, theologians equipped with holiness, learning and insight have had a decisive role because they are committed by their office to a very special service of the People of God.

There is yet another element which serves the prophetical mission of theology. Not only must the theologian "contemplate and study" the word of God, he must also listen carefully to the word of man. For, God's word is disclosed in history and is intended for man in his historical situation. Thus, C.-J. Geffré says that this prophetic dimension of the theologian is the "courage with which he faces the questions which men are asking in our time."[8] On the reflective level, the same author continues to say that man's questioning of his age is philosophical inquiry. By his office, the theologian must listen to questions asked by man for these questions have a real bearing on our understanding of what God is saying to us. Thus, theology is more than the work of making the faith intelligible; it is "human questioning at the living center of faith."[9] Therefore, Geffré concludes that:

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[5] "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. by Walter Abbott, S.J., (New York: The America Press, 1966) p. 116.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

> The theologian is one who believes so much in God that he makes his own those questions of men which are most radical and most free. And what is more radical than the questions which philosophers ask of their age.[10]

Where does this conversation take place? Where does the theologian listen to the questions of man as he asks them at the living center of faith? C. Davis says that the place is "at the creative centre of the culture."[11] What is the creative center? He says:

> There is a creative centre in every culture. It consist of those artists and thinkers who do not shirk reality but are prepared to face it. And reality for them is a present thing; they are not content with past descriptions or received ideas. They grapple with reality itself in its disturbing greatness and unexpected newness, in its unsolved problems and unexplored mystery. And they react to it creatively. They allow questions to arise that give them no rest, and they are not afraid of a commitment that can come near to making life unendurable for them.[12]

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[8] C.-J. Geffré, O.P., "Les courants actuels de la recherche en théologie," VSS, No. 80 (Février, 1967), p. 21.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Charles Davis, "Theology and its Present Task," in Theology and the University, ed. by John Coulson (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1964), p. 110.

[12] Ibid., p. 108.

The theologian, of course, must "respond creatively to revelation itself" which is a present and living reality "immanent in the actual life of the Church."[13] But, even more, he must be at the creative center of his age. Accordingly:

> Unless the questions that its members are asking as men of their time are raised within the Church and are grappled with in the light of revelation, the Church is dead and not bringing the Gospel to men as they are. Unless there are within the Church at least some of those who are at the creative centre of the culture of the times, sensitive to present reality and reacting creatively to it, the Church is not thinking creatively and is out of touch with the man it has been sent to save. And unless the theologian is at that creative centre, he is not asking new questions but repeating the past, he is not thinking personally but echoing the thought of others.[14]

In sum, the theologian will be prophetic to the degree that he is sensitive to the reality around him.

"Prophetic" theology, therefore, is creative to the extent that it is living. If the work of theology is to interpret revelation in a fruitful way for each new age, it cannot be content to repeat the thought of the past. The "prophetic" theologian is one who is related to the creative center of his culture; who hears the questions which reflective men are asking; and who, in behalf of man, asks these questions "at the living center of faith." The result, trustfully, is a continuously renewed theology for modern needs and in modern terms.

The preceding chapters have attempted to show that few contemporary theologians have done more to reemphasize this prophetic dimension of theology than Henri de Lubac. It is the function of this chapter to underline this dimension. There will be a consideration of what de Lubac judges to be the key to contemporary theological renewal, that is, the theological concern which is at the center of all others; at the same time, de Lubac's anthropology will be related to this theological center. In addition, the following pages will suggest how this central theological issue, in the hands of de Lubac, has helped to open the world of theology in the areas of apologetics, ecclesiology and even theology itself.

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[13] Ibid., p. 110.

[14] Ibid., p. 111.

Man and Grace

Theology beings with God but at the same time it begins with man. The two--God and man--are so vitally related that to separate or isolate them in our theologizing is to run the risk of sterility, irrelevance and even more tragic consequences. Thus, Y. Congar says:

> . . . there is no "theology for man" without an "anthropology for God." The greatest misfortune perhaps that has afflicted modern Catholicism is to have concerned itself with theory and catechesis about the *en-soi* of God and religion, without adding to this at all times the significance that this has *for man*. Men and the world without God that we are now living in were born in part as a reaction against such a God without man or the world.[15]

This is the reason why de Lubac considers a new anthropology so indispensable for a revitalized theology, for in a real sense the two--anthropology and theology--form a unity.

The first question that anthropological theology asks is: how is man related to God? In other words, the first question for de Lubac is the relationship of man and grace, the problem of the supernatural. He thinks that the manner in which we answer this question will color and form our answers to most of the questions that follow. Certainly, his own answer was a prime instrument which helped to open the world of theology. In apologetics it led to a break with the strongly rationalist approach of the past. In ecclesiology, it broke ground for such ideas as "anonymous Christianity" and the acceptance of the modern world by the Church.[16]

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[15] Yves Congar, O.P., "Christ in the Economy of Salvation and in our Dogmatic Tracts," *Concilium*, XI: *Who is Jesus of Nazareth*? ed. by Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P. (Glen Rock, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1966), p. 22.

It is a mark of his prophetic insight that in his first published article, "Apologétique et théologie", he referred to Catholicism alone as "giving adequate response to the aspirations of humanity."[17] Even then he argued that the harmony of man and grace by which they complete and vivify each other is in no way a confusion of the two.[18] Of course, as we have seen, it was his Surnaturel which triggered the most important theological debate of the twentieth century, and became a symbol of the post-war theological revival.[19] He attacked the "extrinsecism" which he felt had made the supernatural appear as a miracle for which man had only a non-repugnance. He could not see how man could be explained without grace, as if grace were the most accidental, unexpected and non-essential of realities in relation to man.

Faced with an "extrinsecism" which seemed to be concerned with "protecting" God and in effect isolating him in his heaven, de Lubac sought to reconcile grace with nature without compromising the gratuity of grace. It was no small dilemma. In order to overcome "extrinsecism", he must say that man by his very nature desires God, that grace in effect is related to man essentially. This seemed to undermine the gratuity of grace for God could not have made man otherwise and would be bound to satisfy what man essentially needs. On the other hand, if he said that man desires the vision of God historically, in his existential situation only, then he would be allowing "extrinsecism" to remain entrenched. While it was not quite clear at first, de Lubac ultimately combined essentialism and existentialism by saying that man by his essence in this existential historical situation, desires the supernatural.

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[16] It is the contention of this writer that the key to de Lubac's theology is his anthropology. All else flows from it because it is the wellspring of his thought. Hence, we would disagree with J. Connolly when he says that "The fundamental factor that gives unity to de Lubac's vision of man and humanism is the Church." (James M. Connolly, The Voices of France (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 90. This writer thinks that the Church may very well be the unifying force and vital center of mankind according to de Lubac. However, the Church is hardly the "fundamental factor which gives unity to de Lubac's vision of man." The relationship of man and grace is the basic of de Lubac's thought. The Church is the force, the symbol and the expression of the basic harmony of man and the supernatural.

[17] Henri de Lubac, S.J., "Apologétique et théologie," NRT, LVII (1930), 375.

[18] Ibid., p. 378 376.

[19] Connolly, op. cit., p. 87.

The position of de Lubac is a subtle one and not beyond debate. Is it possible to combine the essential and the existential orders? Can the "must be" and the "what is" be so harmonized? Perhaps K. Rahner is correct in saying that de Lubac is confusing the historical and ontological orders. It would seem that Rahner's own solution, the theory of the "supernatural existential", is a more complete and a more careful theological explanation of the matter. But in either case, "extrinsecism" had been defeated. Then, too, it was not Rahner but de Lubac who had brought the issue to the fore in opposition to an almost universally accepted theological opinion, and it was de Lubac who had changed the direction of the theology of man and grace. He had in effect made an anthropological theology possible.

Some Teilhardian enthusiasts have attempted theologies of the supernatural but in the process seemed to be avoiding the hard questions which they had accused others of answering so badly. Thus, E. Baltazar casually dismissed de Lubac's position from a Thomistic viewpoint and then proceeded to adopt the identical position (ontologically speaking) from the perspective of process philosophy. He concluded that de Lubac had "abolished" the supernatural;[20] but then went on to show that from the starting point of the Incarnation, man has an "intrinsic ordination" to the supernatural on the grounds that:

> . . . God could not create us without structuring us for grace because by his free decision we are unthinkable apart from Christ. What this shows is the all-importance of grace and God's infinite love for his son, and not that we have an exigency for the supernatural. Anything God does, he does for the sake of his son, not for the sake of nature.[21]

In any case, de Lubac's solution, however imperfect, recognized the distinction between nature and grace and yet attempted to restore that mysterious unity by which man has his being in God and at the same time God works from within the very being of man.

Man in Search of God

In appraising the apologetical dimension of Teilhard de Chardin's writings, de Lubac says:

> . . . the entire work of Pere Teilhard de Chardin can be considered as a vast proof, renewed in a scientific perspective, of the immortality of the human soul and of the existence of God. . . .[22]

In similar fashion, we can say that de Lubac's anthropology is, in general, a "proof", an apologetic for religion. This is how he views his own theological endeavors: a renewed and vital theology is the best apologetic for the faith. He says that Augustine and others placed the "intelligence de la foi" before the "intelligence par la foi."[23] The better apologists, Paul, Augustine, Thomas, Pascal, Newman, all saw that basically "only Christianity can answer the longings of the human heart."[24] Hence, he feels that it is proper to say that:

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[20] Eulalio R. Baltazar, Teilhard and the Supernatural (Baltimore: Helicon, 1966), p. 49.

[21] Ibid., p. 299.

[22] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Teilhard Missionaire et Apologiste (Toulouse: Editions Prière et Vie, 1966), p. 57.

[23] Henri de Lubac, S.J., "Apologétique et théologie," NRT, LVII (1930), 371.

> Catholicism is the true religion because it alone gives adequate response to the aspirations of humanity, and as such, its highest guarantee is its own perfection.

But granted that a religion presented as "life and light"[25] is its own best persuasion, how precisely does this apply to modern man who does not seem to see the Christian religion in this way? He rejects the supernatural as a mythical construct which cannot make a serious claim to his assent. De Lubac answers that we must attempt to help man realize that the "ever-recurring disquiet" and "indefinable anguish" which he experiences is in reality "the call for transcendence".[26] Accordingly, de Lubac thinks that:

> . . . fundamental theology is the area or place where we show nature and grace completing each other and mutually vivifying each other rather than being opposed to each other.[27]

Thus, de Lubac applies the doctrine of Surnaturel to the area of apologetics and man's search for God.

The Proof for God

How did the idea of God arise? Is it an illusion as Freud says? Is it "the product of a religious evolution"?[28] Did a magical mentality create it or did it appear in the wake of man's disillusionment? Is it the "fruit of an immanent dialectic" in man?[29] It arises from none of these things, says de Lubac. On the contrary:

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[24] Ibid., p. 367.

[25] Ibid., p. 375.

[26] Henri de Lubac, S.J., "The New Man," DuR, CCXXI, No. 442 (1948), 31.

[27] De Lubac, "Apologetique et théologie," p. 378.

[28] Henri de Lubac, S.J., The Discovery of God, trans. by Alexander Dru (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1960), p. 34.

> The idea of the one God springs up spontaneously at the heart of consciousness, whether as the result of the exigencies of reason or of some supernatural illumination, and imposes itself upon the mind of itself, of its own necessity.[30]

This idea of God is prior to our concepts, our reasoning, and our logic. St. Thomas says that "all knowers know God implicitly in all they know."[31] Every human act of knowing or willing relies secretly on God for God is the Absolute without which nothing can be known or willed.

> So it is not only in the acts which we call religious, nor in a crudely pragmatic sense, that God is used. . . . The supreme contradiction is to . . . act spiritually and not to fall into contradiction at each step, and then, simultaneously, refuse to recognize him . . . the supreme contradiction is to lean upon God in the very act of denying him.[32]

None of this means that there is no need to prove God. Man is not a pure intellect without emotions or passions and so he has recourse to various means to articulate and bolster his initial affirmations of God. Nevertheless, there is something lacking in metaphysical truths, says de Lubac, which leaves room for doubt.

> . . . when their demonstration is over the recollection of it is not always strong enough to repel the assaults of contrary impressions. Their light may, perhaps, shine in an abstract heaven: but it is meant to be felt . . . not simply proved; to be possessed, embraced and not merely perceived in the dim distance, draped in a pale and superficial clarity. Now the proof imposes these truths, but it does

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[29] Ibid., p. 35.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Cited in ibid., p. 39.

[32] Ibid., p. 40.

> not give them to us. The certainty it confers is not given to us as a possession.[33]

Hence, metaphysical certainty has a provisional character about it because it is not merely the mind but the whole man which affirms God. The affirmation of God may flow from "rational necessity"[34] but man is always "essentially and fundamentally free."[35]

It would be a mistake to conclude that de Lubac rejects the traditional proofs of God's existence. He thinks they are quite useful as long as we take them for what they are worth. But if we attempt to endow them with a power they do not and cannot have of themselves then we call the whole endeavor into doubt by the very methodology we use.[36]

De Lubac thinks that there are in general two kinds of criticism directed against the proofs. The first kind of criticism is based on a "narrow conception of the intelligence."[37] For those who maintain it look at the classical proofs of the past but in a superficial fashion. Preoccupied with the conceptual and logical forms of the proofs, they completely miss the spirit which gives them life. In effect, their criticism not only leads to doubting God's existence but also ends in a mutilation of the intelligence. Hence, de Lubac says that agnosticism is contradictory for "how can one continue to affirm an Absolute which is admittedly unknowable?"[38]

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[33] Ibid., p. 46.

[34] Ibid., p. 51.

[35] Ibid., p. 53. Cf. Johannes B. Metz, "Unbelief as a Theological Problem," in Concilium, Vol. VI: The Church and the World, ed. Johannes B. Metz (Glen Rock, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1965), pp. 59-77.

[36] Cf. John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Problem of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

[37] De Lubac, The Discovery of God, p. 83.

[38] Ibid., p. 71.

Scepticism also fails because it introduces contradiction not only into the affirmations of the mind but "into the intelligence itself, into the heart of its every act."[39] The sceptic is then forced to introduce a kind of "*ersatz* Absolute Law," which is half-way "between the immanent and the transcendent."[40]

But there is a second criticism of the proofs and de Lubac himself is one of those who propose it. It is not really a criticism so much as an effort to deepen and perfect the proofs. Critics of this persuasion are not satisfied with proofs which lead to the First Cause or End instead of the true God. Their critique, accordingly, is an effort:

> . . . to bring the proofs to the point at which they become one; although their expression may be marked by a particular mentality or by the state of the sciences at a particular time, the result is to bring out the supereminent and eternal validity of the activity of the mind which, without seeing God, infallibly posits his existence.[41]

The proofs, therefore, are, as Blondel puts it, "not so much an invention as an inventory, not a revelation so much as an elucidation"[42] for *the* proof is, ultimately, "reason itself."[43]

De Lubac suggests that our learned and sophisticated proofs can be very helpful but we should never hesitate to emphasize what L. B. Geiger calls "the whole spontaneous movement by which man rises up to God."[44] The simple believer may not be able to formulate the proof but it is nevertheless etched in the very depths of his reasonable nature. It is rooted in what Maritain calls "a single and primordial intuition" for the knowledge of God is but the "fruit of the intuition of existence."[45] Again, Blondel says that "God is at the very center of all that I think and that I do. . . . Going from myself to myself, I am continually passing through him."[46] Hence, de Lubac says that:

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[39] *Ibid*.

[40] *Ibid*., pp. 71-71.

[41] *Ibid*., p. 84.

[42] Cited in *ibid*., p. 64.

[43] *Ibid*., p. 66.

[44] Cited in *ibid*., p. 86. Cf. Rogert Aubert, *Le probleme de l'acte de foi* (Louvain: E. Warny, 1958), esp. Part III.

> . . . the extraordinary thing is that knowing God for the first time I do, in fact, recognize him. For . . . when I come to know God as the one who will make me happy, I realize at the same time that God is identified with the beatitude which I knew by desiring it, but which I placed at first, among objects which deceived me."[47]

In the foregoing material, de Lubac's inspiration has been primarily Maréchal and his disciples.[48] De Lubac notes his heavy indebtedness.[49] There is no finer summary of de Lubac's view on the proofs than the following passage from V. Fontoynont:

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[45] Cited in ibid., p. 85 and p. 88.

[46] Cited in ibid., p. 68.

[47] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[48] Cf. Michael Novak, Belief and Unbelief (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965). This work by Novak is one of the best contemporary efforts to devise an apologetic for the unbeliever. While the book is heavily indebted to Lonergan (p. 31), it is at the same time an outgrowth of the spirit of Maréchal.

[49] De Lubac, The Discovery of God, p. 89. The following two selections from Maréchal are illustrative of de Lubac's dependency. The first is cited in ibid., p. 90: "Thus we are faced with postulating, in our objective knowledge, something more than the static reception and the abstractive analysis of 'data'; we are driven to postulate a movement of thought continually carrying us 'beyond' what can be represented by concepts; to postulate a sort of metempirical anticipation which would show us the objective capacity of our intelligence to expand infinitely until it surpassed all limitation of being. Apart from that there can be no analogical knowledge of the transcendent. To explain and safeguard it we are therefore led to place ourselves on the path of the dynamic finality of our minds; for it is only the intelligence's internal finality that can enable it continually to surpass the present object and indefinitely

> . . . it (the proof) concerns God . . . it concerns the Being who is the source of my being, and who is "more I than I myself". . . . And at the same time, that which makes a person of me and makes me responsible. That is why the strongest of proofs depends more than any other -- not of course in respect to its abstract form, but where its power of concrete persuasion is concerned -- upon "good will". For there is always more at work than the impersonal functioning of an intelligence. Charity and purity of vision are inseparable at this point from loyalty and honesty.
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> Furthermore, there is no essential heterogeneity between the spontaneous movement of the soul towards the recognition of God's existence and the rational analysis of the philosopher. Faced with the former, people are inclined to speak of instinct, heart, feeling, intuition: equivocal terms, all of them, which attempt to express the dynamism of the intelligence, its ultimate source, the unity of its movement, and at the same time to evoke the richly concrete and delicately sensitive region through which the light of the spirit makes its way. The philosopher's work is critical . . . he analyses and decomposes that unbroken movement into its logical components and tries to check and verify them. It is rare for him to pursue his studies beyond the itinerary, to the heart of the dynamism, to that central and secret point where reason and will originate.[50]

The Search for God

All of creation is a manifestation of God for "everything is drenched in that unique Presence."[51] God is a presence, says de Lubac, both personal and mysterious, and so our knowledge of him is going to be "the knowledge of a Presence."[52] To pursue God by reason alone is to

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pursue a greater object. . . ." This second passage is also cited in _ibid_., p. 91.: "_But_ _if_ _it_ _is_, if, that is, the affirmation of the Infinite is a logical condition which preceded and really constitutes the apperception of finite objects, then, certainly, we can neither deny it nor withdraw it without flagrant contradiction. . . . Purely implicit and 'exercised' in the apperception of finite objects, it can be made explicit only dialectically, by reflection and analysis."

[50] Cited in _ibid_., pp. 62-63.

[51] _Ibid_., p. 93.

[52] _Ibid_., p. 95.

court frustration and failure for he is much more than "something"; he is, as Teilhard says, "The Supreme Someone."[53] Again, de Lubac says that since there is "no real knowledge nor ontological density without mystery"[54] and since in our approach to the mystery of being we draw near to God's personal but mysterious presence, we cannot hope to capture God in a concept or encounter him through logic. And so, "reaching out beyond dialectic and representation, our spirit affirms him who . . . is beyond their grasp."[55]

In no sense does de Lubac disparage reason. He sees that the mystic needs the philosopher just as much as the philosopher needs the mystic. The mystic may be detached from defined forms but he presupposes the work which went into their making and the judgment as to their value. Both the mystic and the philosopher make use of dialectic but the former is more "affective and vital" while the latter is "rational and conceptual."[56] Perhaps, the chief difference between the two is that the philosopher pursues the "unifying One" whereas the mystic is searching for, or being attracted by the "one One."[57] Thus:

> The philosopher starts from the need to explain, a need which is, at least virtually, a desire for a total explanation. What he desires is to unify diversity, and at the same time to diversify the one; he requires a system of relationships which embraces everything and makes everything intelligible. His ambition is to comprehend the universe. And if in the course of his search he

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[53] Cited in ibid., p. 139.

[54] Ibid., p. 102. Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Meeting God in Today's World," in Concilium, Vol. VI, pp. 23-39.

[55] Ibid., p. 114.

[56] Ibid., p. 141.

[57] Ibid., p. 142.

> comes upon God -- as he cannot fail to do -- it will be an explanatory principle and a support for the world, as a unifying One.[58]

But if God as the cause and unifying principle of all things satisfies the philosopher,

> . . . [it] does not satisfy man. It does not satisfy the spirit. The mystical aspiration is greater, more fundamental and more total than the demands of reason. The mystic reaches out beyond the supreme Cause and the unifying One, which is, so to say, hardly more than a function, and pursues the One itself. He seeks the One in its being and unity.[59]

In de Lubac's opinion, St. Thomas is both mystic and philosopher attempting to combine both worlds. As philosopher he insists that "we do not know God, but only the relations of all things to him";[60] and yet he also insists that "the intelligence naturally desires to know God in himself."[61] This "natural desire" represents a merging of the philosophic and mystic points of view because:

> The "desire to see God" which he regards as natural to us, is certainly, at bottom, mystical in character. It cannot be limited to a desire to comprehend the world. Nevertheless, St. Thomas tries to establish its reality in purely rational manner, starting from the effects which the intelligence desires to know in their cause so as to know them fully.[62]

Considered from a purely philosophical viewpoint, Thomas' argument does not fully attain "formally" what it sets out to achieve, for its term is not the first cause in its essence but the first cause as unifying all effects. Thus, de Lubac says:

> St. Thomas, therefore, seems to have failed in his attempt to establish continuity between philosophy and mysticism, between the dynamism of the intelligence and the desire of the spirit. The

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[58] *Ibid.*, p. 142.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[60] Cited in *ibid.*, p. 144.

[61] Cited in *ibid.*, p. 144.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

> doctrine of "the natural desire to see God" is central to his thought, and he has not succeeded in completely unifying it."[63]

Thomas may have failed but only, de Lubac says, because the project is impossible. This is so because:

> The mystical impulse does not exactly prolong metaphysical inquiry; it does not repeat or extend the work, though it can animate it and, in return, be stimulated by it. . . . Philosophical inquiry rises analytically from effect to cause, in virtue of a rational necessity. The mystical impulse rises from effect, perceived as a sign, to that same cause, by a movement which cannot be wholly justified by pure reason . . . but which springs from a need of the spirit no less imperious in its demands than the demands of reason, or more precisely, from the magnetic attraction of Being through its signs.[64]

Nevertheless, de Lubac thinks the distinction between philosopher and mystic is an aritificial one. In the concrete, no man is purely one or the other. It may help us to distinguish the diverse functions of the mind but it must not lead us to forgetting that "the spirit is one" and man's intelligence is steeped in that same spirit.[65] This is the greatness of St. Thomas that he recognized this unity.

> By a process which pure reason alone does not suffice to justify, but which the spirit satisfies, or rather insists upon, he was able to penetrate and explore the ways by which the intelligence moves to the point at which he discovered the spiritual appetite within it. In his very philosophy, the philosophical endeavour develops into a mystical flight. . . . going beyond the techniques and specializations which obliged him, as it were, to divide himself in two, he seeks to rediscover the simplicity of the mind's essential act. The formal distinctions and oppositions tend to be reabsorbed into unity, although without ever quite reaching it.
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> The whole of St. Thomas's philosophical research is the search for God.[66]

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[63] _Ibid._, p. 146.

[64] _Ibid._, p. 146.

[65] _Ibid._, p. 147.

[66] _Ibid._, pp. 147-148.

De Lubac does not argue with modern man for there is no argument or proof which can give him God. Rather, he tells him that to be fully man he must be faithful to his own humanity: faithful to the dynamism of his mind and the mystical impulse of his spirit. Man himself is a mystery and to recognize this is to be on the way which leads to man's mysterious source--God. Ultimately, it is not by reason that God is discovered but by a kind of "passover" which strips us of everything.[67] What is necessary then, above all, is the cultivation of the right dispositions. Yet, these dispositions can only come from God.[68] And so, here is mystery again, for while we think of ourselves as looking for God, "it is always God who is looking for us."[69] While he seems far away, he is really very near; in fact, in man himself. Thus, a man needs only to begin the search within himself.

In his approach to modern man in search of God, de Lubac begins with man himself in order to lead him to God. He begins with immanence and shows how it ineluctably points to transcendence.[70] He uses the mystical and the spontaneous but not independently of the rational. He insists that man is more than his reason but certainly not any less. It is the whole man that must search for God and so de Lubac never lets us forget that we are dealing with man in his total human unity. This whole man may be more easily identified in Augustine; his mind's desire more logically expressed in Thomas; his yearnings more systematically charted in Blondel; his intellect's dynamism more emphasized in Maréchal. Nevertheless, all of these men belong to the really authentic Christian tradition which sees man as a unity gravitating towards God. This is no denial of grace for man is powerless to satisfy his own need, his "restless heart," his "natural desire" for God. Hence, there is no opposition or antagonism between God and man, nature and grace, immanence and transcendence, rather there is a harmony which is well expressed in the words of William of St. Thierry:

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[67] Ibid., p. 160.

[68] Ibid., p. 162.

[69] Ibid.

[70] For the most recent application of Blondelian immanance to the solution of the modern apologetic problem, cf. Henri Bouillard, S.J., The Logic of the Faith (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), especially pp. 161-185.

> . . . no one truly seeks you without finding you because the very truth that you are being sought in the consciousness of the seeker contains in itself the unsuspected answer of a truth which, in a measure, has been discovered already.[71]

Ecclesiology

If one has a dualist conception of the divine plan in which nature and grace are seen in opposition, so to speak, then, to be consistent, one must view the Church as an imposition on the world. For, in its extreme, dualism feels the soul is burdened by the body; it considers grace compromised by nature; it sees the Church contaminated by the world. This implicit disdain of the secular and the human has left modern man no other recourse but to conclude that the world is a self-enclosed order sufficient to itself; and that the Church is like an invader from another order altogether.

Until very recently, a Christian dualism has reigned, as the preceding chapters have implied, and de Lubac comments:

> . . . Such a dualism, just when it imagined that it was most successfully opposing the negations of naturalism, was most strongly

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[71] Cited in de Lubac, The Discovery of God, p. 166.

> influenced by it, and the transcendence in which it hoped to preserve the supernatural with such jealous care was, in fact, a banishment. The most confirmed secularists found in it, in spite of itself, an ally.[72]

One of the symptoms of this dualism can be found in the treatment of De Ecclesia where "there is a certain emphasis upon the rights of ecclesiastical authority in relation to the civil authority."[73] The solution lies in the reconstruction of that traditional harmony between the Church and the world which simply reflects the radical harmony between man and grace. Again, if there is a mysterious and intimate relation between man and grace then there must be a bond which mysteriously ties the Church to the world and the world to the Church. Accordingly, the teaching of Surnaturel flows into the realm of ecclesiology. And so in the last chapter the Church was depicted as a unifying force effecting the spiritual unity of mankind and embracing all truly human values. Such a view, the social dimension of de Lubac's anthropology, implies or presupposes the harmonious integration of man and grace or the Church and mankind.

The Church and Mankind

It is the prophetic dimension of de Lubac's theological reflection, that in the writings of the Fathers he perceived the harmony of man and grace and saw the relationship of the Church to mankind and therefore applied it to the modern situation. Thus, he thinks that, unlike the present day, the Fathers understood the unity of the Church and mankind.

> For them, in fact, in a certain sense the Church was nothing else than the human race itself, in all the phases of its history, in so

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[72] Henri de Lubac, S.J., Catholicism (New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 1964), pp. 171-172.

[73] Ibid., p. 172.

> far as it was to lead to Christ and be quickened by His Spirit. It was the omnis humana conditio. They never lost sight of this vast mass of humanity which Christ came to tear from its idols, which he loves with a gratuitous love in that miserable nakedness which is the result of its sin, which he undertakes to cleanse, to make holy, which he changes from darkness into light, which at the last he makes his bride sine ruga neque macula.[74]

In their interpretation of the Old Testament, the Fathers were able to see a type of the New because they perceived that there is a real spiritual force in history. Further, looking at Jewish history they realized that "by reason of their finality the very facts have an inner significance; although in time, they are yet pregnant with an eternal value.[75]

And so, for example, Irenaeus devised a kind of "supernatural evolutionism"[76] in response to an attack on the divinity of Christ by Marcion. The famous heretic objected that since Christ had come into the world so recently and had allowed so many to be lost for eternity, he could not be God. Irenaeus, however, responded that time was needed for man to be gradually developed and prepared for the coming of the Savior. Nevertheless, it was the same God who had created man and had come to redeem him. Although not all of the Fathers shared the optimism of Irenaeus in this matter, all, according to de Lubac, shared the basic idea: "the unity of the human race in its temporal development."[77] All of the Fathers saw:

> . . . that the religious problem concerns all mankind, and that it is not purely a problem of objective knowledge. What they paid greatest attention to was not the propagation of an abstract doctrine but the actual meeting of man with God, the familiarization of human nature

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[74] Ibid., pp. 102-103.

[75] Ibid., p. 95.

[76] Ibid., p. 136.

[77] Ibid., p. 141.

> with the divinity, the transformation of man by the action of God's grace, the bursting forth of the "Divine Energy" and of the "Strength of the Holy Spirit."[78] (italics added)

This harmony of Church and man can be seen in yet another area of the Fathers. St. Ambrose says that "the seed of the Word is innate in the whole human race,"[79] and de Lubac comments:

> False religions, therefore, are religions that stray from the truth or become engulfed in error, rather than religions whose whole direction is misleading and whose principles are wholly false. . . . The Creator and the Redeemer . . . are one and the same God; therefore, there can be no conflict between their works.[80]

The work of creation is the preparation for the work of redemption. The two form a process, as it were, by which worldly elements are readied for divinization. Further, the Church as the redemptive process, must not be considered as the "perfect religion" built on the ruins of the religions of the past. Rather, the Church, in the words of Canon Masure, is "the conversion of all the ancient moral and mystic efforts of humanity into a higher religion."[81]

Now this assimilation and transformation of the religious struggles and accomplishments of the world religions by Christianity is confirmed by Vatican II. The following statements from this declaration concerning the non-Christian religions make the point quite clearly:

> Likewise, other religions (besides Hinduism and Buddhism) to be found everywhere strive variously to answer the restless searchings of the human heart by proposing "ways" which consist of teachings, rules of life, and sacred ceremonies.
>
> The Catholic Church rejects nothing which is true and holy in

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[78] Ibid., p. 140.

[79] Cited in ibid., p. 152.

[80] Ibid., p. 152.

[81] Cited in ibid., p. 201.

> these religions. She looks with sincere respect upon those ways of conduct and of life, those rules and teachings which, though differing in many particulars from what she holds and sets forth, nevertheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men.
>
> The Church therefore has this exhortation for her sons: prudently and lovingly, through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions, and in witness of Christian faith and life, acknowledge preserve, and promote the spiritual and moral goods found among these men, as well as the values in their society and culture.[82]

This declaration of Vatican II bears no traces of past "extrinsecism" and, in fact, tends to show the harmony and relatedness of Christianity to other religions.

In the light of the preceding treatment of the Fathers, it is easier to see the patristic foundation for the theory of "anonymous Christianity" which de Lubac has, in effect, proposed. At the same time, it becomes more evident that de Lubac's view of the relationship between man and grace is restated in his position on the relationship between the Church and the salvation of mankind. Thus, he says:

> . . . humanity is made up of persons who have all the same one eternal destiny, in whatever category or century their birth has placed them; their relationships cannot be envisaged, then as just external ones, as if some existed only to prepare suitable conditions for the development of others. . . .
>
> As "unbelievers" are, in the design of providence, indispensable for building the Body of Christ, they must in their own way profit from their vital connexion with this same Body. . . . though they are not in the normal way of salvation they will be able nevertheless to obtain this salvation by virtue of those mysterious bonds which unite them to the faithful. In short, they can be saved because they are an integral part of that humanity which is to be saved.[83] (italics added)

It is interesting to see the clear dependence of present-day theologians on de Lubac's insight into the problem of the Church and the salvation of mankind. Rahner, for example, emphasizes the unity of the

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[82] "Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions," in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. by Walter Abbott, S.J. (New York: The America Press, 1966), pp. 661-662.

[83] De Lubac, Catholicism, pp. 124-125.

Church and humanity but of course he presupposes the Incarnational dimension or the "supernatural existential". The following passage bears this out:

> In as far as mankind, thus "consecrated", is a real unity from the very start, there already exists a "people of God" which extends as far as humanity itself. . . . [This] is based on the two coinciding facts of the natural unity of the human race and of the real Incarnation of the Word of God. . . . this real and historical actuality of the people of God, which precedes the Church as a juridical and social body, is however such that it can, and according to the will of God had to be made more concrete on the social and juridical plane, in what we, in fact, call the Church. . . . there exists, therefore, a peculair relationship between the "people of God" and the Church.[84]

The "supernatural existential" as the context of de Lubac's idea on the unity of Church and humanity can be seen again in the following:

> The people of God has a real relation to the Church as a social and juridical body, *even although that relation comes into being by way of a free decision of the God-Man*. Therefore, *where* there is, and to the extent in which *there is the people of God, there already is radically also the Church*, and that independently of the will of the individual man.[85] (italics added)

Rahner continues, developing de Lubac's seminal idea, by saying that when a man freely and totally accepts his concrete human nature then he consents, by that very fact, to membership in "the people of God" which is simply an expression of God's salvific will. Hence, Rahner concludes that:

> . . . whensoever man as a person accepts the concrete reality of his nature totally, in the free act of a *supernatural* justification by faith and love, the *membership of the people of God* becomes the *expression of this justifying act*.[86]

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[84] Karl Rahner, S.J., "Membership of the Church according to the Teaching of Pius XII's Encyclical 'Mystici Corporis Christi'" in *Theological Investigations*, Vol. II, trans. by Karl H. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1964), p. 83.

[85] *Ibid*., p. 84.

[86] *Ibid*.

Schillebeeckx provides us with another illustration of de Lubac's influence. His position is similar to Rahner's:

> Creation in view of Christ, which includes the gift of grace, means that since creation all mankind carries within itself and anonymously this ecclesial orientation as a grace that is accepted or rejected. We may say, then, that it is always within and for a People of God that man's religious life is fulfilled, whether this People be mankind as yet unspecified or Israel, in which messianic humanity began to manifest itself more clearly, or the People of God redeemed by Christ, with its features sharply drawn and constituted as the Church. The human community, insofar as it is created with this orientation toward Christ is an early rough-draft of the Church that is to come. But it is no more than that.[87]

It should be recalled here that Schillebeeckx is opposed to Rahner's theory of the "supernatural existential" but does not[88] offer any solution in its place. Can a note of "extrinsecism" be detected in the next passage where he speaks of the relationship of the Church to the world as a dialogue?

> . . . between two complementary, authentically Christian expressions of one and the same God-related life concealed in the mystery of Christ, namely, the ecclesial expression (in the strict sense of the word) and the worldly expression of that identically same life, internalized within human life through man's free acceptance of grace. In other words, the implicitly Christian and the explicitly Christian dimension of the same God-related life, that is, of human life hidden in God's absolute and gratuitous presence.[89]

It is difficult to say. However, in the same place, Schillebeeckx manifests the influence of de Lubac in his opposition to the "dualism" of the past:[90]

> In the past, a dualistic anthropological conception misled Christians into considering grace and redemption as a matter for God and

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[87] Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P., "The Church and Mankind," in Concilium, Vol. I: The Church and Mankind, ed. Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P. (Glen Rock, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1965), p. 93.

[88] See infra, Chapter II, p. 81.

[89] Schillebeeckx, op. cit., p. 85.

[90] Cf. infra, p. 141.

> the soul of man to deal with, so much so that the whole range of earthly life and of human responsibility for the terrestrial future of mankind seemed to be relegated to the fringe of Christianity. . . .[91]

Another outgrowth of de Lubac's view of the unity of the Church and mankind, as well as his views on missiology[92] is the notion that the Church is not the "ordinary" way of salvation so much as it is "the extraordinary way" because the "majority of mankind does not come to salvation inside the Church."[93] The call to fully realize one's anonymous Christianity in the Church is still in force but there is no longer the literal or "quantitative" mentality in approaching the non-Christian. Hence, it is not enough for the Gospel to be preached to a man for him to be considered "bound" to believe or culpable for not believing. The entire incarnational dimension of our preaching and the subjective condition of the listener must be taken fully into account. The missionary is not dealing with pure spirits but with men of flesh and blood, passions and prejudices.[94]

The Church

When de Lubac's The Splendour of the Church first appeared, it came as a revelation to many. It was not the first attempt to break away from the manual theology of the past but it brought a breadth of view, a patristic richness, a feeling for the modern situation and a sense of the whole living Church which was unique. Its lyrical prose exuded life and warmth and the love of a living thing. Most important, it helped to set the present direction of contemporary ecclesiology.

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[91] Schillebeeckx, loc. cit., p. 86.

[92] See infra, Chapter III. Cf. Henri de Lubac, S.J., Le fondement théologie des missions (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1946), p. 36.

[93] Boniface Willems, O.P., "Who Belongs to the Church?" in Concilium, Vol. I, 148.

[94] Cf. "Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church" in The Documents of Vatican II, esp. pp. 595-596.

Before all else, de Lubac saw the Church as a mystery; in fact, "the meeting-place of mysteries,"[95] for it contains the mystery of Christ and at the same time, the mystery of humanity. The heart of this mystery is the Eucharist which is produced by the Church and yet itself produces the Church.[96] There is also something uniquely mysterious about the solidarity of those who share its life:

> There is a brotherhood of common responses; they answer the same appeal and enjoy the same communion in the same love; it is as if one and the same blood flowed in their veins. They are children of the same Church and have all had from her the inheritance of the same Christ; fed by the same faith, they are "given to drink by the same Spirit". . . .[97]

Created before all things, she lives in time and will live in eternity. "This Holy Jerusalem is mysteriously and 'in hope', the Heavenly Jerusalem; our earthly Mother."[98]

He also saw the Church as a "*complexio oppositorum*":[99] she is the Church which sanctifies and the Church sanctified; hierarchy and faithful; the "*convocatio*" but also the "*congregatio*"; our mother and our brotherhood at the same time. However, there is no question of:

> . . . two sections or groups. The thing in question is the Church herself, and her mysterious reality always transcends all those who belong to her and gather to her from all over the earth.[100]

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[95] Henri de Lubac, S.J., *The Splendour of the Church*, trans. by Michael Mason (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 4. Cf. "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church," in *The Documents of Vatican II*, Chapter I. Cf. also, Yves Congar, O.P., *The Mystery of the Church*, trans. by A.V. Littledale (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1960).

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

[99] *Ibid.*, *passim* pp. 69-86.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

While de Lubac anticipated the Second Vatican Council in his emphasis on the mystery of the Church, he also foresaw the ecumenical honesty which would admit the humanity and sinfulness of the Church as well. When the Decree on Ecumenism stated that "Christ summons the Church, as she goes on her pilgrim way, to that continual reformation of which she always has need",[101] it was expressing that human weakness and sinfulness of the Church which de Lubac had urged us to accept some years previously. He had said that we should not be embarrassed that the Church lives in the real world of men with all of their struggles and passions, for as Renan once said: "There is no immaculate history."[102] We must never be surprised at its sinfulness nor impatient with its weakness. We must not succumb to the temptation to spiritualize the Church, to throw her off "as a burdensome yoke or set her aside as a cumbersome intermediary" for then we will end by worshipping a void."[103] It is in this historical, fleshly, sinful, human Church that we find Christ and there is no other way. For, as Augustine says, "to live by the Spirit of Christ, one must remain in His body."[104] Again, this human Church is the sacrament of Christ or she is nothing:

> If Christ is not her wealth, the Church is certainly destitute; if the spirit of Christ does not flourish in her, she is certainly sterile. If Christ is not her Architect, and His spirit is not the mortar which binds together the living stone of which she is built, then her building is indeed fallen into ruin. If she does not reflect the unique beauty of the face of Christ, the Church is

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[101] "Decree on Ecumenism" in The Documents of Vatican II, p. 350.

[102] Cited in de Lubac, The Splendour of the Church, p. 123.

[103] Ibid., p. 149.

[104] Cited in ibid., 155.

> without beauty. . . . All her teaching is a lie, if she does not announce the Truth which is Christ; all her glory is vanity if she does not find it in the humility of Christ. . . . If she is not the sacrament, the effective sign of Christ, then she is nothing.[105]

If the Church, however, is to be the sacrament of Christ in the most effective way possible, then "she should be through us what she is for us."[106]

Finally, de Lubac encouraged the acceptance of the modern world by the Church:

> We should, then, have no inhibitions about feeling a profound sympathy with the men who surround us. We should be fully human. . . . We ought not to get our loyalty to the eternal mixed up with an attachment to the past which is mischievous and even morbid.[107]

But while we make every effort to adapt Christianity to our present age, we must not:

> . . . de-divinize it or lower it, make it insipid or twist it out of shape. We should have a great love for our age, but make no concessions to the spirit of the age, so that in us the Christian mystery may never lose its sap.[108]

In sum, when speaking of the Church, de Lubac always begins and ends with mystery and paradox,[109] for he sees the Church as both man and grace, immanence and transcendence, human and divine.

De Lubac and the Future of the Theology

The prophetic is a dimension of the theological enterprise.

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[105] *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161. Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., *Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God*, trans. by Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963). Cf. also, Otto Semmelroth, S.J., *Church and Sacrament*, trans. by Emily Schossberger (Dublin: Logos Books, Gill and Son, 1965).

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[107] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

[108] *Ibid.*, pp. 221-222.

[109] See Henri de Lubac, S.J., "Meditation on the Church," in *Vatican II an Interfaith Appraisal*, Ed. by John H. Miller, C.S.C. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 258.

Properly exercised, it can inspire a vital theology. For, if the theologian asks, at the living center of faith, the questions which men are asking outside of it, then theology should be living and relevant to men. A living theology is one that changes and grows because the prophetic dimension of theology is being realized. These changes should take place not only in various areas of theological concern, such as grace, apologetics or ecclesiology, but in the very conception of the theological enterprise. It would seem that this is true in the case of de Lubac that while he has acted as catalyst or prophet in a number of areas of theology, he has at the same time anticipated and helped to form theological approaches of the present and the future.

Revelation and Development of Doctrine

The root from which theology grows, the spring to which it always returns for its refreshment is revelation. This revelation, God's self-disclosure, is "at once history and mystery."[110] But until recent years, theological growth has been hampered by a propositional notion of revelation which seemed to leave little room for its historical context and mysterious depths. Revelation was conceived of as God intervening with a given number of truths, which truths were contained in "the deposit of revelation" and awaited the assent of men. Rahner says that this was a form of "extrinsecism" in the average theology of the day which failed to see "the intrinsic connection between the grace of faith and historical revelation."[111] In addition, this view of revelation was overly rationalist and abstract, for man, more than a "mind assenting to truths", is a mysterious unity responding to the mysterious self-disclosures of God himself.

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[110] Walter J. Burghardt, S.J., "Vatican II and Catholic Theology in America," Vatican II an Interfaith Appraisal, p. 627.

[111] Karl Rahner and Joseph Ratzinger, Revelation and Tradition (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), p. 10.

Closely connected with revelation is the question of doctrinal development. If revelation is conceived exclusively in terms of abstract propositions then the development of doctrine will be explained as a merely logical process; and "new" doctrines considered as a logical unfolding of the original deposit of revelation. The implication for the nature and exercise of theology is fairly clear for if revelation and doctrinal development are viewed from an exclusively abstract and static fashion, then theology will be treated no differently. Accordingly, the renewal of theology depends to a certain extent, on the renewal of the ideas of revelation and doctrinal development.

Without any doubt, de Lubac was one of the earliest theologians of the twentieth century to see the direction that theology was taking in these areas.[112] As early as 1948, de Lubac attacked the repeated efforts to reduce the fact of theological development to theological conclusions and human logic. He argued that "Christianity is not necessarily a religion of syllogisms."[113] He contended that those who say that our knowledge of Catholic dogma develops but that dogma "*en soi*" remains unchanged are making a merely verbal distinction. As Marin-Sola pointed out: there are new objective aspects "and so development cannot be merely subjective."[114]

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[112] This is not to say that de Lubac was the first with these ideas. Moehler and Newman had theories of doctrinal development in the nineteenth century. Owen Chadwick says that Newman made a genuine theory of doctrinal development possible because he was the first to conceive of history as a dynamic process. (See Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 130-138. Newman also understood that intuition is a key factor in any theory of doctrinal development. (See J.H. Walgrave, Newman the Theologian, trans. by A.V. Littledale (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), p. 104.

[113] Henri de Lubac, S.J., "Le probleme du developpement du dogme," RSR, XXXV (1948), 131.

De Lubac maintained that the only starting point for a valid theory of development of doctrine, truly rooted in tradition is -- the mystery of Christ.

> For everything is revealed to us in Jesus Christ. That is, everything which, at first undivided, forms the *global Object*, the unbelievably rich object of revelation . . . under the form of action and under the form of revelation, as reality and object of faith, this unique and total Reality bears in Scripture and in Christian tradition one name: *mystery*.[115]

In its substance, dogma is not so much a teaching as a person. Thus, paradoxically, "it is not the implicit that is contained in the explicit" but, at its beginning, "the explicit which is contained in the implicit."[116]

It was made very clear by de Lubac that he was not proposing a theory of doctrinal development but a necessary point of departure.[117] Nevertheless, his position anticipated and helped to stimulate the present trend in this area. Thus, his starting-point has been adopted and developed excellently by Rahner:

> In the first place it may be supposed that the *Apostles* themselves had a *global experience* (italics added) of this kind, lying behind propositions and forming an inexhaustible source for the articulation and explication of the faith in propositions. Christ, as the living link between God and the world, whom they have seen

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[114] Cited in *ibid*., p. 151.

[115] *Ibid*., p. 156.

[116] *Ibid*., p. 158.

[117] *Ibid*.

> with their eyes and touched with their hands, is the objective content of an experience which is more elemental and concentrated, simpler and yet richer than the individual propositions coined in an attempt to express this experience -- an attempt which can in principle never be finally successful.[118]

The spirit of de Lubac's view can be detected also in the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. It says that "through divine revelation, God chose to show forth and communicate Himself."[117] It sees Christ as the center and plenitude of God's self-disclosure:

> By this revelation then, the deepest truth about God and the salvation of man is made clear to us in Christ, who is the Mediator and at the same time the fullness of all revelation.[120] (italics added)

And again:

> For this reason Jesus perfected revelation by fulfilling it through His whole work of making Himself present and manifesting Himself.[121] (italics added)

Finally, man's acceptance of this revelation in faith is a free response of the whole man, and in his living unity:

> "The obedience of faith" must be given to God who reveals, an obedience by which man entrusts his whole self freely to God. . . . .[122] (italics added)

In effect, the Constitution tells us that revelation and therefore theology is too mysterious, complex and existential to be completely captured in abstract formulas and propositions, however important these may be. And these are the things which de Lubac had been saying.

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[118] Karl Rahner, S.J., "The Development of Dogma," Theological Investigations, Vol. I, p. 65. See also, Gabriel Moran, F.S.C., Theology of Revelation (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), esp. Chapter IV "The Apostolic Sharing in Christ's Consciousness."

[119] "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," in The Documents of Vatican II, p. 114.

[120] Ibid., p. 112.

[121] Ibid., p. 113.

[122] Ibid.

Historical Consciousness

Historical theology has generally been lacking in a sense of the prophetical dimension. It has not asked of the past what it could offer to help shape the future of theology. Rahner is particularly critical of historical theology in this regard:

> On the one hand, *it has not approached the past with a real question,* one which is still open to the test of the facts. On the other *it has not interrogated the past closely enough to hear it with all the overtones with which it once resounded,* overtones which at that time were not perhaps the explicit formulations of a scientific theology, *but rather the echoes of preaching, faith and Christian life*. Yet utterances of this kind could very well be more important for us today than many other truths. . . .[123] (italics added)

He maintains, further, that historians of theology must be more than chroniclers of facts and formulas. "They must look at reality itself with the very eyes of the theologians of the past"[124] in order to perceive the spirit and thinking underlying the formulas of history. Rahner, however, sees some outstanding exceptions to the general unrelatedness of historical theologians. He makes special mention of de Lubac as one of these exceptions and implies that the prophetical is the reason why:

> What is it that makes the properly historical in studies like those of de Lubac or de la Taille so stimulating and to the point? Surely it is the art of reading texts in such a way that they . . . *say something to us which we in our time have not considered at all or*

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[123] Karl Rahner, S.J., "The Prospects for Dogmatic Theology," *Theological Investigations*, Vol. I, p. 8.

[124] *Ibid*.

not closely enough, about reality itself.[125] (italics added)

What Rahner is saying of de Lubac (and of a handful of theologians like him) is that by the exercise of the prophetical dimension of theology, de Lubac has helped to show that historical theology must be more than a sterile historicism. In fact, Rahner says, "it must look backward in order to go forward to a new future of theology and proclamation."[126] It is difficult to think of any single historical study which has done more to fulfill Rahner's demand, than de Lubac's Surnaturel.

Everything that has been said concerning the task of the historical theologian, generally applies to the patristic theologian as well. It is here also, in the field of patrology, that de Lubac's creative spirit shows forth. Once again, he has perceived the spirit of the Fathers and their relevance for the modern world. He was one of the earliest to see that the anthropology of tradition is concrete and existential and therefore in harmony with the anthropological needs of modern theology. If the current patristic revival eventually lends emphasis to the existential aspect of future theology,[127] then it would provide one more instance in which de Lubac had brought the past into dialogue with the future.

Conclusion

A prophet is one who asks in the presence of God, the questions of man. If he asks the right questions, then new insight and new understanding is possible. Thus, de Lubac is truly "prophetic" in the theological sense, for he has asked the right questions at a time when few were asking them and these questions have resulted in new insights for theology. No more than Augustine is he the architect of a highly developed system, nor is he the founder of a theological school. He is simply a prophet who has suffered, like the prophets of old, for his courage in pointing out the right direction --the future. Above all, he has seen man--man as mystery and unity. He has seen the mysterious harmony of flesh and spirit; man and God; man and grace, creation and redemption; the Church and mankind. At times, the vision has been flickering, at times, the direction unsure; more often, the vision and the direction have been steady and sure. Always, however, de Lubac's prophetic thrust has bespoken a unity of the creative center of man and the living center of faith, because in de Lubac the two have been united.

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[125] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[126] Karl Rahner, S.J., "The Task of Theology after the Council," in Vatican II an Interfaith Appraisal, p. 59.

[127] See P. De Letter, "Influence of Greek Philosophy on Theology," NCE, (1966) XIV, 60. "Its [patristic theology] revival may lead to an existential rather than essential, a more real rather than speculative approach to the history of salvation."

APPENDIX

LETTER OF HENRI DE LUBAC TO THE WRITER

Lyon, le 5 mars 1967

Cher Monsieur l'abbé,

Voilà une lettre impressionnante ! En réalité je n'ai pas d'anthropologie personnelle, vraiment systématisée. J'ai seulement cherché à me faire l'écho, aussi fidèle que possible, de la tradition catholique, comprise non comme chose du passé, à étudier du dehors, mais comme une force vivante, et dont nous avons à vivre aujourd'hui même. Cela, je l'ai fait, un peu au hasard des circonstances, d'après les occasions variées fournies par l'enseignement et les ministères qui m'ont été demandés.

Le détail de mon existence n'a pas grand intérêt. La plus grande partie de ma vie s'est passée à Lyon, où j'enseignais théologie fondamentale et histoire des religions à la Faculté de Théologie. J'ai interrompu cet enseignement en 1950, pour le reprendre qques années après. Maintenant, je ne m'occupe plus que de diriger quelques thèses de doctorat. Les petites choses écrites par moi qui vous manquent n'ont pas grande importance. A la liste des livres, vous pouvez ajouter :

- L'Écriture dans la Tradition (Paris, Aubier, 1966)

  (mais ce sont des extraits de mes livres « Histoire et Esprit » et « Exégèse médiévale »).

- Images de l'abbé Monchanin (Paris, Aubier, 1967. 13, Quai de Conti, Paris, VIe)

  (vous y trouverez divers détails, notamment sur l'histoire des religions.)

- (A paraître en 1967 :) Paradoxe et mystère de l'Église (Paris, Aubier).

Ci-joint, les réponses à votre questionnaire.

Votre dévoué Henri de Lubac.

P.S. Hélas, non, je ne serai pas aux USA en juin ou juillet; mais seulement à Toronto (et peut-être New-York?) à la fin d'août.

1. J'ai connu personnellement Blondel et Maréchal, mais non Rousselot. La 1ère influence des trois fut celle de Rousselot (ma 1ère lecture approfondie en philosophie : "L'intellectualisme de S. Thomas". J'ai lu, en 1921-1922, tous ses inédits). C'est surtout par le P. Auguste Valensin que j'ai connu Blondel. Mais c'est par le Père Joseph Huby que j'ai été conduit à étudier l'idée de surnaturel dans S. Thomas.

2. Si je fais une grande place à la défense de S. Augustin, c'est parce qu'il s'agissait pour moi de le désolidariser de la théologie de Baius et de Jansénius, en montrant que ce n'est pas leur rejet d'une éventuelle "pura natura" qui est à la racine de leurs erreurs.

3. J'ai été fait, malgré moi, professeur d'histoire des religions, à partir de 1930. Pendant plusieurs années, j'ai traité du Bouddhisme. En 1950 ss., j'ai eu quelques loisirs, qui m'ont permis de tirer trois ouvrages de mes notes de cours sur le Bouddhisme. Voyez quelques détails dans "Images de l'abbé Monchanin". — Je n'ai pas mis de lien entre marxisme et Bouddhisme.

Lyon, March 5, 1967

Dear Father:

Your letter was impressive. I really do not have an anthropology of my own which is truly systematized. I have only sought to be as faithful an echo as possible of Catholic tradition, understood not as something of the past as studied from the outside, but as a living force, and one which we have to live today. This I have done according to the circumstances, and according to the various occasions furnished by teaching and the (duties) which have been asked of me.

The details of my life are of no great interest. The greater part of my life I have spent at Lyon where I was teaching fundamental theology and history of religions at the faculty of theology. I interrupted this teaching in 1950 to take it up again a few years later. Now I occupy myself only by directing some doctoral theses. The small things written by me which you do not have, are of no great importance. To the list of books you can add:

L'Ecriture dans le tration (Paris: Aubier, 1966).
(Extracts from Histoire et Esprit and Exégese Médievale)

Images de l'abbé Monchanin (Paris: Aubier, 1967).
(various matters can be found here, especially concerning the history of religions).

(to appear in 1967:) Paradoxe et mystere de l'Eglise (Paris: Aubier).

Attached are the replies to your questionnaire.

Henri de Lubac, S.J.

P.S. Unfortunately, I will not be going to the U.S.A. in June or July;

but I will be in Toronto (and perhaps New York) at the end of August.

1. I have personally known Blondel and Maréchal, but not Rousselot. The chief influence of the three was Rousselot (my first profound reading in philosophy: L'Intellectualisme de s. Thomas. I read all of his unpublished works in 1921-1922). It was through Auguste Valensin that I first met Blondel. But it was through Joseph Huby that I was led to study the idea of the supernatural in St. Thomas.

2. If I have given great place to the defense of S. Augustine it is because I wanted to dissociate him from the theology of Baius and Jansenius by showing that their negation of a certain pura natura is not the heart of their error.

3. I was appointed, not by my own choice, professor of the history of religious in 1930. Nevertheless, for many years, I have dealt with Buddhism. In 1950 I had the leisure to publish three works from my course notes on Buddhism. For details see Images de l'abbe Monchanin. I have not placed any link between Marxism and Buddhism.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A	Angelicum
ACPA	American Catholic Philosophical Association
CTSA	Catholic Theological Society of America
DR	Denzinger-Rahner, Enchiridion Symbolorum (1954)
DS	Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum
DuR	Dublin Review
G	Gregorianum
IPQ	International Philosophical Quarterly
JPA	Jesuit Philosophical Association
MSR	Mélanges de science religieuse
NRT	Nouvelle Revue Théologique
NCE	New Catholic Encyclopedia
NS	New Scholasticism
PT	Philosophy Today
RSPT	Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques
RSR	Recherches de science religieuse
SE	Sciences ecclesiastiques
TS	Theological Studies
VSS	La Vie spirituelle: supplément
ZTK	Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche

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